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In this dissertation, several novel defense methodologies for cyber-physical 
systems have been proposed. First, a special type of cyber-physical system, the RFID 
system, is considered for which a lightweight mutual authentication and ownership 
management protocol is proposed in order to protect the data confidentiality and integrity. 
Then considering the fact that the protection of the data confidentiality and integrity is 
insufficient to guarantee the security in cyber-physical systems, we turn to the development 
of a general framework for developing security schemes for cyber-physical systems 
wherein the cyber system states affect the physical system and vice versa. After that, we 
apply this general framework by selecting the traffic flow as the cyber system state and a 
novel attack detection scheme that is capable of capturing the abnormality in the traffic 
flow in those communication links due to a class of attacks has been proposed. On the other 
hand, an attack detection scheme that is capable of detecting both sensor and actuator 
attacks is proposed for the physical system in the presence of network induced delays and 
packet losses. Next, an attack detection scheme is proposed when the network parameters 
are unknown by using an optimal Q-learning approach. Finally, this attack detection and 
accommodation scheme has been further extended to the case where the network is 
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In the past a few decades, technology, science, and engineering has significantly 
redefined the physical world. For example, with the new communication system such as 
the internet and wireless networking, we are able to interact with objects and people from 
almost anywhere on earth. The state-of-the-art transportation system allows us to travel to 
the destination within unimaginably short time. Most recently, a new class of system, 
named as cyber-physical system (CPS), has shown great potential of further rendering us 
capabilities to experience the physical world in a more secure, economical and comfortable 
fashion. 
The CPSs are engineered systems that are constructed as networked interactions of 
physical and computational cyber components [1]. Applications of CPS are found in areas 
as diverse as automobiles, air transportation, civil infrastructure, power grid, embedded 
medical devices, and consumer appliances.  A CPS is a highly collaborative computer 
system because the embedded devices monitor and control the physical processes through 
a networked feedback loop. A major difference between a CPS and a regular control system 
is the employment of communications, which adds re-configurability and scalability as 
well as complexity and potential insecurity. Moreover, CPS has significantly more 
intelligence in sensors and actuators as well as substantially stricter performance 
constraints [2].  
  
2 
Since a CPS is highly complex, spanning multiple scientific and technological 
domains, they thus pose several fundamental challenges, which have been summarized in 
[3] and presented in Figure 1.1. Six major challenges in CPS have been considered: 
dependability, sustainability, reliability, predictability, interoperability, and security. To be 
specific, dependability refers to the property of a system to perform without significant 
degradation in its performance whereas sustainability means the ability of renewing the 
system’s resources and using them efficiently. Reliability refers to the degree of correctness 
which a system provides to perform its function while predictability refers to the degree of 
foreseeing of a system’s behavior. On the other hand, interoperability refers to the ability 
of the systems to work together, exchange information and use this information to provide 
specified services. Finally, security in CPS, which is the main scope of this dissertation, 
refers to the property of a system to control access to the system resources and protect 















 Incorporating operating components
 Scaling in size and throughput
 Combining different components




 Correct and trusted info
 Secret info, privacy
 Denial of Service issue





 Operating as before
 Not causing harm











 Able to keep operating






 Well use of resources
 
Figure 1.1. Challenges in cyber-physical systems [3]. 
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The concern of security in CPS stems from the presence of a hierarchy of 
communication networks that collects information for sensing, exploring, processing and 
aggregating [4]. On one hand, those communication networks are often distributed over 
wide geographic area and thus exposed to a variety of adversaries. On the other hand, many 
components in CPS such as RFID sensors are low-cost embedded devices. As a result, the 
resources including the power budget, computational and transmission abilities are quite 
limited.  
Therefore, the defense methodology for CPS is critical and necessary. As shown in 
Figure 1.2, in order to guarantee the security of CPS, the defense system is required to 
possess the following three capabilities: protection of information security, detection of 
cyber states abnormalities, and detection of physical states abnormalities. 
 
 





 Detection of cyber states abnormalities
-- Methodology: explore the behavior of attackers   formulate 
    cyber changes under attacks  present defense strategies
-- Tools: Markov decision process & game-theoretic approach   
 Detection of physical states abnormalities
-- Methodology: characterizing dynamics of the physical system under 
    attacks  apply classic control theory to bring states back to normal
-- Tools: state-space analysis & observer-based attack detection
 Protection of information security
-- Methodology: protect data confidentiality and integrity
-- Tools: encryption & authorization algorithms
Figure 1.2. Requirements of defense methodologies for CPS. 
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The first requirement of the defense methodology is the ability to protect data 
confidentiality and integrity in the communication networks. The majority of the efforts 
are devoted to the development of light-weight encryption and authorization algorithms, 
which has been summarized in [5][6]. In particular, although RFID systems has been 
widely used in CPS due to their low cost and battery-free feature, the concern of disclosing 
the data and location privacy has not been completely addressed. The main challenge is 
that the computation capability of the RFID tags is too limited to implement complicated 
encryption algorithms and communication protocols. Due to the shared nature of wireless 
channels between the RFID tags and readers, various attacks can be launched by 
unauthorized users to either collect information about the tagged items or create a 
disruption of the system operation. Therefore, it is necessary for the readers and tags to 
authenticate each other before any data exchange. A comprehensive survey that examines 
several aspects related to RFID security has been presented in [7]. 
It is important to note that unlike the traditional information technology systems, 
the protection of data confidentiality and integrity alone is far from enough for CPS 
because certain attacks, especially those targeting at the availability of data, do not require 
knowledge of the cryptographic mechanisms.  For example, the wormhole attacker attracts 
data traffic by establishing a link between two geographically distant regions of the 
network and then delays or drops the attracted data [8]. The jamming attacks over wireless 
networks may severely degrade the performance in terms of message delay and data 
throughput by broadcasting radio interferences [9]. The replay attacker maliciously repeats 
the messages delivered from the operator to the actuator and causes communication 
unreliability, which has been successfully used by the virus attack of Stuxnet [10][11]. This 
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explains the necessity for the defense methodology to meet the second requirement 
introduced in Figure 1.2.  
The second requirement of the defense methodology is the ability to detect the 
cyber state abnormalities. In order to meet this, the defender needs to explore the behavior 
of the attackers, formulate the cyber changes under attacks, and present an appropriate 
strategy to bring the cyber system back to normal. For instance, the effort in [12] introduces 
the DoS flooding attacks by a continuous-time Markov chain and utilizes the state space 
method to compute security measures accurately. Different from [12], the authors in [13] 
study the cyber defense by modeling the actions of the attacker and the defender as a 
stochastic zero-sum game. In [14], the measure of vulnerabilities in cyber-physical systems 
with application to power systems is defined and a security framework including anomaly 
detection and mitigation strategies is provided. The authors in [15] evaluate the cyber 
security by computing the expected probabilities of the attacker and using the probabilities 
to build a transition model through game-theoretic approach. In [15], the cyber 
vulnerability is evaluated dynamically by using hidden Markov model and by providing a 
mechanism for handling sensor data with different trustworthiness. 
In particular, selecting the network traffic flow as the cyber states provides a 
feasible to way to deal with the previously mentioned cyber-attacks [8-11] since it is 
observed that these attacks tend to deviate the amount of traffic flow from the normal value. 
Flow control has been studied in the literature [16-18]. For example, the authors in [16] 
model the high-speed network as fluid-flow queues with a fixed propagation delay for each 
channel. In [17], a receiver-based flow control scheme is proposed that achieves the given 
optimal utility. The authors in [18] propose a new utility max-min flow control framework 
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using classic sliding mode control. However, to the best of our knowledge, minimal effort 
has been spent on studying the flow control from the perspective of network security when 
the network is attacked by injecting or dropping traffic flow.  
The third requirement of the defense methodology is the ability to detect the state 
abnormalities of the physical system. This can be done through characterizing the dynamics 
of the physical system under attacks by extending the classical state-space description. For 
instance, in [20], the system dynamics include an extra term to model the deception attack. 
In [21], the system state under attack is represented with an additive term which in turn is 
used to simulate the false data injection attack. The authors in [22] characterize the 
deception attacks using a set of objectives and propose policies to synthesize stealthy 
deception attacks. In [23], the estimation and control of linear systems when sensors or 
actuators are corrupted by an attacker is provided, together with a secure local control loop 
that can improve the resilience of the system.  
However, there are many weaknesses in the reported work [12-15][20-23]. First of 
all, these approaches only focus on either the cyber system or the physical system and fail 
to take the interactions between the cyber defense policy and the system controller 
performance into consideration. Second, the representations [8-11] can only describe a 
single type of attack due to the fact that attacks affect the system dynamics in a variety of 
ways. Last but not least, it is difficult to implement the representation developed in the 
literature so far since the system dynamics under attacks are considered known. For 
instance, the physical system dynamics becomes uncertain due to random delays and 
packet losses caused by certain cyber-attacks [24].  
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To conclude, in order to guarantee the security of CPS, the defense methodology is 
required to be capable of protecting the information security and detecting cyber state 
abnormalities as well as the physical state vector abnormalities. Such a comprehensive 
defense framework, which is lacking in the existing literature to the best of our knowledge, 
is the main objective of this dissertation. 
1.2. ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION 
In this dissertation, a comprehensive defense framework and several novel defense 
methodologies for CPS has been proposed. This dissertation is presented in five papers, 
and their relationship to one another is illustrated in Figure 1.3. The common theme in 
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In the first paper, the objective is to protect data confidentiality and integrity for a 
particular cyber-physical system – mainly in RFID systems. To this end, a lightweight 
mutual authentication and ownership management protocol is proposed. The protocol is 
compliant with the latest EPC Gen2v2 standard. The protocol is designed to fit within the 
computational abilities of the tag as well as the scarce energy resources. The details of the 
protocol are given along with formal security proof of its correctness. Further, the protocol 
is implemented on EPC compliant tags and is shown to add minimal overhead to the 
standard message exchanges. 
Next, since the protection of the data confidentiality and integrity is insufficient to 
guarantee the security in CPS, in the second paper, we propose a novel representation for 
developing security schemes wherein the cyber system states affect the physical system 
and vice versa. Subsequently by using this representation, an optimal strategy via Q-
learning is derived for the cyber defense in the presence of an attack. Since the cyber system 
under attack will affect the physical system stability and performance, an optimal controller 
by using Q-learning is considered for the physical system with uncertain dynamics. As an 
example, cyber-attacks that increase the network delay and packet losses are considered 
and the goal of the proposed cyber defense and optimal controller is to thwart the attack 
and mitigate the performance degradation of the physical system due to increased delays 
and packet losses.  
In the third paper, we further apply the framework proposed in the second paper by 
selecting the traffic flow as the cyber system states. To be specific, we first propose a novel 
attack detection scheme that is capable of capturing the abnormal traffic flow in the 
communication links due to a class of attacks. Further, it is shown that the stability of the 
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physical system can be affected by the condition of the network due to delays and packet 
losses induced by the attacks. An observer-based detection scheme is developed both for 
the network and physical system. Attacks on the networks as well as on the physical system 
can be detected and upon detection, the physical system can be stabilized by adjusting the 
controller gains. Several attacks are considered in the simulation to show the applicability 
of the proposed scheme. 
Subsequently, in the fourth paper, the work in the third paper is extended to the case 
where the CPS dynamics becomes unknown due to the unknown network parameters. 
Accordingly, an adaptive observer is proposed to estimate the unknown system dynamics 
and an optimal Q-learning based controller is developed to stabilize the flow in the 
presence of disturbances. The detection residual generated by the adaptive observer is in 
turn utilized to determine the onset of an attack when it exceeds a predefined threshold. 
For the physical system, we consider a stochastic dynamic system which incorporates 
uncertain network-induced delays and packet losses in the system dynamics. The proposed 
detection scheme includes an optimal Q-learning based event-triggered controller that is 
capable of detecting attacks on both sensors and actuators. 
Finally, the last paper considers the case where the network traffic flow is modeled 
as a nonlinear system with unknown dynamics. A one-layer neural network (NN) based 
estimator is adopted in order to approximate the unknown system dynamics. Similar to 
Paper IV, the network attack detection residual generated by the adaptive observer is 
utilized to determine the onset of an attack. Upon detecting the attack, another NN-base 
approximator is introduced to estimate the attack input. For the physical system, we 
develop an attack detection scheme by using an optimal or approximate dynamic 
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programming-based event-triggered controller in the presence of network delays and 
packet losses. Moreover, attacks on the sensor or actuators of the physical system can be 
detected and further estimated with the proposed attack detection scheme. 
1.3. CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE DISSERTATION 
This dissertation provides contributions to the area of defense methodologies for 
the cyber-physical systems. The proposed uniform representation for CPS can be used in a 
variety of applications including autonomous systems. In particular, the cyber defender is 
able to make thorough decisions by selecting appropriate cyber state vector and output and 
customizing the payoff function that is of interest. Therefore, the proposed effort 
overcomes these deficiencies mentioned in Section 1.1.  
The contributions of Paper I include the development of a novel lightweight 
authentication and ownership transfer protocol for passive RFID systems. We also 
demonstrate how the proposed protocol is compliant with the EPC Gen2v2 standard. The 
protocol is analyzed by using strand space and implemented and evaluated on hardware, 
which, to the best knowledge of the authors, is the first hardware based evaluation for 
ownership transfer protocols. 
For the second paper, the main contribution is the novel and comprehensive 
representation of the CPS that captures the interrelationship between the cyber and the 
physical elements. The optimal strategies for the defender and the attacker are also 
developed based on the proposed framework. 
On the other hand, the contributions of the third paper include the design of the 
flow controller with randomly delayed measurement in the presence of attacks and the 
development of novel observer-based network attack detection and estimation scheme 
  
11 
along with detectability condition. A controller is also designed for the physical system to 
maintain the stability of the physical system which can be utilized to maintain the healthy 
condition of the communication networks in terms of the delays and packet losses using 
adversary models. 
The contributions of the fourth paper include the design of the optimal flow 
controller in the presence of disturbances and cyber-attacks, where the network parameters 
are considered unknown. A novel observer-based network attack detection and estimation 
scheme along with detectability condition is also provided. The contribution of the fourth 
paper also includes the development of sensor/actuator attack detection scheme with an 
event-triggered controller for the physical system with uncertain system dynamics. 
Finally, for the last paper, the main contributions include the development of a 
novel observer-based network attack detection and estimation scheme for nonlinear NCS 
with unknown system dynamics. It is demonstrated that the proposed scheme works in the 
presence of a class of attacks with specific adversary models. The contributions on the 
physical system include the development of an event-triggered controller in the presence 
of network-induced delays and packet losses and a sensor/actuator attack detection and 





I. EPC GEN2V2 RFID STANDARD AUTHENTICATION AND OWNERSHIP 
MANAGEMENT PROTOCOL 
Haifeng Niu, Eyad Taqieddin, and S. Jagannathan 
Providing security in passive RFID systems has gained significant attention due to 
their widespread use.  Research has focused on providing both location and data privacy 
through mutual authentication between the readers and tags. In such systems, each party is 
responsible of verifying the identity of the other party with whom it is communicating.  For 
such a task to succeed, the tags and readers are initialized with shared secret information 
which is updated after a successful authentication session. Ownership management, which 
includes transfer and delegation, builds upon mutual authentication.  Here, the use of 
security in RFID is extended to encompass the more practical case where a tagged item is 
shifted from one owner to another. As such, we propose a new authentication and 
ownership management protocol that is compliant with the EPC Class-1 Generation-2 
Version 2 standard. The protocol is formally analyzed and successfully implemented on 
hardware. The implementation shows that the use of such protocol adds security with little 





Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) systems are deployed in numerous 
automated asset management applications.  Examples of such applications include 
libraries, warehouses, and border control to name a few. In a RFID system, the 
identification information of the tracked objects is stored in a nonvolatile memory on 
passive tags.  These tags are queried by readers which transmit an RF signal to energize 
the tags so as to get the backscattered information. The readers are connected to backend 
servers which store and process the data. 
An important aspect to be considered in RFID systems is the data and location 
privacy. Given that the communication between the tags and readers is wireless, various 
attacks may be launched by an unauthorized user to either collect information about the 
tagged items or cause a disruption of the system operation. As a result, the communicating 
parties, a tag and a reader, must authenticate each other before any data exchange. 
Moreover, the data should be concealed from unauthorized access through encryption. As 
such, both the reader and the tag need to share secret information. 
Besides authentication, ownership management (i.e.; transfer or delegation) (OT) 
is also an important aspect of RFID security as most tagged items will change owners at 
least once during their lifetime. For example, the ownership of the tagged item is 
transferred from the manufacture to the retailer, and then to the customer. Special attention 
to the security must be paid because this process is relatively vulnerable to attacks due to 
the exchange of secret keys or passwords. Further, it is desired that the ownership 
management protocol would protect the privacy of the new owner from tracking by the 
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previous owner(s) and to guarantee that the new owner will not be able to retrieve the 
previous secret keys used by the old owner. 
To add security features to the passive tags, the EPC Class-1 Generation-2 standard 
(EPC Gen2v1) [1] introduces the access and kill password. The access password is used 
whenever the reader wishes to read/write data in a tag’s memory. On the other hand, the 
kill password along with the kill command is issued to stop the tag from responding to any 
subsequent queries. These basic security mechanisms are easily defeated because the 
passwords are XORed with a random number that is sent in plaintext, which can easily be 
retrieved. 
Recently, the EPC Class-1 Generation-2 standard version 2 (EPC Gen2v2) [2], has 
been ratified.  Backward-compatible with the old version, the new one provides a series of 
features intended to improve security of the tag by allowing the manufacturers to customize 
the cryptographic authentication methods to verify identity and provenance, as well as 
avoid unauthorized access. Similar to the previous standard, EPC Gen2v2 supports the use 
of a pseudo random number generator (PRNG), a cyclic redundancy check (CRC) function, 
and XOR operation. 
A security protocol is usually considered as “EPC compliant” if it solely uses one 
or more of these functions. However, these functions by themselves are not cryptographic 
functions. Other measures should be taken to provide an acceptable level of security 
considering their computational capabilities since there are only 500 – 5000 gate elements 
on the tag, of which 200 – 2000 can be used for security-related functions [3]. The 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), for example, requires about 3000 gate elements to 
be implemented. Hash functions like MD5 and SHA-256 require even more gate elements, 
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8000 – 10000 [4]. Therefore, securing information among RFID devices is a major 
challenge due to the limited storage and computational capabilities on the passive tags. 
1.1. RELATED WORK   
A comprehensive survey [5] examines several aspects related to RFID security. 
Mainly, the importance of mutual authentication and secret information sharing is 
emphasized. In [6], a classification of RFID authentication protocols, based on the 
cryptographic/logical functions, is presented. These protocols range from full-fledged 
protocols in which symmetric, asymmetric, and hash functions are supported [7]-[12] to 
the least computationally demanding class called the ultra-lightweight, where basic bitwise 
logical and shift operations  are employed [13]-[16].  
In [17], an EPC compliant mutual authentication protocol based on CRC exchange 
followed by update on secret information after each authentication session is proposed to 
provide privacy, anonymity, and to resist replay and denial of service (DoS) attacks. 
However, [18] and [19] indicated that [17] did not achieve its intended goals. The work of 
[18] detailed the steps to successfully impersonate a valid tag either temporarily or 
permanently and how to run a DoS attack. These attacks are shown to be practical due to 
the short length of the data units exchanged. In [19], the impersonation attack is extended 
to include the back-end database as well as the tags. The analysis shows how the location 
of the tag can be identified and tracked. 
The authors in [20] proposed a new protocol called Azumi to overcome the security 
flaws of [21] and claim that it is capable of defending against location tracking, DoS 
attacks, counterfeit reader or tag, and man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks. However, it is 
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shown that the work in [20] is vulnerable to tag impersonation and secret disclosure attacks. 
An enhanced version Azumi+ was proposed in [22] as a solution. 
Several research efforts considered the problem of ownership management. One of 
the earliest ownership transfer protocols appeared in [23]. However, the old owner privacy 
cannot be guaranteed due to the way the shared keys are updated, leading to a de-
synchronization attack. Around the same time, the authors in [24] proposed a scalable, 
delegated pseudonym protocol enabling ownership transfer. However, as pointed out in 
[25], the keys shared by several tags become a weakness that reduces security. In [26], a 
protocol based on the use of hash functions, symmetric cryptography, and the XOR 
operation is proposed. The protocol is shown to be vulnerable to tracking and DoS attacks 
by manipulating the value of the random number sent to the tag [27].  Moreover, in [28], 
an attacker can add noise to the final message exchange resulting in the tag holding 
incorrect secret information due to which any subsequent authentication would fail.  
Another protocol appeared in [29] referred to as product-flow ownership-transfer 
protocol (POP). This protocol supports querying, disabling, or updating the secret keys on 
the tag. However, this protocol does not provide privacy to the new owner because the old 
owner will still be able to access the tag by exploiting his knowledge of the shared secret 
keys. In addition, it is prone to de-synchronization attacks similar to [30], [31]. 
As for ownership delegation protocols, for example, the work in [30] assumes that 
the channel from the tag to the reader is secure and that any ownership transfer/delegation 
will be securely accomplished. This is an impractical assumption and cannot be relied 
upon. Another variant of [26] was proposed in [33] as an ownership delegation protocol. 
Delegation is possible because the message containing the new key uses the old key as a 
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variable. As such, the old owner will be able to keep track of the key updates and modify 
its keys accordingly.  
The ownership management protocols mentioned above [23]-[30], as well as in 
[32]-[35], are not EPC compliant due to the nature of the cryptographic functions used in 
computing the messages. An EPC compliant lightweight protocol is given in [36] wherein 
PRNG and XOR functions are used on the tag side. However, the protocol is sensitive to 
replay and MitM attacks. Another EPC compliant ownership transfer protocol is proposed 
in [37] where the authors add a modular division operation to the functions of the tag 
because such a function would not require a large number of gate elements. However, a 
potential attacker can disguise as an owner who can update the secret keys in the same way 
as the new owner does, thus eliminating the security. 
The other ownership transfer protocols [37]-[41] conforming to EPC standards use 
CRC as the encryption method and cannot guarantee security because of the complete 
linearity property of CRC. In fact, as analyzed in [19] and [39][42], the attacker is able to 
trace, impersonate and eventually disclose all the information stored in tags with very few 
interactions. In summary, an EPC compliant secure authentication and owner management 
protocol is yet to be developed for passive tags. 
1.2. CONTRIBUTIONS 
In this paper, a lightweight mutual authentication and ownership management 
protocol is proposed. The protocol is compliant with the EPC Gen2v2 standard. The basic 
supported operations, along with permutation, are used as basic operations to provide the 
cryptographic functionality.   
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The protocol is designed to fit within the computational abilities of the tag as well 
as the scarce energy resources. The details of the protocol are given along with formal 
security proof of its correctness.  Further, the protocol is implemented by using EPC 
compliant tags and is shown to add minimal overhead to the standard message exchanges. 
This paper is an extended version of work published in [43]. We extend our previous work 
by making the following improvements. 1) In addition to the basic ownership transfer 
scheme introduced in [43], the protocol presented in this work also supports ownership 
delegation. 2) A mathematical proof of both authentication and secrecy with strand space 
theory is provided. 3) A detailed description on how the proposed protocol is implemented 
in hardware is offered. 4) More experiments are conducted to evaluate the performance of 
the proposed protocol, such as time consumption analysis for multiple-tag ownership 
transfer and resistance evaluation to the brutal force attack. 
The main contributions of this work include: 1) the development of a novel 
lightweight authentication and ownership transfer protocol for passive RFID systems by 
taking into account both delegation and ownership transfer into consideration, 2) the 
demonstration of how the proposed protocol is compliant with the EPC Gen2v2 standard, 
3) the security analysis of the protocol by using strand space, and 4) hardware 
implementation and evaluation, which, to the best knowledge of the authors, is the first 
hardware based evaluation for ownership transfer protocols. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the detailed description 
of proposed protocol is given followed by the security analysis given in Section 3 and a 
comparison with pervious work in Section 4. The hardware implementation and evaluation 
is given in Section 5. The paper is concluded in Section 6. 
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2. PROPOSED PROTOCOL 
In addition to the limited functions supported by the EPC standard, the available 
power on the tag for various computations and transmissions needed as part of the security 
protocol implementation is an important constraint. Moreover, the limited available time 
for executing the steps for the authentication and ownership management protocol is an 
added challenge. Finally, the protocol has to be implemented in a practical setting in which 
hundreds or thousands of tags are present with several tags simultaneously performing 
exchange and this should be completed within the allowed timeslot. 
To enhance the functionality of the protocol, the ultra-lightweight permutation 
operation (Per) [16] is added to the existing functions on the tag. This operation offers 
diffusion of the bits and helps overcome any problem occurring because of the nature of 
bitwise operations. The operation is defined as follows: 
Definition 1 [16]: For two n-bit strings, X andY , in the form 
 1 2 1 2,  {0,1},  1,2,... ; ,  y {0,1},  1,2,...n i n iX x x x x i n Y y y y i n        .  
The Hamming weight ofY , ( )wt Y  , is  (0 )m m n   and 
1 2 1 2
1, 0,
m m m nk k k k k k
y y y y y y
 
           
where 
1 2 1 21 , 1m m m nk k k n k k k n             . 
Then, the permutation of X according toY , denoted as ( , )Per X Y  , is given by 
 
1 2 1 2 1
( , )
m n n m mk k k k k k k
Per X Y x x x x x x x
  




The following assumptions are made in designing the protocol: 
1) The link between the readers is secure. Also, the link between any reader and the trusted 
third party (TTP) is assumed to be secure. This is a reasonable and quite common 
assumption as the readers are built with more powerful processors which can take 
advantage of complex encryption algorithms to guarantee secure data transmission. 
2) The link between the tag and any other entity is considered insecure. 
3) The current owner and the tag share a secret key that is only known to them. 
2.1. INITIALIZATION 
The tag is initialized with the following values: 
1) K: secret key shared with both current and new owners, as well as delegates, if any. 
2) KM: master key only shared with the tag owner. A reader with KM is able to modify 
key K, but a reader with key K does not have access to KM. 
3) KTTP: key shared between the tag and the TTP. 
4) EPC: electronic product code, the static identifier of a tag. 
5) RIDi: The ID of the reader i currently owning the tag. 
6) IDS: In the protocol, index pseudonym (IDS) is exchanged instead of using the tag 
identifier (ID). The IDS is a pointer to a database entry in which the information of the 
tag is stored. Such an entry may include the identifying information and the keys related 
to that tag. We use the IDS instead of concealing the EPC in the messages, for the 
following two reasons: 1) The EPC value is constant and its use in multiple runs of the 
protocol may reveal information about the tag and its secret values. 2) Tracking the 
EPC by the old owner is possible. 
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Note that for compliance with the EPC standard, all data units in the protocol are 
96 bits long. For the convenience of implementation, these 96-bit data are broken into six 
16-bit words. For example, a 96-bit parameter A is broken into six words, denoted as
(1), (2),... ( ),... (6),A A A i A  where ( )A i is the ith 16-bit subunit. As a result, all the 
computations are executed six times in order to get the complete 96-bit data. 
The current owner is initialized with K, KM, IDS, RIDi and EPC. As mentioned 
earlier, the proposed ownership management protocol takes both delegation (details in 
Section 2.3) and complete ownership transfer (Section 2.4) into consideration. However, it 
is important to notice that before either delegation or complete ownership transfer take 
place, mutual authentication is needed to verify the authority of all parties involved.  
2.2. PHASE I: MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION 
A general scenario for an authentication session starts with the reader querying a 
tag. In response, the tag sends an index pseudonym (IDS). A sequence of exchanges 
follows such that the reader securely sends random numbers to the tag by using the shared 
key, the tag authenticates the reader and vice versa, and the keys and IDS are updated. The 
transactions that take place are shown in Figure 2.1.  
The purpose of the authentication phase is to: 1) prove the possession of shared 
secret key to each other without disclosing it; 2) pass the nonces that are used to update the 
keys. To achieve this, the reader generates two 96-bit random values (rnd1, rnd2) as the 
nonces, then computes A, B, and C in a way described in Figure 2.1. Particularly, in the 
computation of A and B, the secret key is part of the input of PRNG function so that the 
key is protected while the tag can verify the readers’ possession of the key by doing the 
same computation. Furthermore, message C is used to check if the tag has retrieved the 
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correct nonces (rnd1, rnd2) from messages A and B. It is very important to note that the 
PRNG is a nonlinear function, meaning that if an attacker flips one bit of RID2, the tag 
will get a totally different (and incorrect) rnd1. Moreover, since rnd1 is used to retrieve 
rnd2 from B, therefore rnd2 derived by the tag will be incorrect, As a result, even if the 







Generate random number rnd1, rnd2, 
calculate A, B, C:
A(i) = rnd1(i) ⊕ PRNG(K(i) ⊕RID1(i)) ⊕ 
PRNG(K(i) ⊕ RID2(i)) )
B(i) = rnd2(i) ⊕ PRNG(rnd1(i)⊕K(i))
C(i)= PRNG(rnd1(i) ⊕ RID1(i)) ⊕
      PRNG(rnd2(i) ⊕ RID2(i))
Where i=1~6.
Tag
     K, KM, EPC, RID, IDS
A, B, C
Retrieve rnd1, rnd2, calculate C’:
Generate rnd1, rnd2, calculate A, B, C:
rnd1(i) = A(i) ⊕ PRNG(K(i) ⊕RID1(i)) ⊕ 
PRNG(K(i) ⊕ RID2(i)) )
rnd2(i) = B(i) ⊕ PRNG(rnd1(i)⊕K(i))
C’(i)= PRNG(rnd1(i) ⊕ RID1(i)) ⊕
      PRNG(rnd2(i) ⊕ RID2(i))
If C = C’, update K and IDS, calculate D:
K*(i) = Per(rnd1(i), K(i)) ⊕ K( (i+1)mod 
6)
IDS*(i) = Per(rnd2(i), K(i)) ⊕ K(i)
D(i) = PRNG(K*(i) ⊕ IDS*(i)), i = 1 to 6
D
Calculate D’:
D’(i) = PRNG(K*(i) ⊕ IDS*(i))
i=1 to 6
If D = D’, tag is authorized
Secret
 
Figure 2.1. Mutual authentication and keys update [43]. 
If C equals to C’, then it is believed that the reader does have the secret key and the 
tag has retrieved rnd1 and rnd2 successfully. Then the new key and IDS are computed in a 
way specified in Figure 2.1. Similarly, we use message D to:  1) prove the tags’ possession 
of the secret key; 2) inform the reader that the tag has computed the new key and IDS.  
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Upon receiving message D, the reader will compute D’ in the same manner and 
determines whether D equals to D’ or not. If that is true, then the tag is authenticated. 
Consequently, the reader and the tag update to the new computed key and IDS for future 
uses. It should be noted, however, that both the reader and the tag should maintain a copy 
of the old key and IDS to avoid desynchronization problems (more explanation can be 
found in Section 4).  
2.3. PHASE II, CASE 1: DELEGATION 
At this point, RID1 is ready to delegate its rights over the tag to RID2. For that 
purpose, we introduce the use of the ticket. This is used by the delegate reader to prove to 
the tag that it is a valid reader and that it had received sufficient credentials from the current 
owner to allow it to access the tag. In the proposed delegation protocol, both RID1 and the 







    K, KM, EPC, RID, IDS
Ticket = KM ⊕ EPC ⊕ rnd1 ⊕ rnd2 Ticket = KM ⊕ EPC ⊕ rnd1 ⊕ rnd2
Secret Secret
 
Figure 2.2. Ticket computation on an old owner and tag. 
RID1 uses a secure link with RID2 and passes to it the EPC, IDS, K, and ticket. A 
valid ticket allows RID2 to query the tag and to run mutual authentication sessions with it.  
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Figure 2.3 shows how the delegate RID2 uses the ticket to query and update the tag. Note 





K, ticket, EPC, RID2
Generate rnd1, calculate A, B:
A(i) = rnd1(i)⊕PRNG(K(i) ⊕RID2(i)) ⊕    
       PRNG(K(i))
B(i) = PRNG(ticket(i) ⊕rnd1(i))
where i = 1~6 
Tag




Retrieve rnd1, calculate B’:
rnd1(i) = A(i)⊕PRNG(K(i) ⊕RID2(i)) ⊕    
       PRNG(K(i))
B’(i) = PRNG(ticket(i) ⊕rnd1(i))
If B = B’, update K and IDS, calculate D:
K*(i) = Per(rnd1(i), K(i)) ⊕ K( (i+1)mod 
6)
IDS*(i) = Per(rnd1(i), K(i)) ⊕ K(i)
C(i) = PRNG(K*(i) ⊕ IDS*(i)), i = 1 to 6
C
Calculate C’:
C’(i) = PRNG(K*(i) ⊕ IDS*(i)), i = 1 
to 6
If C = C’, tag is authorized
SecretSecret
 
Figure 2.3. Ownership delegation. 
In the case of delegation, RID1 may wish to restore its sole ownership of the tag. 
This means that it has to revoke the ticket such that RID2 will not pass the test of equality 
between B and B’. When that happens, no update will take place and the tag will not run 
further session with the revoked reader. The proposed approach for this is to modify the 
value of
MK such that the ticket given to RID2 will not match with the computed value. 
Note that the value of the ticket is updated with every session because the values of rnd1 
and rnd2 are changed. 
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Delegation is suitable for those cases where certain “guest readers” need to access 
the tag temporally. In other cases, however, the old owner needs to give up the ownership 
completely and transfer it to the new owner. This process is presented in the following 
section.   
2.4. PHASE II, CASE 2: COMPLETE OWNERSHIP TRANSFER 
In this case, we propose the use of a TTP to guarantee the correctness of the 
protocol. The need for the TTP arises from the fact that the old owner holds the same values 
shared between the new owner and the tag. This means that any update taking place by 
RID2 may be mirrored by RID1. This violates an important property of ownership transfer 
which is backward privacy. 
However, it is worth to note that the EPC Gen2v2 standard introduces a new 
“untraceable” command, which allows the tag to reduce its operating range for all readers. 
This function, to some degree, may give a practical solution of releasing the use of TTP by 
reducing the operating range so that only the new owner can reach the tag. As a result, the 
old owner cannot repeat the key update process and thus the backward privacy is 
guaranteed. 
In this protocol, the goal is to change the value of 
MK stored on the tag such that it 
matches that stored on RID2. After that, RID1 will have no access to the tag anymore. This 
proposed approach adds an extra functionality that we may use the reverse process in case 
we wish to satisfy the ownership repossession property.  As presented in Figure 2.4, the 




KM, KTTP, EPC, RID2
Generate rnd1, update KM, Calculate A, B
KM*(i) = PRNG(Per(KM(i), rnd1(i))), 
A(i) = rnd1(i)⊕PRNG(KTTP(i)),
B(i) = PRNG(KM (i) ⊕ rnd1(i)), i = 1~6 
Tag
      KTTP, KM, EPC,  IDS
A, B
Retrieve rnd1, calculate B’:
rnd1(i) = A(i)⊕PRNG(KTTP(i)),
B’(i) = PRNG(KM (i) ⊕ rnd1(i)), i = 1~6 
If B = B’, update KM:
KM*(i) = PRNG(Per(KM(i), rnd1(i)))
SecretSecret
New Owner




Try to Authenticate each other. OT is complete if success
 
Figure 2.4.  Complete ownership transfer [43]. 
1) TTP generates a random number 
1rnd and uses it to update MK to
*
MK . This will 
become the new master key shared between the tag and the new owner, RID2. 
2) TTP sends *
MK to RID2 using the secure channel. 
3) The challenging part for the TTP becomes to send *
MK to the tag. For that, we propose 
the use of messages A and B shown in Figure 2.4. Similar to what we have done in the 
authentication phase, the secret key is set as the input of the nonlinear PRNG function 
while the nonce is XORed with the PRNG output so that the key will not be disclosed 
and the nonce can be passed to the tag safely. Message B is used for the tag to verify 
TTP’s possession of the secret key and to check the correctness of the nonce. 
4) The tag retrieves 1rnd  from A and verifies that B is equal to B’.  
5) The value of 
1rnd is used by the tag to update 
*
MK  in a manner similar to that used by 
the TTP. 





2.5. EXAMPLE OF AUTHENTICATION AND OWNERSHIP TRANSFER 
To illustrate the operations that take place, we give a numeric example. Assume 
that the tag is initialized with the following values: 
K = 0xF702A7DE0826C3F829A1E411; 
KM = 0x5998C1D7782AB07071536E71; 
KTTP = 0xD4B087E2874D2702DE62DE89; 
RID1 = 0x8C00CACD2BD37051AE008186; 
RID2 = 0xF51EF5A0B4BF61ADA7B4B2F6. 
According the protocol, the reader generates two random numbers to be used in the 
computation of messages A, B, and C. Assuming that the random numbers are 
rnd1 = 0x18F86BF86469F341C132C052; 
rnd2 = 0x474BEA6DA7CD08D146A9414E. 
The reader will then send 
A = 0xC8D9BBBC295F1707A0D1B9D7; 
B = 0xB2430574BF1375B0B3186233; 
C = 0xB09F6C3B632DD765C2F767D4. 
Upon receipt of these values, the tag retrieves rnd1 and rnd2 from messages A and B, and 
then computes C’ to compare it with C. If they match then the tag computes new values for 
K and  IDS and uses these updated values to compute D. 
K* = 0xB7E16E19AB54DF2527093616;          
IDS* = 0xB8A64333A6C0C36F650BA775; 
D =  0x2453BE3D512DB598394CD738. 
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The reader verifies the value of D by comparing with D’. If they match then the tag 
and reader both have successfully authenticated each other and updated their secret key 
and IDS values.  
The ownership transfer phase follows a similar manner. Messages A and B are used 
between the TTP and the tag to convey a random number and to prove to the tag that the 
messages originate from an authentic source, the TTP. To illustrate, assume that the TTP 
generates rnd1 as 
rnd1 = 0x411895D3C7772A68D368159E. 
Then A and B will be 
A = 0x330B34429236E6B83E1BD20C; 
B = 0x4DC01DE6C69F8F6E88E025D0. 
The tag retrieves rnd1 and then updates KM to  
KM* = 0x232F1EBB84FED34E175A0797. 
The same key is already in the possession of the new owner through the secure 
channel with the TTP. Thus, the tag and the new owner can communicate with each 
securely using the new key. Note that the old owner will not be able to compute KM* since 
it does not have the rnd1 value. 
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3. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
In this part, we use the strand space analysis to prove the correctness of the protocol. 
A strand is a sequence of events that a single principal may engage in, while a strand space 
is a set of strands [44]. Here, “principal” stands for any participant that may be involved in 
the protocol such as old/new owner, tag, attacker, or TTP [44]. In the following analysis, 
we use some of the definitions and lemmas provided in [44]. We analyze the security of 
the authentication phase only. The analysis of the other two phases is either part of or 
identical to that of the authentication phase.  
Let nameT  Tnamebe the set of names such as 1IDR  and 2IDR  RID1, RID2,and IDS  IDS
Key  Keyxis the set of keys known by the principal x . Let m be a message and K is a key, 
then we represent the encryption of message m usingK  as  
k
m  {m}K. Also, 
1K   is the 
corresponding decryption key of K . Now, for simplicity, we rewrite messages , ,A B C  
and D : 
 
1 21 1 2
{ , } { , }
A AID K ID K
A rnd K R K R   ; (1) 
 
2 { , 1} BKB rnd K rnd   ; (2) 
 
1 21 2
{ 1, } { 2, }
C CID K ID K
C rnd R rnd R   ; (3) 
 
* *{ , }
DK
D K IDS , (4) 
where 1 1 1 1 1
1 2 1 2, , , ,A A B C CK K K K K
     and 1
DK
  are unknown to all the principals because of 
the one-way property of PRNG function. We can show that under the following 
Assumption 1, this presentation is equivalent to the original one in Figure 2.1 in the sense 
of security.  
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Assumption 1: If ( )y PRNG x and y  is known to a principal P , then the 
probability that P is able to compute the value of x is negligible.   
According to EPC Gen2v2 standards [2], the PRNG function shall meet the 
following randomness criteria: 
1) The probabilityP that any RN16 has value 16RN j , for any j , should be bounded by
16 160.8 / 2 1.25 / 2 .P    
2) For a tag population of up to 10,000 tags, the probability that any two or more tags 
simultaneously generate the same sequence of RN16s shall be less than 0.1%. 
3) An RN16 drawn from a Tag’s PRNG 10ms after the rise time shall not be predictable 
with a probability greater than 0.025% if the outcomes of prior draws from the PRNG, 
performed under identical conditions, are known.  
In our protocol, the 96-bit random number consisting of six 16-bit random numbers 
is used which means that the probabilities defined in the above criteria are much smaller 
(new probability 'P equals to 6P  , not just 6P ). Therefore, this assumption is reasonable. 
Taking the computation of message A as an example, we can conclude that even if a 
penetrator managed to get the value of both
1( )IDPRNG K R and 2( )IDPRNG K R (in fact 
he can only know the XOR results of them), by Assumption 1, he still cannot compute the 
value of 
1, IDK R and 2IDR . 
Next, we will introduce the definition of the proposed ownership transfer strand 
space
OTS . 
Definition 2: An infiltrated strand space  ,   is an 
OTS  space if it is the union of 
three kinds of strands: 
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1) Penetrator strands s , the set of keys known by P is
PKey  ; 
2) “Initiator strands” 
1 2[ , 1, 2, , ]ID IDs Init K rnd rnd R R  with trace: 
1 2{ }, { }, { },ID IDR R IDS ABC D      , 
where , , ,A B C and D are defined in (1) to (4) and the sign “+” means sending out a 
message while “-” means receiving. The principal associated with this strand is the old 
owner. We will use [ ]Init   to denote the set of all the strands shown above. The set of 
keys known by Init is
IKey . 
3) Complementary “responder strands” 
1 2[ , 1, 2, , ]ID IDs Resp K rnd rnd R R with trace: 
1 2{ }, { }, { }, .ID IDR R IDS ABC D       
The principal associated with this strand is the tag. Similarly we will use [ ]Resp  to 
denote the set of all the strands shown above. The set of keys known by Resp is
RKey . 
Figure 3.1 shows the strand space representation of the proposed ownership transfer 
protocol. In the next two parts, we prove the two aspects of correctness respectively: 
authentication and secrecy. 
3.1. AUTHENTICATION 
In [45], G. Lowe introduces four reasonable meanings of the word “authentication.” 
They are, from the weakest to the strongest, aliveness, weak agreement, Non-injective 
agreement and agreement. In this paper, we prove that the proposed protocol satisfies the 
strongest definition: agreement.  
Definition 3 (Agreement [45]): A protocol guarantees to an initiator A agreement 
with a responder B on a set of data items if, whenever A  completes a run of the protocol, 
  
32 
apparently with B , which apparently has previously been running the protocol with A as a 
responder. If the two agents agreed on the data values corresponding to all the variables in 




















Figure 3.1. Strand space representation of the proposed protocol. 
It should be noticed that this definition only guarantees to an initiator agreement 
with a responder. To complete the proof of the authentication, it is also necessary to prove 
that the protocol guarantees to a responder agreement with an initiator. We will start with 
the proof of the latter one. Additionally, since the first two data exchanges
1 2{ , }ID IDR R IDS
are broadcasted in the form of cleartext and do not contain any secrets, we will not include 




Proposition 1: Suppose  
1)   is a 
OTS  strand space,  is a bundle in   , and s  is a responder strand in [ ]s Resp   
2) 1 1 1 1 1
1 2 1 2, , , ,A A B C CK K K K K
     and 1
DK
 are unknown to all the principals. 
PK Key .  
3) 1rnd  and 2rnd  originate uniquely in  . 
If all the variables agree ( 'C C and 'D D ), then  contains a unique initiator’s 
strand [ ]t Init  . 
This proposition is illustrated in Figure 3.2. We will use two lemmas to prove this 
proposition. Throughout the remainder of this section, we will fix an arbitrary   and let 
, s , 1 1 1 1 1
1 2 1 2, , , ,A A B C CK K K K K
     , 1
DK
 , 1rnd  and 2rnd satisfy the hypotheses of 
Proposition 1.  
Lemma 1: Let n  be the node from which 1rnd  and 2rnd uniquely originate in  . If
'C C , then n belongs to [ ]Init  and ( ) { }term n ABC  . In addition, to distinguish, we 
will later designate this particular node n as
1in .  
Proof: Let n

 be the node that proceeds 
1rn  immediately. ( n

 may be a penetrator 





 are unknown, we have 1, 2,rnd rnd and { }K ABC and thus 
 1, 2, ( )rnd rnd K term n   (5) 
Now if we can show “ ( )K term n ” then we are able to conclude that [ ]n Init  . 
This is because 1) 
PK Key which implies thatn P ; 2) Although RK Key , 1rnd  and
2rnd do not originate from [ ]Resp  according to (5). Based on the definition of node n , it 
follows that [ ]n Resp  . Therefore, the problem becomes to prove ( )K term n . 
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Now we assume ( )K term n ; from (5) we know ( )K term n , then there exists 
at least one node 'n  that proceeds n

 from which K  uniquely originates and hence
( ')K term n . Since
PK Key , it follows that 'n  lies either in the responder’s or the 
initiator’s strand. However, according to the definition of 
OTS  strand space, the form ofK
is either
1 21 1 2
{ , } { , }
A AID K ID K
rnd K R K R  or 2 { , 1} BKrnd K rnd where 1rnd  and 2rnd are 
fresh. In other words, 1rnd  and 2rnd also originate from 'n , which contradicts with the fact 
























Figure 3.2. Illustration of Lemma 1 and 2. 
Moreover, “ 1rnd  and 2rnd originate from n ” also gives the conclusion that the sign 
of ( )term n  is positive (Lemma 2.8 in [44]). Together with [ ]n Init   and the structure of
OTS , we can get that ( ) { }term n ABC  . 
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Lemma 2: Upon receiving D  if the node n is able to update K and ,IDS then n
belongs to [ ]Init   and 
1in (defined in Lemma 1) proceeds node n . In addition, we designate 
this particular node n as
2in  
Proof: If the node n in [ ]Init  is able to update K and IDS , then 'D D . Since 
* *{ , }
DK
D K IDS where 1
DK
 is unknown to all principals, it follows that node nmust have 
*K and
*IDS in the form of cleartext. Then there are two possibilities: 
1) 1, 2, ( )rnd rnd K term n in the form of cleartext. Node n computes *K and *IDS by 
itself. 
2) Node n receives the cleartext *K and
*IDS from another node 'n . Then
* *( ') { , }term n K IDS  . From the form, we can tell that 'n  does not belong to a regular 
strand, hence 'n P . Therefore we have
PK Key which contradicts with the 
assumption.  
Therefore, only case i) holds and thus [ ]n Init  . From 1, 2 ( )rnd rnd term n
together with the fact that 1rnd and 2rnd originates uniquely from node
1in , it follows that 
1in  proceeds n . Proposition 1 now follows immediately from Lemmas 1 and 2. Note that 
the uniqueness is also proved by the conclusion of “
1in proceeds node n ” because 1in is the 
node that 1rnd and 2rnd uniquely originate from. Next we will prove the other side of the 
authentication: agreement property for the 
OTS initiator.  
Proposition 2: Suppose 
1)   is a OTS   strand space,  is a bundle in   , and s  is a initiator strand in [ ]s Init    
2) 1 1 1 1 1
1 2 1 2, , , ,A A B C CK K K K K
     and 1
DK
 are unknown to all the principals. 
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3) 1rnd  and 2rnd  originate uniquely in  . 
If the all the variables agree ( 'C C and 'D D ), then  contains a unique 
responder’s strand [ ]t Resp  . 
Similarly, we will use two lemmas to prove Proposition 2. 
Lemma 3: Let n  be the node in which D  originates from in  . If 'D D for the 
node 2in (defined in Lemma 2), then n belongs to [ ]Resp  . In addition, we designate this 
particular node n as 3rn  
Proof: The proof of this lemma is almost identical to the proof for Lemma 2. 
Basically we will show that * *{ , } ( )K IDS term n in the form of cleartext. Then it follows 
that ( )K term n . Thus we eliminates the case that n P . Again since the sign of ( )term n  
is positive, together with the form of OTS we are able to conclude that n belongs to [ ].Resp   
Lemma 4: There exists a unique node n in [ ]Resp  proceeding 3rn , such that
( ) { }term n ABC  , where ABC  is given in Lemma 1. In addition, we designate this 
particular node n as 1rn . 
Proof: In Lemma 3 we have shown that 3{ 1, 2, } ( )rrnd rnd K term n . Let n be the
minimal  member of node 3rn in [ ]Resp  . Then by the definition of minimal [44], we have
{ 1, 2, } ( )rnd rnd K term n . Since 1rnd  and 2rnd uniquely originate in  from node 1in
which is proven in Lemma 1, then we have this relationship 
 1






  (6) 
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Therefore the sign of ( )term n  is negative. Given that [ ],n Resp   exploring all the 
forms of responder strands, we have ( ) { }term n ABC  . Since { }ABC is computed directly 
based on 1rnd  and 2rnd , it follows that { }ABC also originates uniquely from node 1in . 
Hence { }ABC  in ( )term n  is the same term that originated from 1in .  
Proposition 2 follows directly from Lemma 3 and 4. And together with Proposition 
1, we have completed the proof of authentication. 
3.2. SECRECY 
Definition 5 (Secrecy [46]): A message m is considered secret if in every bundle of 
the protocol the penetrator cannot receive m in clear text. In other words, there exists no 
node n such that term(n) = m.  
Proof of secrecy for the proposed protocol is straightforward because of special 
treatment with the secret keyK . From (1) to (4) we can see that, in all messages, every 
sub-term containing K is in the form of ˆ{ , }KK   where Kˆ belongs to 
1 1 1 1
1 2{ , , , }A A B DK K K K
   
and is unknown to all principals. Therefore, under Assumption 1, 
we can guarantee the secrecy of K .   
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4. COMPARISON WITH RELATED PROTOCOLS 
The previous section confirmed the correctness of the protocol. Given the proven 
authentication process and secrecy of data, the protocol is guaranteed to resist the tag 
impersonation, reader impersonation, replay, and MitM attacks. Such resistance of attacks 
is an essential requirement in authentication and ownership management protocols. 
However, there are several other distinctive requirements for any authentication 
and ownership management protocol. These requirements include forward and backward 
privacy, desynchronization and windowing avoidance, and location privacy. To perform a 
comparison between the proposed ownership management protocol and the previous work, 
we give an analysis of the protocol in terms of these requirements. 
1) Backward privacy: An important aspect to consider with ownership transfer is the 
privacy of the new owner. The old owner should not be able to update the secret keys 
in order to have copies of the keys of the new owner. In the proposed protocol, the use 
of TTP guarantees that only the new owner can update the keys. The access of the old 
owner is permanently revoked upon ownership transfer.   
2) Forward privacy: Similarly, the new owner of the tag should not be able to deduce the 
keys that were used by the old owner. If such a case arises, then all previous transactions 
can be decrypted, which violates the privacy of the old owner. In the proposed protocol, 
the key update operations depend on the PRNG function which is irreversible. This 




3) Desynchronization avoidance: The desynchronization problem cannot be completely 
prevented because the adversary can always choose to block the last conformation 
message and consequently one party updates the keys while the other one does not. Our 
solution is that the TTP should always keep a copy of the previous secret keys and the 
corresponding tag IDS in case of confronting desynchronization attacks. In that case, 
the new owner will not be able to authenticate the tag and then TTP should attempt to 
resend the key update message until the ownership transfer succeeds. 
4) Windowing avoidance: The windowing problem occurs when the new and old owner 
share possession of the same keys within the same timeslot. Both parties would have 
access to the tag and problems may arise if, for example, the ownership transfer is 
interrupted. In such a case, both parties would have access to the tag and can act as its 
owners. In the proposed protocol, the old owner and the new owner never possess the 
master key at the same time. 
5) Location privacy: Instead of using the unique and life-long static identifier EPC, the 
proposed protocol uses IDS which is updated after every successful authentication. As 
a result, the adversary cannot identify the location of the target tag.   
A comparison with previous related work is shown in Table. 4.1, where a “Y” 
means the scheme satisfies the requirement while an “N” indicates the opposite. From the 
table it can be concluded that among the non-EPC-compliant protocols, Kapoor’s [27] has 
the best performance but it still suffers from the windowing problem and is not suitable for 
low-cost RFID tags due to the use of hash functions. On the other hand, the existing EPC 
compliant protocols either fail to provide backward privacy or are vulnerable to replay 
attack because of using CRC as the encryption method. In contrast, the proposed protocol 
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not only conforms to the EPC standards, but also satisfies the security requirements. 
Furthermore, our protocol also supports delegation, which is desirable in many scenarios 
where temporal ownership sharing is needed.  














EPC compliant N N N Y Y Y 
Support delegation Y N N N N Y 
Resist replay attack Y Y N N N Y 
Location privacy Y Y N Y Y Y 
Backward privacy N Y Y N Y Y 
Desynchronization N Y N Y Y Y 
Windowing N N N Y Y Y 
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5. HARDWARE IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION 
In this section, the proposed authentication and ownership management protocol is 
implemented and evaluated in hardware. Since the new EPC Gen2v2 protocol was ratified 
very recently, there is no reader available in the market supporting the new standard yet. 
Our solution is to use a Gen2v1 RFID tag and emulate the Gen2v2-only commands 
(“Authenticate”, “KeyUpdate”) by using the “BlockWrite” and “Read” commands. Note 
that “BlockWrite” command allows the reader to send as long as 256 words of data to the 
tag and therefore is capable of emulating the above Gen2v2-only commands. As these 
commands take similar amounts of bits, theoretically the differences in terms of processing 
time and energy consumption are negligible. 
5.1. IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS 
The mutual authentication and OT is executed through the use of 
command/response set defined by the EPC Gen2v2 standard as shown in Figure 5.1. The 
current (old) owner sends “select” and “query” command (and “QueryAdjust”, 
“QueryRep” commands, if necessary) in order to identify the target tag from a large 
population of tags. As a result, the target tag replies with a new 16-bit random number 
RN16 and transfers its state from “ready” to “reply”. Note that before identifying the target 
tag, a probabilistic collision management method is adopted as specified in the standards 
while after identifying the target tag, RN16 works as a kind of session ID indicating a 
specified tag to avoid collision. Then the reader issues an ACK command containing the 
same RN16 and the tag replies with its IDS and other information, which can be found in 
  
42 
the EPC Gen2v2 standard specifications. Upon receiving the “Req_RN” with the correct 













IDS Enter “acknowledged” state
Req_RN






Figure 5.1. Mutual authentication under EPC Gen2v2 standard [43]. 
Next, we make use of the “Authenticate” and “KeyUpdate” commands, which are 
newly introduced in EPC Gen2v2, to complete the mutual authentication phase. As 
specified in [2], the “Authenticate” command should contain fields listed in Table 5.1. In 
particular, we define the contents of “message” field in the “Authenticate” command as 
described in Table 5.2. The “command ID” is used to indicate that this command will send 




Table 5.1. Authenticate command [2][43]. 
 Command RFU, SenRep… Length Message RN CRC 
# of bits 8 … 12 variable 16 16 
Comments 11010101 Details in EPC Gen2v2 standards[2] 
Table 5.2. “Message” field in “authenticate” command [43]. 
 Command ID RID1 RID2 A B C 
# of bits 8 96 96 96 96 96 




The value D is contained in the response message of the “Authenticate” command, 
as described in Table 5.3. A non-zero value in the “status” field indicates that the tag has 
retrieved the nonces and computed the new key and IDS. Upon receiving a response with 
the “status” of success, the reader will compute D’ in the same manner of computing D.  
Table 5.3.  Response message of the “authenticate” command [43]. 
 Command 
ID 
Status Length Message RN16 CRC 
# of bits 8 2 10 96 16 16 





If D equals to D’, then the tag is authenticated. Consequently, the reader issues a 
“KeyUpdate” command to the tag for confirmation. As a result, the tag commits to the 
newly computed key and IDS for future uses.  
The implementation details of the delegation phase and the ownership transfer 
phase under EPC Gen2v2 framework are omitted as it is similar to what we have presented 
in the authentication phase.  
A common RFID platform presented in [44] is chosen to implement and analyze 
the proposed protocol. Operating in the UHF frequency range, this platform is designed 
based on the Wireless Identification and Sensing Platform (WISP), developed by Intel 
Research Seattle [44].  Similar to the WISP tags, the program running in the modified 
WISP tags is also written strictly conforming to the EPC Gen2v1 standard [1]. Therefore, 
the tag can communicate with most of the off-the-shelf UHF RFID readers.  
On the modified WISP tag, shown in Figure 5.2, a “bow tie”  antenna and a four-
order Dickson charging pump are adopted to convert the RF signal to DC power to support 
the whole on-board circuitry. The 16-bit microprocessor MSP430F2132 has an ultra-low 
power consumption (only 600µA at 1.8V and 4MHz). It can execute an instruction in as 
little as 0.25µs.  
Further, the 1Mbit EEPROM 24AA1026 embedded only on the modified WISP 
tags ensures enough space for storing the data such as secret keys. Therefore, these features 
including its ability of re-programming, relatively strong computation capacity, and large 
memory space make it a decent platform to evaluate customized protocols. In fact, the 
WISP tag was utilized to demonstrate the feasibility or performance of security protocols 










Authentication and Ownership 
Management Protocol
(Java in Eclipse)












RFID Protocol  
Figure 5.3. Software structure of the evaluation platform. 
On the reader side, the protocol is implemented with Java in Eclipse, above the 
“Reader library” and “LLRP [50]” layers. On the tag side, we implement the proposed 
protocol in a higher level in order to stay compliant with the EPC standards. The IAR 
Workbench for MSP430 is used for debugging and downloading the program. The reader 
used in the experiments is Impinj Speedway Revolution R220, with transmission power set 
to 30dBm with a receiving sensitivity set to -70dBm. 
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5.2. OT OPERATION TIME, WITH SUFFICIENT ENERGY 
First, it is of interest to measure the execution time for a complete ownership 
transfer process when there is sufficient energy on the tag. To do this, the tag is placed as 
close as 0.5m away from the reader antenna to ensure it can harvest enough energy.  
Note that no matter how complicated one protocol is, it can be broken into steps 
that belong to one of the four categories: a) computation on tags, b) computation on readers 
(here consider TTP as a reader), c) data exchange between tags and readers (T R ), d) 
data exchange between two different readers ( R R ).  The results are presented in Table 
5.4.  
In our case, both the computation on readers and data exchange between two 
different readers can be negligible. From the results presented in Table 5.4. It can be seen 
that the total time of on-tag computation plus the data exchange between the reader and the 
tag is Ttag  = 146.14ms, which is quite close to the actual measured total time Ttotal = 
167.28ms.  
Table 5.4. Measured time and instruction cycles. 
Notation Definition Value Cycles 
NTR Number of T R rounds 3 - 
TTR Time for each T R round 43.16ms - 
Tauth Time of computation during authentication phase 12.39ms 37170 
Ttran Time of computation on tag during OT phase 4.27ms 12810 
Ttag Ttag = NTR* TTR+ Tauth+ Ttran 146.14ms - 




In fact, the time spent for the on-tag computation is only 16.66ms (49980 
instruction cycles @ 3MHz) for the authentication and ownership transfer phase and 10.83 
for the delegation phase (32490 instruction cycles @ 3MHz), which confirms the ultra-
lightweight property of the proposed protocol. 
5.3. OT OPERATION TIME, WITH INSUFFICIENT ENERGY 
Since passive RFID tags are powered by the RF signal emitted by the reader 
antenna, the energy being harvested decreases when moving away from the antenna. It is 
also of interest to measure the execution time when there is insufficient energy. For this 
purpose, the tag is placed at different distances away from the reader antenna and the 
corresponding number of successful ownership transfer sessions per minute is taken. In 
contrast, the experiments are repeated using the same tag running the protocol, with all the 
computations eliminated. In other words, the control group only executes instructions to 
perform the same number of data exchanges.  
From Figure 5.4, it can be seen that when the distance is within 1m, the number of 
successful ownership transfer session per minute is almost constant because enough energy 
has been harvested within this short distance. As the distance increases, the number of 
successful ownership transfer sessions goes down due to failure of data exchange when 
there is insufficient power.  
As a consequence, the reader will either start over a new ownership transfer session 
or request for a retransmission, which both consume longer time. When the distance is 
larger than 3m, the proposed protocol with or without computation can only be executed 




Figure 5.4. Number of successful OT sessions per minute. 
However, the most important conclusion is that, if one compares the two curves 
with each other, the number of sessions executed per minute for the proposed protocol with 
computation is only slightly less than that the one without computation, which shows that 
the on-tag computation involved due to the proposed protocol is insignificant. 
5.4. OT OF MULTIPLE TAGS, WITH SUFFICIENT ENERGY  
In most applications, there may be more than one tag whose ownerships should be 
transferred. The previous analysis focused on a single tag ownership transfer. However, it 
is of interest to investigate the performance when multiple tags are exchanged, given that 
collisions or interference may happen.  
In this experiment, we place the tags at a distance of 0.5 m from the reader antenna. 
The maximum number of tags in this test is 13 in order to ensure that each tag receives 
sufficient energy from the reader antenna. We initially start with one tag and add more tags 
until we reach the maximum of 13 tags. For each set of present tags, we measure the 
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number of successful ownership transfer sessions. For comparative purposes, we also 
examine the performance with and without the cryptographic computations of the protocol. 
The results are shown in Figure 5.5.  From Figure 5.5, it is evident that as the number of 
tags increases, the number of successful ownership transfer session decreases. This drop is 
due to the added extra time caused by the reader when it isolates one specific tag from all 
the tag population. However, the drop is not that significant in terms of performance. For 
example, in the case of the protocol without the computations the drop in the successful 





Figure 5.5. Number of successful OT sessions per minute for multiple tags. 
The added time when multiple tags are present has a minimal effect on the 
performance, especially when compared with the average time for one complete ownership 
transfer process. This is because as specified in [2], once the reader has identified one 
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certain tag, it will append a unique handle (called “RN16”) at the end of each following 
message exchange such that the other tags will not respond back, in order to reduce time. 
This inherent property in the standard results in a favorable performance that meets the 
requirement to serve multiple tags with the least possible delay. 
5.5. LOCATION PRIVACY 
As mentioned before, we propose the use of IDS to protect location privacy by 
updating the IDS after each authentication session. Therefore, it is of interest to examine 
the degree of difference between the old and updated IDS. To do this, we ran 200 
consecutive authentication sessions and recorded each IDS as IDSi, where i = 1, 2, …, 200.   
We consider 
,avg consHD , as the running average of the Hamming distance between 
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where H(x, y) is the Hamming distance of two 96-bit binary number x and y. This metric 
measures the difficulty for the attacker to deduce the pattern of IDS generating function 
from the past message exchanges. The results are plotted in Figure 5.6 against the actual 
Hamming weight values recorded for each of the 200 authentication sessions. We see from 
the Figure 5.6 that the running average of the Hamming distance for all pairs of IDS 
converges to 48, indicating a good degree of randomness. This tells us that any new IDS 
value will have around 48 bit positions, on average, that differ from the previous IDS value. 




Figure 5.6.  Hamming weight of IDS values and average of Hamming distance. 
For consecutive pairs, we see a fluctuation in the Hamming weight above or below 
the overall average for consecutive pairs, which is essential to deny an attacker the chance 
of tracking the tag. The Hamming weight for the IDS values ranges from 36 to as high as 
67. As a result, the attacker cannot determine the presence of the tag by analyzing the 
values of IDS.  Next the reader impersonation aspect is considered. 
5.6. READER IMPERSONATION 
In this scenario, the attacker impersonates an owner attempting to deceive the tag 
to believe that the attacker is authentic. Assuming the IDS of the tag has been disclosed, 
the attacker generates two random numbers (rnd1, rnd2), guesses a secret key, computes 
the values of A, B, and C, and sends them to the tag. Upon receiving A and B, the tag 
retrieves rnd1 and rnd2 using the authentic secret key, then computes the value of C’. The 
tag is compromised if C equals to C’. Note that the attacker does not necessarily have to 
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possess the exact authentic key to make C’=C. In some circumstances, if the protocol is 
not well designed, some other different values other than the authentic key could also result 
in C’=C, this is normally referred to as a collision.  
If such a scenario happens, the tag will update its secret keys and IDS although the 
actual owner has not initiated the session. Thus, the owner and the tag will be 
desynchronized. Therefore, it is of interest to examine how long it takes the attacker to 
compromise the tag. Note that it is unrealistic to measure the elapsed time if the length of 
all data units is 96 bits as it takes too long. To solve this, we truncate the data length to 16 
bits, measure the elapsed time, and based on that, estimate the theoretical time for when 
the data units are 96-bit long. We repeat the attack 50 times and compute the average time 
for compromise. The results are shown in Figure 5.7, where we see when the length of all 





Figure 5.7.  Compromise time for 50 iterations of the brute force attack. 
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As shown before, in an authentication round, the computation takes much less time 
than the wireless messages exchange. Therefore, if we assume that the time for computing 
96-bit long numbers (A, B…) is very close to that for computing 16-bit long numbers, we 
roughly estimate that the time for the attacker to compromise the tag through brute force 
when the data units are 96-bit long is 16 96 25(18 / 2 ) (2 ) 2.1 10   hours. 
Therefore, it is safe the say that the proposed protocol is able to resist against the 
reader impersonation attacks.   
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6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, a new EPC Gen2v2 compatible protocol by using limited 
cryptographic functionality was presented for mutual authentication and ownership 
management.  This was done by employing the ultra-lightweight permutation operation 
and the PRNG function. Such use of a simple operation adds a minimal level of 
computation and energy consumption while, at the same time, supports the cryptographic 
goals of the protocol. 
The protocol was examined both from a security point of view as well as with a 
hardware implementation. The analysis indicated that the transactions in the protocol do 
not expose the secret key information nor does the protocol depend on previously used 
secret keys, thus guaranteeing that replay or disclosure attacks are not possible. The 
comparison with previous work shows that the proposed protocol not only conforms to the 
EPC standards, but also satisfies the security requirements. The hardware implementation 
supports our initial goal of adding security to the existing EPC Gen2v2 based tags such 
that the system would be secure both in the case of being used by a single owner or in the 
more practical cases of having multiple owners during the lifetime of a tagged item. 
The next steps in this work include examining the use of various ultra-lightweight 
or lightweight functions that would possibly fit on the very limited number of gate elements 
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II. OPTIMAL DEFENSE AND CONTROL OF DYNAMIC SYSTEMS MODELED 
AS CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEMS 
Haifeng Niu  and S. Jagannathan 
With the increasing connectivity among computational cyber-connected elements 
and the physical entities, a unified representation that captures the interrelationship 
between the cyber and the physical systems becomes increasingly important. In this paper, 
we propose a novel representation for developing cyber security schemes for physical 
systems wherein the cyber system states affect the physical system and vice versa. 
Subsequently by using this representation, an optimal strategy via Q-learning is derived for 
the cyber defense in the presence of an attack.  Since the cyber system under attack will 
affect the physical system stability and performance, an optimal controller by using Q-
learning is considered for the physical system with uncertain dynamics. As an example, 
cyber-attacks that increase the network delay and packet losses are considered and the goal 
of the proposed cyber defense and optimal controller is to thwart the attack and mitigate 
the performance degradation of the physical system due to increased delays and packet 
losses. An illustrative example is given where the proposed theory is evaluated on the yaw-
channel control of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). Simulation results show that on the 
cyber side, both the attacker and the defender gains their greatest payoff whereas on the 
physical system side, the optimal controller is able to maintain the linear system in a stable 





Cyber-physical systems (CPS) refer to engineered systems constructed as 
networked interactions of physical and computational cyber components [1].  Examples of 
CPS can be found in areas as diverse as automobiles, air transportation, civil infrastructure, 
power grid, embedded medical devices, and consumer appliances. Recently, with the 
development of information technology (IT) such as IT management and networking 
growth, the security in CPS has received attention. Moreover, as cyber and physical 
capabilities are becoming increasingly intertwined, a comprehensive framework that 
models the cyber system, the physical plant dynamics, and their interrelationship is also 
increasingly needed.  
In general, there are two types of the representations for the security analysis of 
CPS in the existing literature: one that models the effect on the cyber systems under a 
certain specific attack [2-6] and the other includes the effect of cyber-attacks on physical 
systems [7-12]. The former effort explores the behavior of the attacker as well as the 
defender, formulates the cyber changes under attacks, and presents appropriate strategies 
that bring the cyber system back to normal. For example, the effort in [2] introduces the 
Denial of Service (DoS) flooding attacks by a continuous-time Markov chain and utilizes 
the state space method to compute security measures accurately.  
Different from [2], the authors in [3] study the cyber defense by modeling the 
actions of the attacker and the defender as a stochastic zero-sum game. In [4], the measure 
of vulnerabilities in cyber-physical systems with application to power systems is defined 
and a security framework including anomaly detection and mitigation strategies is 
provided. The authors in [5] evaluate the cyber security by computing the expected 
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probabilities of the attacker and using the probabilities to build a transition model through 
game-theoretic approach. In [6], the cyber vulnerability is dynamically evaluated by using 
hidden Markov model which provides a mechanism for handling sensor data with different 
trustworthiness. However, this type of representation mainly focuses on the cyber system 
and neglects the fact that the states of the physical system also affect the cyber defense 
strategy.   
In contrast, others [7-12] concentrate on characterizing the dynamics of the physical 
system under attacks by extending the classic state-space description in order to include 
the attacks. For instance, in [7], the system dynamics include an extra term to model the 
deception attack. In [8], the system state under attack is represented with an additive term 
where the additive term is used to simulate the false data injection attack. Unlike [8], the 
authors in [9] characterize the deception attackers by a set of objectives and propose 
policies to synthesize stealthy deceptions attacks in both linear and nonlinear estimators. 
In [10], the estimation and control of linear systems when sensors or actuators are corrupted 
by an attacker is provided, together with a secure local control loop that can improve the 
resilience of the system. On the other hand, the authors [11] define the control input under 
attacks as the product of the given input and a coefficient to characterize the effect induced 
by the DoS attacks. A class of human adversaries, who are called correlated jammers, is 
considered in [12]. By modeling the coupled decision making process as a two-level 
receding-horizon dynamic Stackelberg game, the authors propose a control law and 
analyze the performance and the closed-loop stability under attacks. 
However, there are many weaknesses [13] in the above reported works. First, the 
representation can only describe a single type of attack due to the fact that attacks affect 
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the system dynamics in a variety of ways. In particular, the author in [13] proposed a 
unified framework that is able to detect attacks however it still has the two drawbacks 
mentioned next. Second, it is difficult to implement the representation developed in the 
literature so far since the system dynamics under attacks are considered known. For 
instance, due to random delays and packet losses caused by certain cyber-attacks, the 
physical system dynamics can be uncertain.  Last but not the least, these representations 
fail to take the interactions between the cyber defense policy and the system controller 
under consideration.   
In summary, to the best knowledge of the authors, little effort has been carried out 
in the literature to develop a representation that precisely characterizes the interplay 
between the cyber and the physical systems. Such a representation is necessary because 
inadequate decisions can be made for the cyber defense if the physical states are ignored. 
Likewise, the physical plant may not be stable if the controller is designed without 
considering the impact due to the changes in the cyber system.  
Therefore, in this paper, we propose a framework for cyber-physical systems to 1) 
study optimal defense to mitigate attacks and 2) to derive an associated optimal control 
policy for physical systems. First, we introduce a mathematical representation for the 
cyber-physical system, in which it was shown that the activities of the cyber system affect 
the states of the physical system and vice versa. Then based on this representation, we 
derive the optimal strategies for the defender and the attacker by considering them as two 
players in a zero-sum game. Since the cyber state influences the behavior of the physical 
system, next, an optimal controller for the physical system in the presence of uncertainties 
induced by the cyber system is revisited based on [14]. In addition, a condition on the cyber 
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state vector is derived under which the physical system is stable. Finally, an illustrative 
example is given in which we show that on the cyber side, both the attacker and the 
defender gain their greatest payoff while on the physical side, the optimal controller is able 
to maintain the plant stable when the state vector of the cyber system meets a certain 
condition.  
Thus, the main contributions of this work include: 1) a novel and comprehensive 
representation of the cyber-physical system that captures the interrelationship between the 
cyber and the physical elements; 2) the development of the optimal strategies for the 
defender and the attacker; 3) the application of the optimal controller [14] for the physical 
system in the presence of uncertain dynamics induced by the cyber system; and 4) the 
demonstration of how the proposed theory can be applied to the control of the yaw-channel 
of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) in the presence of an attack.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The proposed representation for the 
cyber-physical systems is introduced in Section 2. In Section 3, the optimal defense and 
attack policies are derived and presented, followed by the optimal controller design for the 
physical system introduced in Section 4. The illustrative example including policy 
derivation as well as the simulation results are presented in Section 5 and this paper is 
concluded in Section 6. 
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2. PROPOSED REPRESENTATION FOR CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEMS 
In this section, the proposed framework for the cyber-physical systems is 
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Figure 2.1. Proposed representation of a cyber-physical system. 
2.1. CYBER SYSTEM 
Consider the cyber system described by a nonlinear discrete-time system given by 
  ( 1) ( ), ( ), ( )c cx k f a k d k x k 
  (1) 
where cNcx   is the state of the cyber system, cN being the dimension of the state vector 
of the cyber system, a  is malicious action taken by the attacker, and d  is the defense 
strategy taken by the cyber system. 
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The cyber state cx represents a set of network performance metrics such as latency, 
throughput, packet loss rate, and so on. Since it was shown in the literature that most attacks 
on the cyber system will cause an increase in network delay and packet losses [15], in this 
paper, we mainly consider these two as the cyber state vector in the controller design 
(Section 4) and in the illustrative example (Section 5).  In some cases, cx  also needs to 
include a few network security metrics such as the number of successive failed 
authentications or the changes of IP addresses. It is obvious that the cyber state can be 
affected by the action of both the attacker and the defense strategy and a relationship is 
described by the function f .  
In particular, we propose a more concrete representation of the cyber state as 
     
0 0
( 1) ( ) ( ) ( )
a dN N
c c c c c i j ij c
i j
x k A k F x k D k a d f x k
 
    ,  (2) 
where 0 1, ,..., ac NA a a a     is a vector consisting of all aN  number of possible attacks,  each 
 0,1ia   stands for a type of attack (except for 0a ) wherein 1ia  implies the i th  attack has 
been lunched and 0ia   otherwise. In particular, we let 0 1a   if and only if there is no active 
attack at that moment. Similarly, 0 1, ,..., d
T
c ND d d d    is a vector describing the status of the 
defense strategies and 0 1d  if and only if there is no active defense. Finally, 
00 01 0 0 1, ,..., ;...; , ,...,d a a a dN N N N NF f f f f f f





  describes the effect to the cyber state cx brought by the ongoing 
attack/defense pair ( , )i ja d . In other words, at each sampling time instant k , the active 
attack/defense pair ( , )i ja d corresponds to a function ijf which characterizes the system 
dynamics for the following sampling interval.  
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An assumption is made in that when there are two or more attacks (and defense) 
simultaneously being lunched, the effect of each attack (and defense) to the cyber system 
state is independent.  
As depicted in Figure 2.1, the cyber system output in the proposed representation 
is described as  
  ( ) ( ), ( )c c py k h x k x k  , (3) 
where cy   is the output of the cyber system and
pN
px   is the state of the physical 
system with pN  being the dimension of the state vector. The output cy , which is a function 
of cx  and px , is a quantized value indicating the condition of the cyber system. A simple 
example is presented in Remark 1 whereas more complicated forms can be found in 
Remark 2.  
One can assess the health condition or even the specific attack on the system by 
exploiting the cyber state cx as well as the physical system state px . For example, if the 
network is reported with a significant drop in throughput and a considerable mean delay in 
a short time, then it is possible that the system is experiencing a denial of service (DoS) 
attack. The importance of introducing the cyber output cy stems from the fact that the states 
needs to be organized and interpreted in order to be useful for the administrator to make 
suitable defense strategies.  
It is important to note that the physical system state px is also necessary at the cyber 
system in order to obtain a comprehensive and accurate estimation of the system condition. 
For example, if an attacker manages to get the administrative privilege without being 
detected by cracking the password or exploiting the security bugs, then he/she is able to 
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give malicious instructions that may lead to the failure of the physical system. In this case, 
only the abnormality in the physical system state (not the cyber state) could be detected. 
Therefore, by including the physical system state when assessing the condition of the cyber 
system, the administrator can still trigger the alert mechanism and launch the defense even 
if no abnormities in the cyber systems have been observed. Therefore, by using both cx and
px in cy , the cyber defense decision becomes more insightful and reliable. The relationship 
between cy , cx , and px is characterized by the function h .  
Remark 1: A simple example of the cyber output cy is presented here, in which cy




c cd d dd
c







where cdX  and ddX  are the set of desired values of the cyber state cx  and physical state px  
respectively. Therefore, in this example, 1cy   represents a healthy system while 0cy   
represents a compromised one.  
Remark 2: The function h  may take various forms on the basis of the system 
security requirement.  The selection of h  is critical to the system security level, considering 
that the output of h  is used to assess the system health condition and determine the defense 
strategies that will be launched. The objective of selecting function h  is that it should make 
use of the observed states and precisely predict the ongoing or even potential attacks. A 
few examples of function h  can be given as follows: 
1) Threshold form:
_ min _ max
_ min _ max
sgn sgn / 2
c c c c
c
p p p p
x x x x
y
x x x x
         
                    





_ min _ max,c cx x ( _ min _ max,p px x ) are the predefined lower, upper threshold vectors for each 
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cyber (physical) state respectively and sgn( )  is the sign function. As a result, the 
corresponding row of cy  becomes “-1” if a state is smaller than the lower limit, “0” if 
within the interval, and “1” if higher than the upper limit. This form of function h
provides a straightforward assessment of whether the states are in the desired zone or 
not.  







 denote the 
coefficient vectors for each state. By making use of these weighting factors, this form 
maps the state vector onto a scalar that provides an approximate description of the 
system healthy condition. 
3) Quadratic form ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
T T







   represent the weighting matrices for each state. Similar to the linear form, 
this quadratic form also maps the state vector onto a scalar except that it takes the 
correlation between each state into consideration. 
In this paper, the attacks considered will increase the network delay and packet 
losses which in turn will make the linear time-invariant system as an uncertain stochastic 
time-varying system.  The goal of the cyber defense and optimal controller is to mitigate 
the increase in random delays and packet losses and performance degradation of the 
physical system. 
2.2. PHYSICAL SYSTEM 
As shown in the right block in Figure 2.1, the physical system is described as a 
linear discrete system in the presence of a disturbance given by 
 
( 1) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
c c c
k
x k A x x k B x u k D x w k
y k Cx k
   






px   is the state of the physical system, u
m
u is the control input, wmw is the 
disturbance input, 
ry  is the output, and p pn nA









 and p wn mD


denote the system matrices.  
It is important to note that unlike the classical linear discrete system, the system 
matrices described by (4) are a function of the cyber state cx . In other words, the state of 
the cyber system will influence the dynamics of the physical system. For instance, a large 
network-induced delay or packet loss can degrade the system performance or even results 
in instability. Therefore, this framework is able to capture the cyber system activities 
because when a cyber-attack occurs, the physical system matrices { ( ), ( )...}c cA x B x change.  
In conclusion, the cyber state vector, whose update is subject to the attack/defense 
decisions, changes the physical system dynamics. As a result, the control input needs to be 
adjusted to drive the physical states back to the desired value. The changes in the cyber and 
physical states, in turn determine the cyber output and hence the attack/defense decisions. 
A summary of the interrelationship between the cyber and the physical systems is shown 






Physical System Dynamics A,B...
Physical Stats xp
Control input u
Cyber System Physical System
 
Figure 2.2. Inter-relationship between the cyber and the physical system. 
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Hence, the objective is to design an optimal policy by using a cost function for the 
physical system with unknown system dynamics induced by the cyber system.  Therefore, 
by 1) including the physical system state in the assessment of cyber health condition and 
2) considering the influence on the physical system dynamics induced by the cyber states 
when designing the optimal controller, the proposed optimal defense/control scheme offers 




3. OPTIMAL ATTACK/DEFENSE POLICY FOR CYBER SYSTEMS 
In this section, the optimal attack and defense policies for the cyber system are 
derived while in the next section, we derive the optimal controller for the physical system 
with the presence of the delay and packet loss. We also derive the condition for the delay 
and packet loss under which the physical controller can be stabilized. The optimal 
controller gain will be computed and applied to the physical system once the delay and 
packet loss satisfy the condition. Otherwise appropriate defense strategy needs to be 
launched in order to drive the cyber states (delay and packet loss) to meet the criterion. 
In this section, we first model the interactions between the attacker and the defender 
as a two-player zero-sum Markov game [16]. Then after defining the instant payoff as well 
as the expected discounted payoff function, we introduce two lemmas to show the existence 
of the solution of the game and the optimal policy. Next, the Q-function is proposed and it 
is shown in Theorem 1 that using the Minimax-Q algorithm [17], the Q-function converges 
to the game value. As a result, the optimal strategies for the defender and the attacker in 
order to gain their greatest discounted payoff are also derived.  
Consider the cyber system with dynamics described by (2) and an output function 
in quadratic form of the state vectors, i.e. as   
 
    
0 0
( 1) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
a dN N
c c c c c i j ij c
i j
T
c c c c
x k A k F x k D k a d f x k






where the cyber state vector cx consists of delay and packet loss for illustrative purpose. 
Then the system can be modeled as a Markov decision process in which the state at the 
next sampling interval, ( 1)cx k  , is determined by the state at the current instant, ( )cx k , 
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together with the action pair  ( ), ( )c cA k D k  launched by the defender and the attacker. The 
defender and the attacker update their defense strategies based on the condition indicated 
by cy , which is a quantified value computed based on the delay and packet loss of the cyber 
system. In other words, the defender and the attacker launch appropriate actions so as to 
drive the delay and packet loss into preferred values. 
Let Y  be the set of all possible values of cy . Since it is based on the value of cy  that 
the defender and the attacker decide which action should be taken, the problem becomes 
deriving the optimal action for each single value of cy , which is impractical and 
unnecessary due to the tremendous computation. Therefore, we divide Y into several 
subsets and study the optimal strategies for each subset rather than for each element. 
Suppose that Y  is divided into ydN  disjoint subsets (i.e., 1 2 ... ydNY Y Y Y  and i jY Y    
for i j ) and each subset corresponds to a level of health status.  As illustrated in Figure 








Y8 Y7 Y6 Y5 Y4 Y3 Y2 Y1 Y0 
Figure 3.1. Each subset of Y corresponds a level of health condition. 
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Subset 0Y is the secure state (with the smallest delay and packet loss) and subset 8Y is 
the failed state of the system (with the largest delay and packet loss). The defender decides 
which action should be taken based on the subset that current cy is in. For example, if 4cy Y
, the defender may choose to load the defense more frequently to drive cy  into a more 
secure subset. As a result, the delay and packet loss are reduced and the physical system 
becomes more robust and resilient. Obviously, the more subsets Y  is divided into, the more 
accurate the model is. However, more computation is needed as the optimal strategies need 
to be derived for each subset. Next, the definition of instant reward and discounted payoff 
are introduced in order to obtain the optimal strategy for each subset iY . 
Let ( ( ), ( ), ( ))c c ir A k D k Y k be the instant payoff (reward or cost) at time instant k  in 
region ( )iY k  for the action pair  ( ), ( )c cA k D k . Let the instant payoff of the attack and the 
defender be ar  and dr  respectively and assume the game is zero-sum, we then have the 
relationship 
 ( ( ), ( ), ( )) : ( ( ), ( ), ( )) ( ( ), ( ), ( ))c c i a c c i d c c ir A k D k Y k r A k D k Y k r A k D k Y k   . (6) 
Specifically, we let the instant reward be defined as 
 ( ( ), ( ), ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
T T T
c c i c c c p p p d c a cr A k D k Y k x k x k x k x k D k A k       ,  (7) 
which consists of the cost of the cyber state, physical state, defense, and attack. The defense 
cost is defined as ( )d cD i  where ,1 ,2 ,, ,..., dd d d d N        and each element ,d i
  is the 
corresponding cost of launching defense id . Likewise ,1 ,2 ,, ,..., aa a a a N        is the vector 
describing the cost of launching attacks. Next, we will derive the optimal strategy for the 
attacker and the optimal defense can be obtained in the same manner. 
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After introducing the definition of the instant payoff, we now consider the expected 
discounted payoff function over multiple stages. Let  (1), (2),... ( )...A c c cA A A k  and 
 (1), (2),... ( )...D c c cD D D k  be the policies for the attack and defense respectively, where 
( )cA k and ( )cD k stand for the actions at the time instant k . A policy, which is a sequence of 
decisions over time, is the mathematical description of a plan of the player for the game 
[18].  Now define the expected discounted cost function V  for each subset iY  as 
  
0
( , , ) ( ) | , ,kA D i A D c i
k
V Y E r k y Y


        , (8) 
where [0,1)   is the discount factor. As a result, the objective of the attacker becomes 
finding the appropriate policy A  in each subset iY  such that the expected discounted 
payoff functionV is maximized. Correspondingly, the defender aims to find the appropriate 
defense policy D  for each iY  to minimize V .  That is to say, we need to solve 
'




    and
'




   . Next, the following two lemmas are introduced 
before we derive the optimal policies. 
Lemma 1. [19] The discounted zero-sum game always possesses a unique solution 
yielding the optimal game value. 
Lemma 2. [20] The policy  * *,A D   is guaranteed to be optimal if * *( , , )A D iV Y   
satisfies the following fixed-point Bellman equation given by 
 
'
* * * *( , , ) min max ( , , ) ( ' | , , ) ( , , ')
D A
i
A D i c c i i i c c A D i
Y
V Y r A D Y p Y Y A D V Y
 
  
      
  
  , (9) 
where p  is the probability of transitioning from current state iY  to the next state 'iY  after 
taking action pair  ,c cA D .  
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Based on these two lemmas, we use iterative Q-learning method to search for the 
game value
* *( , , )A D iV Y  in (9). Now define the Q-function for each region iY  as 
 ( , , ) ( , , ) ( ' | , , ) ( , , ')
i
i
c c i c c i i i c c A D i
Y Y
Q A D Y r A D Y p Y Y A D V Y

    . (10) 
Accordingly, the optimal action dependent value function 
*Q  of the game is defined as 
 
* * *( , , ) ( , , ) ( ' | , , ) ( , , ')
i
i
c c i c c i i i c c A D i
Y Y
Q A D Y r A D Y p Y Y A D V H Y

    . (11) 
From (9) to (11), one can conclude that if the action pair sequence  ,A D  is 
optimal, the optimal Q-function 
*( , , )c c iQ A D Y  is equal to the game value function
* *( , , )A D iV Y  . In other words, we have 
 
* * * * * *( , , ) min max ( , , ) ( , , )
D A
A D i c c i c c iV Y Q A D Y Q A D Y
 
    .  (12) 
The Minimax-Q algorithm proposed in [17] is adopted to obtain
*( , , )c c iQ A D Y since 
it provides strong convergence guarantees according to the following theorem. 
Theorem 1. Let the Q-function ( , , )c c iQ A D Y and the optimal action dependent value 
function,
*( , , )c c iQ A D Y , be defined as in (10) and (11) respectively. Then ( , , )c c iQ A D Y
converges to the optimal value
*( , , )c c iQ A D Y after an infinite number of iterations with the 
following tuning law given by 
    1( , , ) 1 ( ) ( , , ) ( ) ( , , ) ( ')i c c i i c c i c c i a iQ A D Y i Q A D Y i r A D Y Y        ,  (13) 
where ( )i














  , and ( )a iY is 
called the state value function [17] calculated by  
  ( ) min , , ( , )c
c
a i c c i a c i
D
A
Y Q A D Y A Y   ,  (14) 
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where ( , )a c iA Y  denotes the probability for the attacker to take action cA  given c iy Y .  The 
proof of Theorem 1 is similar to the theorem in [21]. 
In addition, since ( , )a c iA Y  is unknown, linear programming is employed to 
approximate it at each iteration. An appropriate update law for ( , )a c iA Y is given by [21] 
  
( , )
( , ) : arg max min , , ( , )
c
a i c
a c i c c i a c i
DY A




    
   
    
  . (15) 
A flowchart of the proposed method to obtain the optimal defense/attack strategy 






1) Divide Y into appropriate number of subsets Yi;
2) Let the Q-function Q(Ac,Dc,Yi)=0 for all Ac, Dc, and Yi;
3) Let the state value function Θa(Yi)=0, for all Yi;
4) Let the action distribution vector πa(Ac,Yi)=1/Na for all Ac.
Randomly pick up an action Ac or use greedy search [16]
Update:
1) Update action distribution vector πa(Ac,Yi)=1/Na with (13);
2) Update state value function Θa(Yi) with (12);
3) Update Q-function Q(Ac,Dc,Yi) with (11).
Calculate cyber state xc and output yc with (4);
Find Yi such that c iy Y





Figure 3.2. Flowchart of the optimal policy for the defender/attacker. 
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4. OPTIMAL CONTROLLER DESIGN  
In this section, we introduce the optimal control scheme for the physical system 
based on the previous work [14]. First, we model the linear discrete-time system with 
dynamics that is unknown and altered by the cyber state vector, which includes packet 
losses and time delays since these are two important metrics for the network that may cause 
deterioration or potential instability of the system [22]. We then introduce the optimal 
control gain and show that the system is stable only when the cyber state vector satisfies a 
certain criterion. The cyber system needs to launch the appropriate defense if its state vector 
fails to satisfy the criterion. The development of the system dynamics as well as the Q-
function update law is taken from the paper [14]. In summary, we show that the cyber state 
vector affects the optimal controller design and meanwhile the states of physical system 
also have an impact on designing the defense for the cyber system.  
In cyber-physical systems, there are two types of network-induced delays: the 
sensor-to-controller delay and the controller-to-sensor delay. With the assumption that the 
former is negligible, the linear continuous system can be described as [14] 

















  and  is the delay which is discrete-
value. It is important to note that the data information needed to be discretized before 
transmitting into the communication network. Moreover, to avoid the infinite-dimensional 
issue, authors assume that the delays are bounded. Let sT  be the sampling time, the system 





k s k k i i k i k k
i
x A x B u y Cx  

   , (17) 
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where b is the maximum number of delayed control input during the sampling interval; 
 kx x kT ;
AT
sA e ;
   
0
0 0k




   1 ;
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iT
B e dsB T iT
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
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 . Let the augmented state kz  be defined as: 
1[ ]
T T T T
k k k k bz x u u  , then the system dynamics become [14] 
 1 ,
n
k zk k zk k k z kz A z B u y C z    ,  (18) 
where the system matrices are a function of the unknown random delays, and packet losses 
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and 1 1[ ]
n T T T T T T
k k k k b k k by y u u w w     where ,m lI I are m m and l l identity matrices.  The 
objective is to minimize the cost function  
,
T T
k m m m m
m k







  where S and R are 
symmetric positive semi-definite and symmetric positive definite constant matrices 




k m z m m z m
m k







  where { , / ,..., / }zS diag S R b R b  and /zR R b . The cost function 
is known to be quadratic and is given as  
,
T
k k k kJ E z P z
 
  where 0kP  .  Define the Q-function 
as       1
, , ,
( , ) ( , ) , , , ,
k k k k k k k k
T T
T T T T T T T T
k k k k k k kQ z u E r z u J E z u H z u z u E H z u
     

                  , (19) 
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where ( , )
T T
k k m z m m z mr z u z S z u R u  . Therefore  , kE H  can be expressed in terms of the system 
matrices as  
  
   







zz zu z zk k zk zk k zk
k k
k k uz uu T T
k k zk k zk z zk k zk
S E A P A E A P B
H H
H E H
H H E B P A R E B P B
   
 
   
 
 
             
 . (20) 




k k kK H H

 . Moreover, with the linear in the unknown parameters (LIP) assumption, 
the Q-function can be written as ( , ) T Tk k k k k k kQ z u w H w h w  , where ( )k kh vec H , [ , ( )]
T T T
k k kw z u z
,and
2 2 2
1 1 2 1( ,..., , ,..., , )k k k kq k kq kq kqw w w w w w w w is the Kronecker product quadratic polynomial basis 
vector. Therefore, the Q-function can be estimated as ˆˆ( , ) Tk k k kQ z u h w in which 
ˆ
h is the 
estimate value of the target parameter vector h .  
Now define the residual or temporal difference error as  1 1ˆ ˆ ,hk k k k ke J J r z u    , then 




( , ) Thk k k k ke r z u h W     where 1k k kW w w   . (21) 
Next, we define an auxiliary residual error vector as 
1 1
ˆT
hk k k kh       where  
1 1 1 2 2 1 1[ ( , ) ( , ) ( , )]k k k k k k i k jr z u r z u r z u           
and 1 1 2 1[ ]k k k k jW W W         . 
Similarly, the dynamics of the auxiliary vector are derived as: 
1 1
ˆT
hk k k kh      . The 
update law of the target matrix kH  is given by 
    
1
1
ˆ T T T
k k k k h hk kh 

        .  (22) 
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It is shown in [17] that with the update law (22), there exists a positive constant h  
satisfying  0 1h   such that both the state vectors kz  and the adaptive parameter 
estimator errors are asymptotically stable in the mean.   
Finally, we show the sufficient condition on the cyber state in term of the delay and 
packet loss that need to satisfy in order to maintain the system to be stochastically stable. 
Consider the systems with slowly-varying parameters, since the initial stabilizing control 
and disturbance inputs are given, the linear discrete-time system can be represented as 
*
1k zk kz A z  [23]. Applying the linear transformation, the expectation of
*
zkA can be written as 
 
   00 1 1
* **
0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
k kk k k
s k k b bs k k k b b
zk zkm m
m m
E A B K E BA B K B B
K K
A E AI I
I I
        
  
   




   
.  
According to the definition of stability for stochastic linear time-varying system 
[24], if eigenvalues of  **zkE A  are within a unit radius n-dimensional sphere (or disc) for all 
instants, then the system is stable. Since the eigenvalues of the right bottom block of  **zkE A
are ones, the left upper block has to satisfy the condition: 0
,
[ ( )] 1ki s kE A B K
 
   for any i  and 
k  and ( )M denotes the eigenvalue of the matrix M . Since K  and L  are the initial fixed 
stabilizing control and disturbance input gains for the linear discrete-time system, we have 
 ( ) 1
s
i s s iA B K     with 
 
0
T A T s
sB e dsB

  . (23) 
Then 0
,
( )ks kE A B K
 
  can be represented as 
 0 0 1 2 1 2 1
,
( ) ( ) ( ) min{ , } min{ , }k ks k s k s s sE A B K A E E B K I A A B K
   
               (24) 
where




( ) ( ) /
k
T TA T s A T s
kE E e ds e ds 

 
     and 
   
0 0
2 ( ) ( ) /k k
T TA T s A T s
kE E e ds e ds  

 
    .   
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Combining (23) with (24), we have 
  0 1 2 1 2
,
[ ( )] 1 min{ , } ( ) min{ , }k si s k i s iE A B K A
 
            .  
Therefore, in order to maintain stability, the expected values of the delays and 
packet losses should satisfy  
 1 2 1 2min{ , } 1 1 min{ , } / ( )
s
i i sA          , (25) 
where 1 and 2 are functions of the delay and packet losses defined by (24). When this 
inequality is not satisfied, the cyber system needs to launch an appropriate defense to 
reduce the delay and packet losses in order to prevent instability; otherwise the physical 
system needs to be halted as it becomes unstable.  
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5. AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE 
In this illustrative example, the proposed framework is verified on a small-scale 
UAV helicopter with remote controller. The objective of the controller design is to stabilize 
the yaw rotation rate with the presence of two types of cyber-attacks. The attacker aims to 
maximize the payoff, which are given in terms of the network delay and packet losses in 
this case, such that the yaw channel becomes unstable. The defender, on the other hand, 
aims to limit the delay and packet losses under a certain threshold. We will show that on 
the cyber side, both the attacker and the defender gain their greatest payoff while on the 
physical system side, the optimal controller is able to maintain the yaw rate stable when 
the cyber state vector expressed as delay and packet loss meets the derived condition. 
5.1. PHYSICAL SYSTEM SETUP 
In this illustrative example, we consider the control of the yaw rotation of a small-
scale unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) helicopter. A yaw rotation, as illustrated in Figure 
5.1, is a movement around the yaw axis of a rigid body that changes the direction it is 
pointing [26]. The yaw rotation control is one of the most challenging tasks in controlling 
small-scale UAVs because even a small control input or disturbance can cause the vibration 
of the light-weight body [26]. Since it is verified in [27] and [28] that the yaw-channel 
dynamics for small-scale helicopters can be physically decoupled from other channels, it 
is reasonable to assume that the yaw-channel dynamic is a single-input-single-out (SISO) 
system. Furthermore, after applying the prediction-error method [29], an accurate fourth-
order model is proposed in [26] as 
;x Ax Bu y Cx   , 
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where  1 2 3 4, , ,
T
x x x x x  consists of the first to the fourth derivatives of the yaw rotation rate; 
y  is the yaw rotation rate that can be measured by a gyro; and  
2.66 21.94 3.83 6.05 0.63
31.03 3.52 17.10 3.09 6.22
, , [15.32 10.32 0.73 4.73].
6.11 6.96 9.76 96.38 29.20
17.17 25.73 37.18 33.08 14.64
A B C
   
   
  
       
      
   


























Figure 5.1. Illustration of a yaw 
rotation. 
Figure 5.2. Diagram of the UAV with remote 
controller. 
The other parameters of the physical system are introduced as follows. The total 
simulation time is 200 steps with the sampling time of 100ms and the positive constant h  
equals to 610 . In the first 50 steps, zero-mean exploration noises with variance of 0.006 
and 0.003 are added for the odd and even steps respectively, in order to meet the persistency 
of excitation (PE) condition. The objective of the controller is to stabilize the yaw rotation 
rate y by driving the state vector x  to zero.  
  
85 
5.2. CYBER SYSTEM SETUP 
As illustrated in Figure 5.2, we suppose that the UAV is controlled by a base station 
through a wireless network that suffers from cyber-attacks. As stated earlier, we choose 
packet losses  and time delays  as the cyber state vector in order to evaluate the effect 
on the network induced by the attack/defense activities, i.e.,  ,
T
cx   . Furthermore, smurf 
attack and slow read attack [30-32] are considered.  
Smurf attack is an example of amplification distributed denial of service (DDoS) 
attack that exploits the unprotected networks to generate significant traffic load on the 
victim network [30-31].  
Slow read attack, on the other hand, tries to exhaust the server’s connection pool 
by sends legitimate application layer request but reads the response slowly [32]. Based on 
these characteristics, we model the delay and packet loss rate to increase exponentially 
under the smurf attack and linearly under the slow read attack, which are illustrated in 
Figure 5.3 (a) and Figure 5.4 (b).  
Furthermore, the corresponding strategies that are capable of defending smurf 
attack and slow read attack are denoted as 1d  and 2d , respectively. We assume that when 
the appropriate defense strategy is loaded, the packet loss rate and the time delay decrease 
in a linear manner, which are illustrated in Figure 5.3 (c) and Figure 5.3 (d). In addition, 
the delay and packet loss rate are modeled to decrease slowly and linearly once the attack 
is stopped regardless of the action of the defender. For simplicity, we mainly focus on the 
case where only one attack and one defense are active at a sampling instant. However, it is 
also briefly shown that the proposed representation can be easily expanded to apply 
multiple attacks and defenses. 
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   
 
; 
ptx is the threshold of the physical states; ( )  is defined in Section 4. According to this 
definition, when the physical states are within the threshold, the cyber output is a quadratic 





                   (a)               (b)               (c)               (d) 
Figure 5.3. Models of delay/packet loss rate under (a) smurf attack, no defense; (b) 
slow read attack, no defense; (c) smurf attack with the corresponding defense; (d) slow 
read attack with the corresponding defense. 
 
Next, as presented in the flowchart in Figure 3.2, we divide the cyber output Y  into 
four subsets, i.e., 0 1 2 3Y Y Y Y Y  where 0Y , 1Y , 2Y , 3Y  correspond to the “healthy”, 
“sensitive”, “dangerous”, and “failed” condition respectively. Moreover, we define the 
instant reward in the form of (7) with ,1 ,20, ,d d d       and ,1 ,20, ,a a a      . In other words, 
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the costs for “not launching any defenses”, “launching defense 1d ”, and “launching defense
2d ” are 0, ,1d , and ,2d , respectively.  
Table 5.1. Summary of system information used in the illustrative example. 
Attacks 
 0 1 2, ,cA a a a , where 0a  demotes “no attacks; 1a  demotes smurf attack; 
and 2a denotes slow read attack. 
Defenses 
 0 1 2, ,
T
cD d d d , where 0d  demotes “no defenses; 1d  demotes the defense 
against smurf attack; and 2d denotes the defense against slow read 
attack. 
Cyber states  ,
T
cx   , where   is the packet loss rate and   is the delay. 
System 
Dynamics 
     
     
     
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0
1 0 1 1 1 1 2
2 0 2 2 1 2 2 2 3
( 1) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
c c c c
c c c
c c c
x k a d x k a d x k a d x k
a d x k a d x k a d x k
a d x k a d x k a d x k
 
          
      




0 1 2 3, , ,

      characterize the packet loss rate/delay linearly 







( ) ( )
0
T





    
 





0 1 2 3Y Y Y Y Y  . 
Payoff 
( ( ), ( ), ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )T Tc c i c c c d c a cr A k D k Y k x k x k D k A k     , where 




It is important to note that we make 0Y  be the region with “healthy” condition by 
setting the cost for launching the defense close to the upper values of 1Y . As a result, if the 
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cyber output falls into subset 0Y , the defender tends not to launch the defense as it costs 
more than the payoff brought by the state.  Subset 1Y , on the other hand, is modeled as the 
“sensitive” region where the defender is more likely to launch the defense to avoid the 
output going into subset 2Y , which is the “dangerous” state in this model. Likewise, if the 
output falls into region 2Y , there is a very high chance that the defenses needs to be launched 
to avoid the system going into 3Y , which is the “failed” region. 
The system information for this particular example is summarized as in Table 5.1. 
The simulation is performed with the algorithm described in Figure 3.2 and numerical 
values shown in Table 5.2.  
Table 5.2. Numerical values used in the simulation. 
( ) 1/k k  ; 0.5  ; 3a dN N   ; 1.2  ; 1 2 1   ; 
 0 1;1.1  ,  1 50;48  ,  2 3;2.9  ; [0,5000,4500]d  ;  0,1500,1000a  ; 




5.3. SIMULATION RESULTS 
In the simulation, the optimal defense/attack policies for the cyber system and the 
optimal controller are derived in the presence of delay and packet losses. Since the delay 
and packet losses are generated from the cyber system, they are determined directly by the 
policy launched by the defender. After deriving the optimal defense/attack policies, two 
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scenarios are considered in the simulation. In the first scenario, we let the defender launch 
the cyber defense policy based on the probability distribution given by the derived optimal 
policy. By contrast, in the second scenario, the defender selects the defense actions at 
random.  
5.3.1. Results of Deriving the Optimal Attack/Defense Policies.  First, we shall 
show the simulation results of deriving the optimal attack/defense. After about 2000 
iterations, the Q-values for all action pairs converge to fixed values. To avoid redundancy, 
we only show the Q-values for the attacker and the defender in region 1Y  in Figure 5.4 (a) 
and Figure 5.4 (b), respectively.  From Figure 5.4 it can be concluded that the expected 
discounted payoff for the attacker in region 1Y  is higher if he chooses action 0a rather than 
1a  and 2a . Likewise, the expected discounted payoff values suggest the defender in region 
iY  to load action 2d more frequently than 0d and 1d . Furthermore, the percentages of the Q-





                            (a)             (b) 
Figure 5.4. Q-values in region for (a) the attacker; (b) the defender. 
















































It can be concluded from Table 5.3 that when 0cy Y , the attacker shall take action
2a more often as it increases the delay and packet losses in a faster way. The defender, on 
the other hand, shall take no actions, which corresponds to our previous analysis that 0Y  is 
the region with “acceptable” health condition. With the increase in cy , the attacker shall 
slow down the speed to avoid being detected by the defender, as one can conclude from 
the Q-value distributions in region 1Y  in the table. Correspondingly, the defender starts 
loading the defense more often in this sensitive region. If the attacker manages to drive cy  
into region 2Y  or even 3Y , he shall stop attacking and let the system recover and go back to 
region 1Y  where he obtains the largest expected payoff.  It is important to note that we 
deliberately design the system as a secure one by letting the recovery speed of the cyber 
states when appropriate defense is loaded much faster than the degrading speed when the 
system is under attacks. As a result, the attacker gains the greatest payoff only when cy is 
large enough yet not to the degree of being detected by the defender.  
Table 5.3. Percentages for each action in the region. 
 Attacker Defender 


















0Y  0.02 0.58 0.34 0.71 0.09 0.20 
1Y  0.53 0.08 0.39 0.11 0.25 0.64 
2Y  0.69 0.13 0.18 0.04 0.37 0.59 




The proposed model and analysis is verified through the following simulation. We 
start the system with the cyber state initialized to zero and stop after 1000 iterations. During 
iteration, the attacker and defender will 1) determine which region cy  is in and take actions 
according to the probabilities given by Table 5.3; 2) update the states; and 3) calculate the 






Figure 5.5. Evolution of the states (a) delay; (b) packet loss rate. 
From Figure 5.5 it can be concluded that after a rapid increase at the beginning, the 
delay and the packet loss rate remains relatively stable so that the attacker gains the largest 
expected payoff in terms of the delay and packet losses. This is achieved by loading much 
more 0a  (no attacks) than 1a  (smurf attack) and 2a (slow read attack), as suggested by the 
probabilities in Table 5.3. Due to the stochastic property of this game, we observe that 





















































occasionally, the attacker loads the “inappropriate” attack ( 1a ) and detected by the 
defender, resulting in a significant drop in the states. Figure 5.6 shows the evolution of the 
output, where one can conclude that as previously analyzed, the output stays in the 
“acceptable” region at most times, goes to the “dangerous” region occasionally, and never 





Figure 5.6. Evolution of the output. Figure 5.7. Evolution of average payoff. 
From Figure 5.7 we can see that after about 100 iterations, the averaged payoff 
tends to be stable at around 8000, which is the greatest averaged payoff for the attacker. 
This example shows that by applying the optimal policies the attacker is able to obtain the 
greatest payoff meanwhile the defender is able to keep the health condition under the 
“dangerous” level. 





















































In addition, the simulation is repeated for the case where the two attacks/defenses 
can be loaded simultaneously. As a result, a table similar to Table 5.3 is obtained except 
that two extra columns are added, which are the probability distributions of simultaneously 
loading two attacks  1 2a a  and two defenses  1 2d d . To verify the results, we use the 
method mentioned earlier, in which we observe the output cy by letting the attacker and 
defender select their action based on the derived probability distributions. The results are 





      Figure 5.8. Evolution of the output. 
From Figure 5.8 one can conclude that the output stays in the “acceptable” region 
at most times and never goes to the “dangerous” or the “failed” region. This results agree 
with our previously analysis and verify that the proposed representation can be used in the 
case where multiple attacks can be loaded simultaneously.  
































5.3.2. Scenario I: Defender Chooses the Optimal Policy. In this scenario, we let 
the defender launch the defense policy based on the probability distribution given by the 
derived optimal policy. As a result, the delay and packet losses have been limited to 
relatively low values so that the system always stays out of the failed region, which is as 
verified in Figure 5.5 (a). Consequently, equation (25) is satisfied in this scenario. The 
simulation results of the regulation errors for the physical system are shown in Figure 5.9, 





Figure 5.9. Regulation errors in Case I where the cyber defense is optimal. 
Therefore, we show that on the cyber side, both the attacker and the defender gains 
their greatest payoff while on the physical side, the optimal controller is able to maintain 
the plant stable when the cyber state vector meets the derived criterion.  































5.3.3. Scenario II: Defender Chooses a Random Policy. In the second scenario, 
the cyber defense is selected at random rather than based on the optimal probability 
distribution given in Table 5.3  As a result, the attacker manages to comprise the system in 
some cases and the cyber states go far beyond the limit, as verified in Figure 5.10 in which 
the time delay is plotted.  
Consequently, equation (25) cannot be satisfied and thus the system becomes 
unstable. The regulation errors in this scenario are plotted in Figure 5.11, where it can be 
seen that the errors do not converge. In summary, the simulation results verify that that the 
decisions made on the cyber system have an effect on the convergence of the physical 
system. The system is stable when applying the optimal control in the physical plant and 
optimal defense policy in the cyber system. If the states go abnormal such that (25) is not 
satisfied, appropriate actions needs to be launched on the cyber system to bring them back 





Figure 5.10. Delay in Case II where the 
cyber defense is randomly selected. 
Figure 5.11. System becomes unstable in 
Case II. 















































6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
With the increasing meshing among the cyber-connected elements with the 
physical entities, the representation for such cyber-physical system becomes more 
complicated. In this paper, we have proposed a representation that captures the 
interrelationship between the cyber and physical systems such that the states in the physical 
system affect the decision made on the cyber systems and vice versa. Based on this 
representation, the optimal defense and attacks are given to gain the greatest payoff. An 
optimal controller from the literature is revisited to maintain the stability of the physical 
system in the presence of the uncertainties induced by the cyber state vector. Since the 
proposed representation is in a general form, it can be used in a variety of applications 
including autonomous systems. In particular, the cyber defender is able to make thorough 
decisions by selecting appropriate cyber state vector and output and customizing the payoff 
function that is of interest. Meanwhile, there are some recent works focusing on modelling 
and controlling for multi-agent networks or cyber-physical systems [33-35]. For example, 
the work in [33] characterizes a binary notion of security and characterizes security levels 
in terms of the graph matrix and its spectrum, which is complementary to control-theoretic 
modeling of attacks in cyber-networks and networked control systems. Based on these 
works, as future work, we can consider studying the impact of different attacks on the 
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III. FLOW-BASED ATTACK DETECTION AND ACCOMMODATION FOR 
NETWORKED CONTROL SYSTEMS 
Haifeng Niu and S. Jagannathan 
In networked control systems, the communication links are vulnerable to a variety 
of potential malicious attacks. In this paper, we first propose a novel attack detection 
scheme that is capable of capturing the abnormality in the traffic flow in those 
communication links due to a class of attacks. Further, it is shown that the stability of the 
physical system can be affected by the condition of the network due to delays and packet 
losses induced by the attacks. An observer-based detection scheme is developed both for 
the network and physical system. Attacks on the networks as well as on the physical system 
can be detected and upon detection, the physical system can be stabilized by adjusting the 
controller gains. Several attacks are considered in the simulation to show the applicability 





Networked control systems (NCS) are ubiquitous with applications ranging from 
large-scale industrial systems to critical infrastructure such as electric networks. In NCS, 
the digital controllers receive measured data from sensors and transmit control commands 
to the actuators through a communication network. However, the data flow between 
different system components are vulnerable to a variety of potential system disturbances 
and malicious attacks, which have been recently discussed and summarized [1]. 
The defense methodology in NCS can be due to [2]: 1) protection of information in 
the cyber system and 2) attenuation of disturbances and detection of states abnormalities 
in the physical system. The majority of the effort in the former category is devoted to the 
development of encryption algorithms on the communication channel [2]. However, it is 
only a partial solution for securing NCS because certain attacks, especially those that target 
information availability such as denial of service (DoS) attacks, do not require the data to 
be decoded. Moreover, the delay induced by the encryption methods could lead to 
performance degradation of the control system.  
Other effort [3-7] in the former category explore the behavior of the attacker as well 
as the defender, formulate the cyber changes under attacks, and present an appropriate 
strategy to bring the cyber system back to normal. For instance, the effort in [3] introduces 
the Denial of Service (DoS) flooding attacks by a continuous-time Markov chain and 
utilizes the state space method to compute security measures accurately. Different from 
[3], the authors in [4] study the cyber defense by modeling the actions of the attacker and 
the defender as a stochastic zero-sum game. In [5], the measure of vulnerabilities in cyber-
physical systems with application to power systems is defined and a security framework 
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including anomaly detection and mitigation strategies is provided. The authors in [6] 
evaluate the cyber security by computing the expected probabilities of the attacker and 
using the probabilities to build a transition model through game-theoretic approach. In [7], 
the cyber vulnerability is evaluated dynamically by using hidden Markov model and by 
providing a mechanism for handling sensor data with different trustworthiness.  
On the other hand, the latter category concentrates on characterizing the dynamics 
of the physical system under attacks by extending the classical state-space description. For 
instance, in [8], the system dynamics include an extra term to model the deception attack. 
In [9], the system state under attack is represented with an additive term which in turn is 
used to simulate the false data injection attack. Unlike [9], the authors in [10] characterize 
the deception attacks using a set of objectives and propose policies to synthesize stealthy 
deception attacks in both linear and nonlinear estimators.  
In [11], the estimation and control of linear systems when sensors or actuators are 
corrupted by an attacker is provided, together with a secure local control loop that can 
improve the resilience of the system. On the other hand, the authors in [12] define the 
control input under attacks as the product of the given input and a coefficient to characterize 
the effect induced by the DoS attacks. A class of human adversaries, referred to as 
correlated jammers, is considered in [13]. By modeling the coupled decision making 
process as a two-level receding-horizon dynamic game, the authors propose a control law 
and analyze the performance and the closed-loop stability under attacks.  
Despite interesting ideas by the above mentioned effort [8-13] for the security of 
the overall NCS, there are many weaknesses [14]. First, the representation can only 
describe a single type of attack due to the fact that attacks affect the system dynamics in a 
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variety of ways. In particular, in [14] a unified framework that is able to detect attacks is 
proposed whereas it still has the two drawbacks mentioned next. Second, it is difficult to 
implement the representation developed in the literature so far since the system dynamics 
under attacks are considered known. For instance, due to random delays and packet losses 
caused by certain cyber-attacks, the physical system dynamics will become uncertain [15]. 
This problem has been addressed by the authors [15][16] by using Q-learning and zero-
sum game theoretic formulation.  
However, the cyber-attacks may not be detected in a timely manner until a 
significant deviation in the physical system state vector is observed. For instance, it is well-
known that a large delay and packet loss rate can result in the instability of the physical 
system [16].  Instead of waiting for the detection of abnormal state vector in the physical 
system, it is better to identify the problematic communication link that is likely to be 
congested with excessive data by the attacks, which is not covered in our previous work 
[15]. Therefore, in this paper, we propose a detection scheme that is capable of capturing 
the abnormal traffic flow in the communication links for certain class of cyber-attacks 
given the network and physical system dynamics under consideration.  
We begin by introducing the state–space representation of traffic flow under cyber-
attacks with random delayed measurements for the communication network. Next, we 
derive the observer-based controller that stabilizes the flow during healthy conditions 
without attacks within the desired level by using linear matrix inequality (LMI) in the 
presence of delayed information. By using the observer and measured outputs, network 
attack detection residual is generated which in turn is utilized to determine the onset of an 
attack in the communication network when the residual exceeds a predefined threshold.  
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Then the detectability condition is introduced and the performance of the attack detection 
scheme is discussed.  
Next, we introduce an attack detection scheme for the physical system that is 
capable of detecting attacks in both the communication network and physical system. A 
new controller gain will be selected upon the detection of attacks in order to stabilize the 
physical system. Finally the proposed scheme is evaluated by considering four types of 
cyber-attacks in the simulation. The results verify that the proposed scheme for the 
networks is able to detect certain types of attacks while revealing inherent limitation. The 
simulation results on the physical systems verify that the attacks on both the network and 
the physical system can be detected and the physical system can be stabilized by applying 
the obtained controller gains. The results of the hardware implementation on an RFID 
network confirm that both the jamming attack and the blackhole attack can be detected by 
the proposed detection scheme. 
The contributions of the paper include: 1) the design of the flow controller with 
randomly delayed measurement in the presence of attacks; 2) the development of novel 
observer-based network attack detection and estimation scheme along with detectability 
condition; 3) the design of the observer and the detection scheme using measured outputs 
of the physical system for detecting attacks on both network and the physical system; 4) 
the controller design for the physical system to maintain the stability of the physical system 
which can be utilized to maintain the healthy condition of the communication networks in 
terms of the delays and packet losses; and 5) demonstration of the proposed scheme in both 




The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the state-
space stochastic flow model under cyber-attacks. The observer and controller design is 
presented in Section 3, followed by the adversary model and cyber-attack detectability 
provided in Section 4. In Section 5 we present the detection scheme and controller design 
for the physical system. The simulation as well as the hardware implementation results and 
analysis are given in Section 6 and conclusions in Section 7.  
The notations used in the paper are briefly introduced. Prob   stands for the 
probability of the event occurring “  ”.  E x  denotes the expectation of the stochastic 
variable x ,  max M  represents the largest eigenvalue of matrix M ,  diag v stands for the 
square diagonal matrix with the elements of vector v  (or with the sub-blocks of matrix v ) 
on the main diagonal and the “*” in matrices denotes the symmetric terms. 
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2. STOCHASTIC FLOW MODEL 
Figure 2.1 shows the diagram of a typical NCS, in which both the controller 
commands and the sensor data are transmitted through a wired or wireless communication 
link. In this section, we propose a stochastic state-space representation in discrete-time for 
the traffic flow at the bottleneck link in the presence of attacks. It is verified both 
theoretically and experimentally [17] that the performance measures such as the delay and 
transmission rate are determined by the bottleneck node and therefore a mild assumption 











Figure 2.1. Diagram of a typical NCS. 
Let the input rate at sampling time kT be k  packets per second and ku be the 
adjustment from the previous input rate, that is 
1k k ku    . (1) 
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The transmission or output rate k , which slightly fluctuates around the standard 
transmission rate 0 , is modeled by a stable autoregressive–moving-average (ARMA) 
process given by [19] 




k i k i ki
l d   
  , (3) 
where “ d ” represents a bounded disturbance with Md being its bound, l  and m  are 
predefined constants obtained during system identification. Compared with other 
transmission rate models such as the random walk model [19], the advantages with the 
ARMA process is that it is analytically tractable and capable of capturing a wide range of 
possible behavior.  
Let the traffic flow in the bottleneck node at time kT be k . Then we have 
1k k k k kT T         , (4) 
where k  is the number of the packets introduced by the attacker with 0k   implies that 
the attacker has injected data while 0k  implies that the attacker has dropped data. More 
detailed representation of the attack models can be found in Section 4. 
Let the desired flow at the bottleneck node be 0 and re-write (4) as 
1 0 0 0( ) ( )k k k k kT T               . (5) 
Now define the shifted flow k and input rate k  as 
0 0,k k k k         . (6) 
Then the flow dynamic in (5) become 
1k k k k kT T         . (7) 
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Define the state vector  1, , , ,
T






1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 0 0 0
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1 ,k k k k kx Ax Bu Dd W      (9) 
where A , B , D  and W represent the appropriate dimensioned matrices from (8). 
It has been reported in the literature [20] that the network state can be easily 
measured when the servers at the output queues are Rate Allocating Servers and the 
transport protocol supports the Packet-Pair probing technique. Therefore, in this paper, the 
network state described by input rate, output rate, and the current flow in the link are 
considered accessible.  Suppose the current traffic flow in the link and the output rate can 
be known after a delay of , where  is a stochastic variable. Define the output 
vector y as 
         
1
,1, ,1 ,1 ,0, ,0, ,0
k
k k k k k k k i
i
y diag x diag i i x

        

       (10) 
where   1x  for 0x  and   0x  for other values of x . 
Moreover, as illustrated in Figure 2.2, considering the fact that the backward 
transmission delay is much smaller than the forward delay due to the lack of queuing time, 
we make the following weak assumption. 
kT {0,1, }k 
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Assumption 1 [21]: Assume  0,1k  , i.e., the feedback delay for the output rate 
and buffer length measurement is one sampling interval at most and k is a Bernoulli 
distributed white sequence with 
   Pr 1 : .k kE      (11) 
Then the output vector y in (10) becomes 







1 ,1, 1 ,1 ,1 ,0, ,0, ,0
k k k k
k
k k k k k
k m
k k k k k k
y
diag x diag x
   

   














     
 (12) 
Define a diagonal matrix with the random variable k  as  ,0, ,0 ,0k k kdiag    
and we further let  ,0, ,0, ,0diag   . Then (12) can be re-written as 
1( )k k k k ky I x x     . (13) 
Now we are ready to introduce the flow observer and controller. Controller will be 






Feedback for buffer length
Feedback for output rate
 
Figure 2.2. Illustration of the delayed measurement. 
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3. FLOW OBSERVER AND CONTROLLER DESIGN 
The benefit of the observer is twofold. On one hand, due to the stochastic delay in 
measurement, the state cannot be known instantaneously. An estimated state, which is 
generated by the observer, will be utilized by the controller. On the other hand, by using 
the measured and estimated outputs, an estimation error or attack residual is generated for 
detection. The observer is described as 
1
1
ˆ ˆ ˆ( )
ˆ ˆ ˆ( )
k k k k k
k k k k k
x Ax Bu L y y
y I x x


    

    
, (14) 
and the flow controller is given by using the observer state as 
ˆ ,k ku Kx  (15) 
where L  and K  denote the observer and controller gain matrices, respectively, with 
appropriate dimension to be designed later.      
Define the state estimation error as 
ˆk k ke x x  . (16) 
Then the state and the estimation error dynamics become 
 1k k k k kx A BK x BKe Dd W      , (17) 
   1 1 1( )k k k k k k ke L x A L I e L x L e Dd W                    . (18) 
Combining (17) and (18) yields 
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    
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   






Now define the augmented state vector as  1 1
T
k k k k kX x e x e  .  Then (19) 
becomes 
1k k k kX AX Dd W    , (20) 
where A , D , and W represent system matrices from (20). 
Next we will first introduce the definition of stochastic stability in the mean-square 
sense together with the H  performance constraints since the closed-loop dynamic system 
of the source-destination pair described in (20) contains stochastic variable  . Then we 
will introduce the design of the controller and observer gain matrices L and K such that the 
system (20) is stabilized and satisfies the H performance constraints in the absence of 
attacks. We solve the gain matrices L and K by using linear matrix inequalities (LMI). 
Finally, we will demonstrate that with the obtained L and K , the estimation error is bounded 
when the attacks are absent. 
3.1. STABILITY IN THE HEALTHY CASE 
Before obtaining the gain matrices, the following definitions and lemmas are 
needed in order to proceed. 
Definition 1 [21]: The closed-loop system (20) is said to be exponentially mean-
square stable with 0kd   and 0k  , if there are constants 0   and  0,1   such that 
   2 20kkE X E X  . (21) 
Before we introduce the theorem on stability in the absence of attacks, the following 
definition and lemmas are needed. 
Definition 2 [22]: The closed-loop system (20) in the absence of attacks meets the 
H  performance constraints when its state satisfies 
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   2 220 0k kk kE GX E d
 
 
   (22) 
for all nonzero kd , where   is a prescribed positive scalar, G is the given input-output gain 
matrix.   
Lemma 1 [23]: Let  kV X  be a Lyapunov function for the system (20). If there 
exists real scalars 1 0  , 2 0  , 0  and 0 1   such that 
 
2 2
1 2k k kX V X X   , (23) 
and 
    1 |k k kE V X X V X    , (24) 
then the sequence kX  satisfies 










Lemma 2 [24]: Let A be a real n n  matrix and  1, nB diag b b be a diagonal 
stochastic matrix. Then 
  
   








E b E b b
E BAB A








where   is the Hadamard product, i.e.,   ij ijijA B A B   . 










 where 1M , 2M , and 3M
are matrices with appropriate dimensions. Then M  is positive definite (PD) if and only if 
both 3M and matrix  11 2 3 2TM M M M are PD. 
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Lemma 4: For a given observer gain matrix L  and controller gain matrix K , the 
closed-loop system (20) is exponentially mean-square stable in the absence of disturbances 


















A BK BK Q




    
          
   
   
      
0 0
0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0
, (27) 
where  (1 ),0, (1 ),0,...,0diag        , 
 2 2 1 4 3 2 4, , ,Q diag P P P P P P     , (28) 
and 
 3 1 3 1 3, , ,Q diag P P P P , (29) 
Proof: Let the Lyapunov function be defined as 
1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1
T T T T
k k k k k k k k kV x Px x P x e P e e P e       , (30) 
where 1P , 2P , 3P ,and 4P are PD matrices.  For the rest of the paper, we let  k kV V x  for short.  
Then from (17) and (18) it follows that
 
 
     
       
        
1






T T T T T T T T
k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k
T
k k k k
T
k k k k
T
k k k k
T T T
k k k k k k
E V V
E x P x e P e x P x e P e x P x x P x e P e e P e
A BK x BKe P A BK x BKe
A L I e L e P A L I e L e
E L x x P L x x
x P x e P e x P x





       
    
          
        
   1 2 1 3 1 4 1
T T T





Applying Lemma 2, we have 
         
       
     




1 3 1 .
TT
k k k k
TT T
k k k k
T
k k k k
T
k k k k
E x x L P L x x
x x E L P L x x
Lx Lx I P Lx Lx





       
        
      
      
 (32) 
Substitute (32) into (31), it follows that 
   1 1 3 1 2T T Tk k k k k kE V V X Q Q Q Q X X X     . (33) 












        , (34) 
where  1 3 2 4, , ,P diag P P P P and 
    1 min max0 min , P     . (34) 
Thus, (34) together with Lemma 1 completes the proof.   
Next, Theorem 1 introduces the selection of controller and observer gain matrices 
L and K in order to both stabilize the system and meet the performance constraints. 
Theorem 1: Given a positive scalar 1 , the system (20) without attacks i.e. 0k  , 
is exponentially mean-square stable and satisfies the H  performance constraint, if there 




















 where G G   0 0 0  , (37) 
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 22 2 1,S diag Q I  , (38) 
and  3 3,S diag Q I . (39) 
Proof: It is clear that (35) implies (25), and by Lemma 4, it follows that the system 
is exponentially mean-square stable. Now consider the following term 
 
          
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1 1 1 11 11 1
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G G D PQ D PQ
D PQ D PQ D P P D I
 
    
 
    
.  
Now we are left to prove 0  where 
 
   
 












Q Q Q G G D Q Q
diag Q I
D Q Q D Q D
Q D Q Q D





    
 
 
     
         
     0 0
 (41) 
According to Lemma 3, (36) implies (41). Therefore, we have 
           21 1 0T Tk k k k k kE V E V E Gx Gx E d d     . (42) 
By summing up (42) from 0 to  with respect to k , it follows that 
     2 2210 0k kk kE GX E d E V
 
 
   . (43) 
Since the system is exponentially mean-square stable, inequality (43) becomes 
   2 2210 0k kk kE GX E d
 
 
  . (44) 
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So far we have shown in the absence of attacks, the closed-loop system (20) is 
exponentially mean-square stable and satisfies the H  performance constraint, as long as 
the matrices L , K  and matrices 1P , 2P , 3P , and 4P  satisfy inequality (36). Therefore now we 
are at the stage to solve for such matrices, which are presented in the next section.  
3.2. CONTROLLER AND OBSERVER GAIN SELECTION 
It is important to note that inequality (36) in Theorem 1 is not in the form of LMI 
due to the term 13S
 and thus cannot be solved directly. The following theorem from [21][25] 
converts (36) into a solvable LMI and provides the controller and observer gain matrices 
to stabilize the system while satisfying the H performance constraints.  
Theorem 2 [21][25]: Given positive scalars 1  and 2 , the system (20) is 
exponentially mean-square stable and satisfies the H  performance constraint, if there 











where  3 1 3 1, , , ,S diag P P P I  , 2S  is defined by (38),  
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1 1 1 1 1




P A BM BM PD PW















0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
,  
 1 11 12,
TP U diag P P U and   [0,1; 1;0], 1,...,1U diag diag  . 
Moreover, the controller and observer gain matrices are given by 
 111 1K P M
  and 13 2L P M
 . (46) 
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The proof is similar to that of ([21], Theorem 3) and thus omitted. Next, the 
following corollary verifies that with the controller and observer gain matrices generated 
by Theorem 2, the states of closed-loop system (20) are bounded in the presence of bounded 
disturbances without any attacks. 
Corollary 1: Consider the closed-loop system (20) with the disturbance bounded by
Md in the absence of attacks i.e. 0k  . Let the controller and observer gain matrices be 
generated by Theorem 2, then the estimation error is bounded in the mean square such that 
 2kE e   , (47) 
with 
 
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, (48) 
where    3 1 3 1
T
T TD Q Q D Q Q and 2 is a positive real number satisfying 
     min min 2 max 0P          . (49) 
Proof: Select the Lyapunov function defined in (30) and combine the system 
dynamics (20) yields 
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 (50) 
By further applying (49) in (50) we have 
  
   
 
min 2 max 1 2
1 2 3
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. (51)  
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Next apply Lemma 1 to (51) to obtain 
   
 
   
 
 
     
1 2
2 32 2max min 2 max max
0





D Q D dP P
E X X
P P P
    
     
     
         
.  (52) 
Therefore it follows that 
   2 2k kE e E X   . (53) 
Remark 1: Corollary 1 introduces the bound of the estimation error when there is 
no attack and can be utilized to design an attack detection scheme when the estimation 
exceeds this bound. With the presence of bounded attacks, k M  , by following the 
same procedure, one can show that the estimation error is also bounded with  2 'kE e  
where '   . 
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4. NETWORK ATTACK DETECTION 
In this section, we first introduce the adversary models of three typical flow-
targeted network attacks. Next, we develop the network attack scheme based on the 
observer designed in the previous section. The detectability condition is also given under 
which certain types of attacks can be detected.  
4.1. ADVERSARY MODEL 
Cyber-attacks are multifarious but they all target at one or more of the three 
fundamental properties of information and services: confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability, often known as CIA [26]. Confidentiality-targeted attacks are usually 
defended by encryption techniques and therefore in this paper, we only concern about 
attacks that impair the integrity and availability. Specifically, in the context of flow 
management, this paper deals with attacks that either inject false data or drop/block 
authentic data. Three types of such attacks are considered as examples.  
Jamming Attack: The jamming attacker aims at creating traffic congestion by 
placing jammers that consistently inject data into the link. Assuming the attacking strength 
(number of jammers) increases linearly, then this type of attack can be modeled by [27] 
1 kk e
   , (54) 
where , kk   and   is the time, percentage of injected data, and the network-related 
coefficient, respectively. Jamming attack is plotted in Figure 4.1.   
Black hole Attack: If the attacker manages to compromise one or more nodes in the 
routing path from the source to the destination, then a black hole attack has been launched. 
As a result, part of the data (depending on the attack strength) would be discarded. 
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Assuming the attack strength (number of black holes) increases linearly, then the black 
hole attack can be modeled by a linear equation [28] given by 
1k k   , (55) 
where , kk   and   is the attack strength (number of black holes), percentage of dropped 
data, and the network-related coefficient, respectively and it is plotted in Figure 4.2. 
Minimum Rate DoS Streams Attack: Instead of continuously injecting data, false 
data is periodically injected into the network, in order to avoid router-based mechanisms 
that detect high rate flows. In this way, the attacker attempts to minimize their exposure to 
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, (56) 
where 1 2 1, 2, , ,n n p p ,andT is the first attack strength, second attack strength, packet drop 
rate, first attack duration, second attack end time, and total attack period, respectively. The 
DOS stream attack is plotted in Figure 4.3. Next, an attack detection scheme is introduced. 
4.2. ATTACK DETECTION SCHEME 
In this section, we will present the attack detectability condition followed by the 
detection scheme performance. 
Theorem 3 (Attack Detectability Condition): Consider the closed-loop system (20) 
with the disturbance bound Md . Let the controller and observer gain matrices be generated 
by using Theorem 2. Attacks can be detected if the injected (dropped) traffic flow k  into 
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If (57) is satisfied, by using triangle inequality we have 
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Figure 4.1. Jamming attack. Figure 4.2. Black hole attack. Figure 4.3. Minimum rate 
DoS streams attack. 
Note that the inequality (57) presents a sufficient condition under which certain 
types of attacks can be detected. However it is not the way how the attack is detected in 
practice. Instead, the estimation error or the detection residue is constantly monitored and 























































































the attack is detected when the residue exceeds the bound given by (44). Moreover, since 
the accumulated value of attack function k  is used in (57), it is possible that certain attacks 
cannot be detected, which will be further demonstrated in Section 6.  
Combining Corollary 1 and Theorem 3, we are now ready to introduce the main 
results for the proposed attack detection scheme.  
Theorem 4: Consider the closed-loop system (20) with the disturbance bound Md
and the controller and observer gain matrices generated by Theorem 2. The attacks can be 
detected when the network detection residual exceeds a predefined threshold given by (48) 
provided k M  .  Upon detecting the attack, consider the observer  
1 1 1 1
ˆˆ ˆk k k k kx Ax Bu W Ae       , (61) 
to estimate the attack flow where ˆk is the estimated attack flow which is updated using 
1 3 1 4 3 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ1T Tk k k kKe A W W W           , (62) 






  are design parameters. Then the network attack 
residual ke  and the estimation error of the attacking flow k  are bounded.  
Proof: Select the Lyapunov function candidate as 




k kV e e  and 
1 2
2 3 kV  
  (63) 
From (61) we can have the estimation error dynamics given by 
0 1 1 1k k k ke A e W Dd      , (64) 
where 0A A A  . Substitute (61) and (64) into (63), we have 
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 , (65) 
where 5 4 3 1ˆ1
T
kW W      . Combing (64) and (65) and after manipulation, we have 
    
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k k k d M M
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A k e e d            

                  
 . (66) 
Therefore, both the network attack residual ke  and the attack flow estimation error
k  are bounded by selecting the appropriate design parameters.   
Theorem 5 provides a way to estimate the injected or dropped flow by the attacker, 
which can be further utilized to tune the controller parameters of the physical system. Next, 
the effect of network attacks on the physical system will be discussed. 
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5. PHYSICAL SYSTEM CONTROLLER DESIGN 
Consider the physical plant with the system dynamics described by 
, 1 , , , ,
, ,
p k p p k p p k p p k p p k
p k p p k
x A x B u D d W
y C x
    

 , (67) 
where ,p kx , ,p ky , ,p ku , ,p kd , and ,p k  is the system state, output, input, disturbance, and 
attack respectively. The subscript " "p , stands for “physical system”, is utilized to 
differentiate the network system dynamics variables in (9).    
Remark 2: Although it appears from (67) that the attack affects the system state 
dynamics, this representation is not limited to the case where the attack targets the states. 
For instance, for any actuator attacks, the controller input is manipulated from pu  to 'pu  
and the dynamics (67) can still be used with the attack term  , 'p p k p p pW B u u   .  
Let ,sc ca    be the number of sampling cycles to represent the sensor-to-
controller and controller-to-actuator delay information and let pd  be the number of 
dropped packets. Assume that if the packets containing control and state information are 
delayed or lost, the most recent values will be used. Under this situation, the state feedback 





p k p p k










Define ,p k sc ca pd      and ,'p k sc pd   . Then as illustrated in Figure 5.1, this 
variable will be used to assess the condition of the communication network, which further 
determines the controller gain of the physical system. Suppose that in the absence of any 
attacks on the communication networks, the delay and packet losses are bounded by
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, 1p k M  . The term ,p k will continue to increase and exceeds 1M if the attack has been 
launched yet not detected while ,p k will decrease back to normal provided that the attack is 
defended successfully or on the other hand, it could keep increasing and finally exceed
2 ,M which is the maximum allowed value the physical system can tolerate before it can 





ε ≤ εM1  
Under Attack
 εM1 < ε ≤ εM2  
Compromised











Figure 5.1. Illustration of transitions of the networks and physical states. 
For the physical system, the controller gain should be re-configured once an attack 
on the networks or an abnormity of ,p k  is detected in order to keep the system stable. For 
example, suppose ,1pK  is the controller gain that stabilizes the system for , 1p k M  . Then a 
different control gain, ,2pK , needs to be selected once an attack is launched until




Lemma 5: Let ,p k  be the networked induced overall delay and packet loss as 
defined by (68). Let 1M be the bound of ,p k in the absence of network attacks. The closed-
loop system (67) in the absence of attacks, i.e., , 0p k  , on the physical system is stable 
and satisfies the H  performance constraint
2 22
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with 1M M  . Moreover, the controller gain ,1pK for the case of , 1p k M  is given by 
solving 
5 ,1 3p pP B K M . (70) 
However, the stability of the system for this controller gain ,1pK  cannot be 
guaranteed if , 1p k M  . 
Proof: Substituting (68) into (67) yields the closed-loop system dynamics: 
,, 1 , , ,p kp k p p k p p p k p p k p p
x A x B K x D d W      . (71) 
Define the Lyapunov function as 
1 1
, 5 , , 6 ,1
M kT T
k p k p k p j p ji j k i
V x P x x P x
 
  
    , (72) 
where 5P  and 6P are PD matrices with appropriate dimensions. With the absence of 
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  (73) 
Now we consider the closed-loop system with disturbances. Substituting the system 
dynamics (71) into (72) yields 
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 is the augmented states vector and 
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  (75) 
It is clear that 1 0p   implies that inequality (73) holds thus the system is stable. 
Moreover, by Lemma 3, 1 0p   is equivalent to 2 0p  where 
5 5 1 6 5 ,1 5
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0 0
0
0 0 0 0
  (77) 
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With the definition of 3 5 ,1p pM P B K , we can conclude 2 0p  (thus 1 0p  ) from 
inequality (69) by applying Lemma 3 once again. Next, summing up (74) from 0 to  with 
respect to k and considering that the system is stable when 1 0p  , we have
2 22




  . From (77) it can be seen that 2 0p  may not hold if
, 1p k M   thus the stability of the system cannot be guaranteed.  
In Lemma 5, we have shown that the physical system will become unstable once 
the network delay and packet losses exceed 1M . In the next theorem, we will show that 
when the network is experiencing higher delays and packet losses due to network attacks 
such that , 1p k M  , the controller gain has to be adjusted in order to maintain stability of 
the physical system. 
Theorem 5: Let ,p k  be the networked induced overall delay and packet loss as 
defined by (44). For the case of , 1p k M  due to the presence of network attacks, the 
physical system (71) is stable and satisfies the H  performance constraint if 2 1M M  , 
where 2M is maximized value of the following convex optimization LMI problem 
 
 maximize M  
           (78) 
 subject to 5 0P  , 6 0P  , and (45) 
Moreover, the controller gain ,2pK for the case of 1 , 2M p k M    is given by solving 
5 ,2 3p pP B K M .      (79) 
where 3M , 5P  and 6P are matrices satisfying (78). However, the stability of the system cannot 
be guaranteed regardless of the selection of the controller gains if , 2p k M  . 
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Proof: By solving the optimization LMI problem (78), we get 2M , which is the 
maximum allowed network delay and packet losses that the physical system can tolerate. 
If 2 1M M  then the stability cannot be guaranteed as previously explained. On the other 
hand, when 2 1M M  , the controller gain is derived by solving (69) with 2M M  . The 
proof of the stability and H  performance in this case is similar to that in the proof of 
Lemma 5. Likewise, for , 2p k M  , the stability cannot be guaranteed because 2 0p  in 
(77) may not hold. Since 2M is already the maximum allowed value, no controller gain pL
could exist to guarantee (78) for , 2p k M  .  
It is important to note that Theorem 5 gives the maximum network delay and packet 
losses that the physical system can tolerate. Appropriate network defense must be launched 
once ,p k exceeds this threshold, or the physical system needs to be shut down to prevent 
further damages.  
Therefore, by combining Theorems 4 and 5, the stability of the physical system 
when the network is under attacks can be predicted. To be specific, Theorem 4 gives the 
estimated current buffer length ˆk  as well as the transmitting rate ˆk . Thus the current 
sensor-to-controller delay can be estimated by 
ˆ ˆˆ /sc k k   .      (80) 
The controller-to-actuator delay cˆa  can be estimated in the same way. Furthermore, 
it is also given in Theorem 4 that the dropped packets by the attack can be estimated by ˆk
. Therefore, the overall delays and packet losses can be estimated by 
ˆ ˆˆ ˆsc ca k      . (81) 
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Next, detection observer is proposed for the physical system in order to detect and 
isolate attacks on both networks and physical systems. Define the observer as 




p k p p k p p k p p k p k
p k p p k
x A x B u L y y
y C x 


   

 ,      (82) 
Suppose the delay and packet losses increase from '  to '  when the network is 
experiencing a higher delay and packet losses due to the network attacks. Define the 
estimation error or physical system detection residual as , , ,ˆp k p k p kx x x  , then by combining 
(67) and (82) we have the following estimation error dynamics 
 , 1 , , ' , ' , ' , ,p k p p k p p p k p p p k p k p p k p p kx A x L C x L C x x D d W              .    (83) 
Let the augmented estimation error vector be 
 , , , 1 , '
T
T T T
pa k p k p k p kx x x x    
  (84) 
Then (83) can be rewritten as 
 , 1 , , ' , ' , ,pa k pa pa k pa p k p k pa p k pa p kx A x H x x D d W            ,      (85) 
















      (86) 
and 
T
pa p pH L C   0 0 ,
T
pa pD D   0 0 , and 
T
pa pW W   0 0 . Next the 
following lemma is stated to describe the performance of the observer in the absence of 
attacks. 
Lemma 6: Consider the closed-loop physical system (71) and the observer (85) with 
the disturbance bound ,p Md and without any attack i.e. , 0p k  and 0  . Select the observer 
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gain matrix L  such that the observer representation matrix (86) is stable. Then the 
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   .      (88) 
Theorem 6: Consider the closed-loop physical system (71) and the observer (85) 
with the disturbance bound ,p Md . Attacks on the physical system or on the communication 
networks can be detected if ,p k and  satisfies 
  
1 1
, ' , ' ,0
2
k k i
pa pa p pa p k p k p ki
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 .    (90) 
It is important to note that this theorem shows the detection scheme on the physical 
system is able to detect the attacks on the networks due to an increase in the delay and 
packet losses. However, detecting the attack by the flow observer will be faster when 
compared to on the physical system. Moreover, the location of the attacks can be 
determined by applying Theorems 3 and 6 together.   
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6. SIMULATION AND HARDWARE IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS 
In order to show the effectiveness of the proposed attack detection scheme, several 
scenarios involving both the networks and physical systems are considered in the 
simulation. On the network side, the first scenario is the simulation for the healthy case 
where there is no attack. In the next three scenarios, we show the detection results for the 
attacks introduced in the previous section. In the last scenario, we consider a contrived 
attack in order to show the limitation of the proposed attack detection scheme.  
On the side of the physical plant, we show that the system becomes unstable when 
the delays and packet losses exceed a certain threshold. Then it is shown that this 
abnormality in the network flow can be detected by the proposed detection scheme and by 
reconfiguring the controller gain, the system can be stabilized again. Finally we 
demonstrate that the proposed detection scheme is able to detect not only the abnormalities 
in the network, but also attacks on the physical system. 
Furthermore, the proposed attack detection for the networks has been implemented 
in hardware for a wireless sensor network where the results show that both the jamming 
attack and the blackhole attack can be detected.  
6.1. NETWORK SIMULATION RESULTS  
The simulation is performed in MATLAB with the following parameters for the 
communication networks: sampling period 1msT  , total simulation time 200sT T , standard 
transmission rate 0 300  packets per T ,the desired flow in the bottleneck node 0 100 
packets, 3m  , 1 1/ 8l  , 1 1/ 4l  , 1 1/ 2l  , the expectation of the delayed measurement 0.1 
,the bound for the disturbance 10Md  . 
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6.1.1. Scenario A1 (Normal Case).   Let 0  and by solving the LMI (45), we get 
the following controller and observer gain matrices 
 [ 0.9971 2.0174 0 0 0]K     and 
0.0191 0.9599 -0.9900 0.0564 1.0995
0 0.6832 0 0 0
0.0011 0.0024 0.3334 0.3204 0.3250
0 0 1 0 0















Figure 6.1. Actual flow. Figure 6.2. Estimation error. 
Figure 6.1 shows that the actual flow in the bottle bottleneck node fluctuating 
slightly around the desired level. Moreover, the estimation error of the flow in the link 
plotted in Figure 6.2 is very close to zero, concluding that the estimated state given by the 
observer is fairly accurate. Figure 6.3 shows the input rate while Figure 6.4 shows the 
output rate at the bottleneck node. 


















































Figure 6.3. Input rate at the bottleneck node. Figure 6.4. Output rate. 
6.1.2. Scenario A2~A4. In the following three scenarios, jamming attack, 
blackhole attack, and minimum rate DoS stream attack has been launch at / 2sT , 
respectively.  In Scenario A2, the attacker is assumed to increase the number of jammers 
in the network linearly along with the time until to the maximum value. As a result, the 
packets injected by the attacker increase until to the maximum of 5 packets per millisecond, 
as plotted in Figure .6.5. The estimation error of the flow, plotted in Figure 6.6, exceeds 
the threshold shortly after the attack is launched and thus it can be detected. 
Upon detection, if the new observer introduced in Theorem 4 is applied, then the 
attack flow can be estimated as shown in Figure 6.5. Correspondingly, the attack residual 
with the new observer decreases after the detection of the attack and eventually becomes 
smaller than the threshold. With the estimated attack flow, one can estimate the delay and 
packet losses in the link, which can be further utilized to tune the controller parameters of 
the physical systems. 






































Figure 6.5. Injected flow by the jamming attack with estimation. 
 
Figure 6.6. Estimation error in Scenario A2. 
Similarly, in Scenario A3, we assume the nodes compromised by the black hole 
attack increases linearly as displayed in Figure 6.7. Consequently, the estimation error 
exceeds the lower bound of the threshold and the attack can be detected after 10 sampling 
periods, as shown in Figure 6.8. 







































Figure 6.7. Dropped flow by the black hole attacker. 
 
Figure 6.8. Estimation error in Scenario A3. 
In Scenario A4, we launch the minimum rate DoS stream attack as shown in Figure 
6.9 with the following parameters 1 5n  , 2 1n  , 1 2p T , 1 5p T and 20T T . As shown in 
Figure 6.10, although the estimation error increases slower than those in Scenario A2 and 
A3, the attack can still be detected as due to the high-data-injecting-rate period of the 
attack. 
































6.1.3. Scenario A5. In this scenario we consider a type of attack with a special 
pattern. We let the attack drop a few packets first and followed by injecting the same 





Figure 6.9. Injected flow by the Minimum rate DoS attacker. 
 
Figure 6.10. Estimation error in Scenario A4. 
Note that the number of packets that are injected (dropped) is identical with that 
during high-data-injecting-rate period of the Minimum rate DoS stream attack in Scenario 
A4. However, as plotted in Figure 6.12, the estimation error never exceeds the threshold 































due to the fact that it is updated in an accumulated way. Due to the delayed measurement 
feeding into the observer, the current positive estimation is counteracted with the previous 
negative ones, resulting in an insignificant change in the estimation error compared with 
the actual variation of the packets in the link. Therefore, this type of attack cannot be 





Figure 6.11. Injected and dropped flow in Scenario. 
 
Figure 6.12. Estimation error in Scenario A5. 
 


































6.2. SIMULATION RESULTS FOR THE PHYSICAL SYSTEMS 
The network attack is launched at T=10s and increases its attacking strength at 
T=20s.  (a): regulation errors when the same controller gain is applied through the 
simulation; (b): the estimation error; (c): regulation errors when the controller gain is re-
configured at T=10s, as shown in Figure 6.13 
The batch reactor system, which is a benchmark example for studying NCS [30], is 
considered in the simulation of the physical system. The continuous system dynamics are 
given by 
1.38 0.2077 6.715 5.676 0 0
0.5814 4.29 0 0.675 5.679 0
1.067 4.273 6.654 5.893 1.136 3.146
0.048 4.273 1.343 2.104 1.136 0
0 0.3 0.3 0
0.6 0.3 0.6 0.3
x x u
y x
    
   
 
    
    
   




  (91) 
The system is discretized with the sampling period , 100p sT ms  . The disturbance
,p k  follows the uniform distribution within the interval  0.5,0.5 . The total simulation time 
is 30 seconds.  
1) 0 10T s    ( 1p M  ). For the first 10 seconds, we consider the healthy case where 
there are no attacks either on the network or on the physical system. As a result, the 
delays and packet losses are bounded by 1 2M  . Solving the LMI (69) with 2 5   
yields the controller gain 
 ,1 0.49,0.21,-0.47,-0. .79,0.27,2.33 0,0.8 77;1pK  . 
The simulation results are shown in Figure 6.13 (a) where the regulation error is fairly 
close to zero and thus the system is stable with ,1pK K . 
2) 10 20T s   ( 1 2M p M    ). Next, we launch the jamming attack introduced in 
Scenario A2 on the communication networks at 10T s . 
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Figure 6.13. Simulation results for the attack detection on the physical system.  
By adjusting the attack strength, we set the delays and packet losses satisfying
3 4p  , which has exceeded the threshold 1 2M  . Figure 6.13 (a) shows the simulation 
results if the same controller gain ,1pK is applied. It is clear that the regulation errors do not 
converge, because the delays and packet losses exceed the threshold and inequality (73) 
cannot be satisfied. These results agree with the conclusion from Lemma 5. 
However, consider that the physical system is implemented with the observer-based 
attack detection scheme (82). Then as shown in Figure 6.13 (b), the estimation error quickly 
exceeds the threshold thus the attack can be detected. Since it is shown in Scenario B2 that 
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the controller gain ,1pK  cannot stabilize the system in this case, we need to compute the 
controller gain by solving the optimization LMI problem (78). As a result, we obtain 
2 5.8M   and  ,2 0.42, 0.52, 0.43, 0.27;1.62,0.20,1.14, 0.64pK       .  
Figure 6.13 (c) shows the convergence of the regulation errors when the new 
controller gain ,2pK  is applied. Combining Scenario B2 and B3, we can come to the 
conclusion that the attacks on the networks can be detected and upon the detection, the 
physical plant can be stabilized by selecting the appropriate controller gain. 
3) 20 30T s   ( 2p M  ). Suppose that the attacker increases the attack strength at the 
time 20T s  such that 2p M  . As shown in Figure 6.13 (a), the system becomes 
unstable even if the new controller gain ,2pK  is applied, which verifies the conclusion 
in Theorem 5. 
6.3. PHYSICAL SYSTEM ATTACK DETECTION 
It is shown in the previous simulation results that the proposed attack detection 
scheme is capable of detecting attacks on the network that leads to an increase in the delays 
and packet losses. Next, it is of interest to study the detectability launched on the physical 
system directly either through sensor, actuator or other means. Consider an attack launched 




p k e   . 
As shown in Figure 6.14, the state estimation error increases and exceeds the 
threshold shortly after the attack has been launched at the physical system. Therefore, the 





Figure 6.14. Detection of attacks on the physical systems. 
6.4. HARDWARE IMPLEMENTATION  
The proposed flow based network attack detection scheme is implemented in a 
wireless sensor network where the RIFD reader collects the data from the RFID sensors 
then sends to the server through a ZigBee network. As shown in Figure 6.15, the links 
between the RFID reader and the XBee modules as well as the ZigBee networks are 
vulnerable to malicious attacks.  
Two types of attacks are considered here: 1) the jamming attack where the attacker 
places a transmitter in order to create congestion in the ZigBee network; 2) the blackhole 
attack where the attacker blocks the signal of the input node, which causes data losses in 
the link.  
The proposed flow based attack detection scheme has been implemented on the 
source node and for the purpose of demonstration, all the data including the estimation 
errors will be sent to the server where a simple user interface has been developed. As shown 
in Figure 6.16 (a), the red lines are the lower and higher detection thresholds while the blue 





















line is the flow estimation error, which is the difference between the expected and the actual 
flow. The estimation error should stay within the bound if there are no attacks launched, as 

















Figure 6.15. Diagram of the hardware implementation. 
Next, we launch the jamming attack by placing a transmitter which constantly sends 
data to the ZigBee network. As a result, more flow is introduced and the attack can be 
detected when the estimation error of the traffic flow exceeds the upper threshold, as 
verified in Figure 6.16 (b). Similarly, we launch the blackhole attack by blocking the signal 
of the input node for some certain time. The attack can be detected when the estimation 
error of the traffic flow exceeds the lower threshold, as verified in Figure 6.16 (c).  Though 
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this hardware implementation does not include the physical system, the effect of the 








Figure 6.16. Estimation error for (a) the normal scenario; (b) the jamming attack 
scenario; (c) the blackhole attack scenario. 
  
145 
7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
The presence of communication links to transmit sensor data and control commands 
has brought in vulnerabilities into NCS. A corrupted communication link can introduce 
large delays and packet losses, which could lead to the instability of the physical system. 
This paper proposes a novel cyber-attack detection scheme that is capable of capturing the 
abnormality in those communication links. The detection of the attacks is faster than the 
traditional approach where one has to wait for the physical states to be deteriorated. With 
the proposed detection scheme, attacks on both the networks and the physical system can 
be detected. Upon detection, the physical system can be stabilized by re-configuring the 
controller gain. However, the proposed scheme is applicable only to those network attacks 
causing delays and packets losses while revealing limitation to sophisticated attacks as 
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IV. AN OPTIMAL Q-LEARNING APPROACH FOR ATTACK DETECTION IN 
NETWORKED CONTROL SYSTEMS 
Haifeng Niu and S. Jagannathan 
In networked control systems, both the communication links and the physical 
systems are vulnerable to a variety of attacks. Attacks on the networks may falsify sensitive 
data, cause link congestion and/or increase the number of lost packets. As a consequence, 
the physical system whose feedback loop relies on these infected networks then becomes 
uncertain.  Moreover, attacks on the physical systems targeting the sensors or the actuators 
may degrade the performance or even lead to the instability of the overall system. In this 
paper, we propose a novel attack detection scheme that is capable of detecting attacks on 
both the network and the physical system. The network traffic flow is modeled as a linear 
system with unknown system dynamics and an optimal Q-learning based controller is 
developed to stabilize the flow in the presence of disturbances. An adaptive observer is 
proposed to generate the attack residual, which is utilized to determine the onset of an 
attack when it exceeds a predefined threshold. For the physical system, we consider a 
stochastic system which incorporates network-induced delays and packet losses making 
the system dynamics uncertain. The proposed detection scheme includes an optimal Q-
learning based event-triggered controller which is capable of detecting attacks on both 




1.  INTRODUCTION 
Networked control systems (NCS) consists of the system to be controlled, sensors, 
actuators, and controllers where different components coordinate through a communication 
network. Although after over thirty years’ development NCS are fairly mature with 
applications in areas varying from large-scale industrial systems to critical infrastructure, 
there are also challenging problems for current research.  
Due to the nature of NCS where its components are spatially distributed, the 
communication networks between different components can be vulnerable to potential 
malicious attacks. For example, the wormhole attacker attracts data traffic by establishing 
a link between two geographically distant regions of the network with high-gain antennas 
and then delays or drops the attracted data [1]. The jamming attacks over wireless 
networks, which are inevitable due to the shared nature of wireless channels, may severely 
degrade the performance in terms of message delay and data throughput by broadcasting 
radio interferences [2]. The replay attacker maliciously repeats the messages delivered 
from the operator to the actuator and causes communication unreliability, which has been 
successfully used by the virus attack of Stuxnet [3][4]. 
Note that none of the attacks mentioned above requires the knowledge of 
cryptographic mechanisms. That is to say, the efforts in [5-7] proposing encryption 
algorithms that are specially designed for the low-cost and resource-restrained devices for 
NCS cannot protect the network security from those attacks. However, one common 
attribute shared by these attacks is that they all tend to deviate the amount of traffic flow 
in the communication links from the normal value though this traffic flow due to these 
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attacks may not be known beforehand. Inspired by this observation, we propose the traffic 
flow-based network attack detection scheme.  
Flow control has been studied in the literature [8-11]. For example, the authors in 
[8] model the high-speed network as fluid-flow queues with a fixed propagation delay for 
each channel. As a result, the network is represented by a linear hybrid system, which 
allows the design of the flow control on a mathematical basis. In [9], a receiver-based flow 
control scheme is proposed that achieves the given optimal utility. The proposed flow 
control scheme creates virtual queues at the receivers as a push-back mechanism to 
optimize the amount of data delivered to the destinations via back-pressure routing. 
Different from [9], the authors in [10] propose a new utility max-min flow control 
framework using classic sliding mode control. The framework consists of a source 
algorithm and a binary congestion feedback mechanism and is proven to be asymptotically 
stable by Lyapunov-based theorem. In [11], a new joint flow control and scheduling 
algorithm for multi-hop wireless networks is proposed. Unlike traditional solutions based 
on the back-pressure algorithm, the proposed algorithm combines window-based flow 
control with a new rate-based distributed scheduling algorithm.  
However, to the best of our knowledge, minimal effort has been spent on studying 
the flow control from the perspective of network security when the network is attacked by 
injecting or dropping traffic flow. Moreover, it is also challenging to regulate the traffic 
flow at the desired level in the presence of disturbances and attacks, especially when the 
system dynamics that characterize the network parameters are unknown.  
On the other hand, the physical system whose feedback loop relies on the 
communication networks becomes uncertain in the presence of cyber-attacks. In other 
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words, a vulnerable communication network results in larger delays and higher packet loss 
ratios, which could further lead to the instability of the physical system [12]. To address 
this issue, the authors in [12] incorporate uncertain network-induced delays and packet 
losses in the physical system dynamics and propose a stochastic adaptive dynamic 
programming (ADP) approach to estimate the value function and solve the optimal 
regulation problem. This work is further extended in [13] by adopting the stochastic ADP 
technique in an event-driven control scheme, which is reported to significantly reduce the 
computation and data transmission. Furthermore, this event-driven control scheme is 
improved in [14] by utilizing the interval between the sampling instants for iterative 
parameter learning updates. This hybrid Q-learning algorithm renders a higher efficiency 
of the optimal regulator.     
  However, the physical system is also subject to attacks, which is not considered 
in the above mentioned effort [12-14]. For instance, an attacker can manipulate the physical 
behavior of a system by exploiting the vulnerabilities of the sensors and attempting to 
modify or send falsified sensor data to the controller [15]. Similarly, the attacker may also 
sabotage the actuator and cause chaos or calamity immediately since the actuator is the 
final step in the control chain when the control instructions are made physically real [16]. 
Therefore, it is critical to take the attack input into account and implement an attack 
detection scheme for the physical system.  
Therefore, in this paper, we propose a detection scheme that is capable of capturing 
the abnormal traffic flow in the networks for certain class of cyber-attacks by modeling the 
flow as a linear system with unknown dynamics. Likewise, an attack detection scheme is 
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proposed to detect both sensor and actuator attacks on the physical system, whose 
dynamics are uncertain due to the networked-induced delays and packet losses.  
We begin by introducing the state–space representation of traffic flow in the 
presence of disturbances and cyber-attacks. Since the network parameters such as the 
service rate are usually unknown, we consider the system dynamics of the traffic flow as 
unknown. Next, we derive the optimal controller by using Q-learning technique that 
stabilizes the flow during healthy conditions. The network attack detection residual is 
generated which in turn is utilized to determine the onset of an attack in the communication 
network when the residual exceeds a predefined threshold. Then the detectability condition 
is introduced and the performance of the attack estimation scheme is discussed.  
Next, we introduce an attack detection scheme for the physical system whose 
dynamics are uncertain due to the network-induced delays and packet losses. The event-
triggered optimal control scheme is adopted since it is proven to reduce network traffic 
which might help to mitigate congestion in the presence of attacks in the event that attacks 
increase traffic flow. Finally the proposed scheme is evaluated though the simulation. The 
results verify that the proposed scheme for the networks is able to detect certain types of 
attacks and the attacks on the physical system can also be detected. 
The contributions of the paper include: 1) the design of the optimal flow controller 
in the presence of disturbances and cyber-attacks, where the network parameters are 
considered as unknown; 2) the development of novel observer-based network attack 
detection and estimation scheme along with detectability condition; 3) the development of 
sensor/actuator attack detection scheme with an event-triggered controller for the physical 
system with uncertain system dynamics; 4) the derivation of the maximum network-
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induced delays and packet losses that the physical system can tolerate; and 5) 
demonstration of the proposed scheme in both simulation in the presence of a class of 
attacks with specific adversary models. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the state-
space stochastic flow model under cyber-attacks. The observer and controller design is 
presented in Section 3, followed by the adversary model and cyber-attack detectability 
provided in Section 4. In Section 5 we present the detection scheme and controller design 
for the physical system. The simulation as well as the hardware implementation results and 
analysis are given in Section 6 and conclusions in Section 7.  
The notations used in the paper are briefly introduced.  E x  denotes the 
expectation of the stochastic variable x ,  max M  represents the largest eigenvalue of 
matrixM , [ ]ijM  represents the element in the 
thi  row and thj  column of matrix M and 
nI  denotes the n-dimensional identity matrix.
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2. LINEAR FLOW MODEL WITH UNKNOWN DYNAMICS 
Figure 2.1 shows the diagram of a typical NCS, in which both the controller 
commands and the sensor data are transmitted through a wired or wireless communication 
link. In this section, we propose a stochastic state-space representation in discrete-time for 
the traffic flow at the bottleneck link in the presence of attacks, where the network 











Figure 2.1. Diagram of a typical NCS. 
It is verified both theoretically and experimentally [17] that the performance 
measures such as the delay and transmission rate are determined by the bottleneck node 
and therefore a mild assumption widely reported in the literature [18][19] is asserte. 
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Let the input rate at sampling time kT be k  packets per second and ku be the 
adjustment from the previous input rate, that is 
 1 .k k ku      (1) 
The transmission or service rate k , which slightly fluctuates around the standard 
transmission rate 0 , is modeled by a stable autoregressive–moving-average (ARMA) 
process given by [19] 




k i k i ki
l d     ,  (3) 
and kd represents a bounded disturbance with Md being its bound while the constantm  is 
the number of past values used in ARMA model which can be obtained during system 
identification and the weights il  are unknown constants. Compared with other 
transmission rate models such as the random walk model [19], the advantages with the 
ARMA process is that it is analytically tractable and capable of capturing a wide range of 
possible behavior.  
Let the traffic flow in the bottleneck node at time kT be k . Then we have 
 1k k k k kT T w        , (4)  
where kw  is the number of the packets introduced by the attack flow with 0kw   implies 
that the attack has injected data while 0kw   implies that the attack has dropped data. More 
detailed representation of the attack models can be found in Section 4. Let the desired flow 
at the bottleneck node be 0 and re-write (4) as 
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 1 0 0 0( ) ( )k k k k kT T w              . (5) 
Now define the shifted flow k and input rate k  as 
 0 0,k k k k         . (6) 
Then the flow dynamic in (4) become 
 1k k k k kT T w        . (7) 
Define the state vector  1, , , ,
T
k k k k k mx       [19] and assume that the attack input is 
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0 0 0 1 0
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 (8)  
or 
 1 ,k k k k kx Ax Bu Dd Ww       (9) 
where
n nA  , B , D , and 1nW  represents the corresponding matrices from (8) with 
2n m . The attack input kw  is unknown but deterministic [1][20][21]. Moreover, the 
















    
      
    
 , (10) 
where k is the link end-to-end delay and k is the packet loss rate. The functions f and
f are protocol-dependent functions, which can be either deterministic or stochastic [22]. 
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The noise sources 
,kv and ,kv are immeasurable random values following a certain 
distribution [23].  
Assumption 1: The network delays and packet losses are primarily determined by 
the network protocol and the state kx  including the input rate, buffer length, and the service 
rate. However, the delays and packet losses become stochastic because they are also affected 
by many stochastic factors such as the node processing speed, number of hops in the link 
and also measurement noise [22] [23]. For example, the delay in ARQ-enabled slotted radio 



















   
 
where  is the buffer length and other variables are protocol-dependent parameters defined 














    
 
  where 
,L kv is the noise and other variables are protocol-dependent parameters defined in [25].  
Remark 1: Note that matrix A  is unknown because the weights 1l , …, ml of the 
ARMA process introduced in (3) are unknown . Therefore, an adaptive observer is utilized 
in order to estimate the unknown matrix A , which is presented in Section 3.1. 
It has been reported in the literature [20] that the network state can be easily 
measured when the servers at the output queues are Rate Allocating Servers and the 
transport protocol supports the Packet-Pair probing technique. Therefore, in this paper, the 
network state in the link is considered accessible. Now we are ready to introduce the flow 
observer and controller. Note that controller will be utilized for the system (9) in the 
absence of network attacks first.
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3. FLOW OBSERVER AND CONTROLLER DESIGN 
In this section, we first introduce the adaptive observer used to estimate the 
unknown system dynamics. Then we show the convergence of the estimation error for the 
unknown parameters in the absence of attacks. Next, the Q-learning based optimal network 
flow controller is introduced along with the stability analysis.  
3.1. PARAMETER ESTIMATION 
The benefit of the observer is twofold. On one hand, the unknown system dynamics
A needs to be estimated in order to compute the appropriate control input. On the other 
hand, by using the measured and estimated states, an estimation error or attack residual is 
generated for detection. The observer is described as 
  1 ˆˆ ˆ ˆk k k m k k kx A x A x x Bu     , (11) 
where 1ˆ n
kx
 and ˆ n n
kA
 is the estimated states and matrix A , respectively. The 
matrix n n
mA
  is a stable matrix satisfying a certain condition to be derived later.  
Define the estimation error of the matrix A  as ˆ
k kA A A , and the estimation error 
of the state vector as ˆ
k k kx x x . Then combining (11) and (9) with 0kw   yields the 
system state error dynamics, which is given by 
 1 ˆ ,k s k k k kx A x A x Dd     (12) 
where
s mA A A . The following assumption is needed before we proceed.  
Assumption 1: Assume that the attack is launched after the convergence of the 
parameter estimation. This assumption is reasonable because in the presence of attacks, it is 
impossible to determine whether the state estimation error is caused by the attack input or 
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by the identification error. As a result, the state estimating error and the identification error 
may never converge. Next, we show in the following theorem that with the given update 
law for the parameter estimation, the estimation error of the matrix A  and state vector x
are both ultimately bounded (UB). 
Theorem 1 (Parameter Estimation): Consider the network traffic represented as a 
flow at the bottleneck node described by (9). Let the adaptive observer be described by (11) 













   

  (13) 
where
1
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   
  
 
  (14) 
Then in the presence of bounded disturbances (
k Md d ) and in the absence of 
network attacks ( 0kw  ), both the parameter estimation error kA  and the state estimation 
error kx  are UB. 
Proof: According to (13), the error dynamics of the unknown system matrix A is 














   

  (15) 
Select the Lyapunov function as 
  , 1 ,T To k k k k kL x x tr A A     (16) 
where
1
n n  is a positive definite matrix. Then the first difference of ,o kL is given by 
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    , 1 1 1 1 1 .T T To k k k k k k kL x x tr A A tr A A         (17)  
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     
                 
  (18) 
Apply Cauchy-Schwartz (C-S) inequality and (18) becomes 
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  (20) 
Now, substituting the state error dynamics into (20) and applying C-S inequality yields 
 
   
 
22 2 2 2 1
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       
   
 
 
    
 
 (21)  
If (14) is satisfied, we have 
 2
1






































   

. Therefore, by selecting the 





kA be negative. According to the standard Lyapunov theorem 
[27], the parameter estimation error,
kA , and state estimation error given by the observer 
kx  are bounded within a small subset.  
Remark 2: From (21) it can be seen that in the absence of disturbances, the 
parameter estimation error and the state estimation error will eventually converge to zero.  
3.2. CONTROLLER DESIGN 
Define the instant cost function as 
  , , ,T Tk k k k k k k kr x u k x P x u R u    (22) 
where n n
kP
 is a positive semi-definite symmetric time-varying weighting matrix and
kR
 stands for the weighting matrix of the control input. The objective of the controller 
  
163 






k N N N i ii k
J x S x r x u i


   (23)  
with N  being the final time instant. It is known [28] that the finite-horizon optimal control 
input, *
ku , can be obtained by solving the Riccati equation (RE) 
   11 1 1 1 .T T Tk k k k k k kS A S S B B S B R B S A P         (24) 






k k k k k k ku K x B S B R B S Ax

        (25) 
However, the RE cannot be solved in this case since the system dynamics are 
unknown. To address this issue, we will use a Q-learning adaptive approach to estimate the 
value function and further to compute the controller gain. 
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 (26)  
Rewrite the Bellman equation as 
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 
   
    
   
  (28) 
Therefore the optimal control input can be derived from (25) and (28), which is 
given by  
1
* .uu uxk k k ku G G x

  (29) 
It is important to note that one can compute the control input immediately from the 
matrix kG , even though the system dynamics are unknown. Before proceeding, the 
following assumption is required.  
Assumption 2 [29]: The slowly time-varying Q-function  , ,k kQ x u N k  can be 
expressed as the linear-in-the-unknown parameters (LIP).  
With 02, we express  , ,k kQ x u N k in the following form 




k k kz x u   , kz  is the Kronecker product quadratic polynomial basis vector of 
kz  and kg  is a vector generated by stacking the columns of kG into a one-column vector 
with the summed off-diagonal elements. Now the smooth and uniformly piecewise-
continuous function kg  can be represented as 
   ,Tkg N k     (31) 
where 
L L  with  1 / 2L n n    is the target parameter vector and  N k  is the 
basis function matrix defined as     1, exp tanh
L j
i j
N k N k
 
      . Then the 




k is the estimated value of target parameter vector  . Combine (30) with (32) and 
then the estimated value function is given by 
    ˆ ˆ ˆ, , T Tk k k k k kQ x u N k N k z z     , (33)  
 where  k kz N k z  is the regression function satisfying kz 0  for kz 0 . 
Accordingly, the control input using the estimated value function becomes 
  
1
ˆ ˆ .uu uxk k k ku G G x

   (34) 
 Note that if ˆ uu
kG is singular then it is replaced by kR . Then by using the adaptive 
observer (11), the Bellman error is given by 
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     
     
     
    
  (35) 
 where 
1k k kz z z   and  
11,...,1 LvI
 .   
Let  0k k vz I    and     ,k k kx kron x u  and     ˆ ˆ ,k k kx kron x u  
with  kron   being the quadratic polynomial of the Kronecker product, then (35) can be 
rewritten as 
         , 1 ˆ ˆ, , , , .
T T
b k k k k k k k k ke x x r x u k r x u k            (36) 















  (37) 
where 2 0  is the tuning rate.  
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Then the error dynamics for ˆ















  (38) 
Now we are ready to introduce the boundedness of the closed-loop system.  
Theorem 2 (Closed-loop System Stability): Consider the network traffic represented 
as a flow at the bottleneck node described by (9). Let the adaptive observer be described by 
(11) with the update law given by (13). Let the control input be given by (34) with the 
estimated value function tuned by (37) with 20 1 5.  Then in the presence of bounded 
disturbances (
k Md d ) and in the absence of network attacks ( 0kw  ), the parameter 
estimation error
kA , the state estimation error kx , the value function estimation error k , 
and the system state vector kx  are all UB.  
Proof: Define the Lyapunov function as 
  , 1 2 ,T Ts k k k k k o kL x x tr L       (39)  
where 
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  (40) 
Applying C-S inequality and expand the last term in (40), we have 
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Note that * * ˆ
k k k k k k k ku u K x K x K x   and k K kK    where K is the positive 
Lipschitz constant. Then (41) becomes  
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Since the closed loop system (9) with the optimal control input 
*u satisfies 
2*
k k kAx Bu x   with 0 1 2  [1], we then have 
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, and    and r are Lipschitz 








r x u k
x
r x u k


.   
Therefore, the parameter estimation error,
kA , state estimation error given by the 
observer kx , the value function estimation error k , and the system state vector kx are 
bounded within a small subset.  
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4. NETWORK FLOW ATTACK DETECTION SCHEME 
In this section, we first introduce the adversary models of three typical flow-
targeted network attacks. Next, we develop the network attack scheme based on the 
observer designed in the previous section. The detectability condition is also given under 
which certain types of attacks can be detected. After attack detecting, an observer is 
proposed to estimate its flow. 
4.1. ADVERSARY MODEL 
Cyber-attacks are multifarious but they all target at one or more of the three 
fundamental properties of information and services: confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability, often known as CIA [26]. Confidentiality-targeted attacks are usually 
defended by encryption techniques and therefore in this paper, we only concern about 
attacks that impair the integrity and availability. Specifically, in the context of flow 
management, this paper deals with attacks that either inject false data or drop/block 
authentic data. Three types of such attacks are considered as examples.  
Jamming Attack: The jamming attacker aims at creating traffic congestion by 
placing jammers that consistently inject data into the link. Assuming the attacking strength 




   , (44) 
where , kk   and   is the time, percentage of injected data, and the network-related 
coefficient, respectively. Jamming attack is plotted in Figure 4.1.   
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Black hole Attack: If the attacker manages to compromise one or more nodes in the 
routing path from the source to the destination, then a black hole attack has been launched. 
As a result, part of the data (depending on the attack strength) would be discarded. 
Assuming the attack strength (number of black holes) increases linearly, then the black 
hole attack can be modeled by a linear equation [28] given by 
 1kw k   , (45) 
where , kk   and   is the attack strength (number of black holes), percentage of dropped 
data, and the network-related coefficient, respectively and it is plotted in Figure 4.2. 
Minimum Rate DoS Streams Attack: Instead of continuously injecting data, false 
data is periodically injected into the network, in order to avoid router-based mechanisms 
that detect high rate flows. In this way, the attacker attempts to minimize their exposure to 
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  (46) 
where 
1 2 1, 2, , ,n n p p ,andT is the first attack strength, second attack strength, packet drop 
rate, first attack duration, second attack end time, and total attack period, respectively. The 
DOS stream attack is plotted in Figure 4.3. Next, an attack detection scheme is introduced. 
4.2. ATTACK DETECTION AND ESTIMATION SCHEME 
In this section, we will present the attack detectability condition followed by the 
detection scheme performance. Theorem 2 shows that without the presence of the attacks, 
the system is stable and the estimation error (or the detection residue) is UB. In the next 
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theorem, the attack is introduced and a theoretic condition is derived under which the attack 






Figure 4.1. Jamming attack. Figure 4.2. Black hole attack. Figure 4.3. Minimum rate 
DoS streams attack. 
Theorem 3 (Network Attack Detectability Condition): Consider the network traffic 
represented as a flow at the bottleneck node described by (9). Let the adaptive observer be 
described by (11) with the update law given by (13). Let the control input be given by (34) 
with the estimated value function tuned by (37). Assume the attack is launched at 0 0t k 
, after the convergence of the system state kx , matrix A estimation error kA , and state 
estimation error kx . Then the attack is detectable at time 0 1t k k    if the injected 
(dropped) traffic flow  kw x  into (from) the link satisfies 
  0 0 0
00 0
1 11 1k kk k i k k k k i
m i k m k m i ii k i k
A Ww x A x A Ax
       
 
     , (47) 
where     22 2 2 2 2 21 2/ 2 / 1 4k d M r k MB K          with d defined in (43).  























































































Proof: According to (43) derived in Theorem 2, the estimation error of the system 
state under healthy condition is bounded by 
 k kx   . (48)  
With the presence of attacks, the error dynamic of the system states becomes 
  1k m k k k kx A x A x Ww x    . (49)  
The solution of 1kx  with the initial condition of 0kx is given by 
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      (50) 
Therefore, if the attack input  kw x  is large enough such that (36) is satisfied, by 
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  (51) 
Note that the inequality (47) presents a sufficient condition under which certain 
types of attacks can be detected. However it is not the way how the attack is detected in 
practice. Instead, the estimation error or the detection residue is constantly monitored and 
the attack is detected when the residue exceeds the bound given by (48).  
Upon detecting the attack, it is of interest to know how much flow has been injected 
or dropped by the attacker. For this purpose, we propose to add an adaptive term to the 
observer (11) to estimate the attack input. Before we proceed, the following assumption 
that is widely used in adaptive control [35] is made.  
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Assumption 3: Assume the attack input  kw x  is bounded by  k Mw x w and it 
can be expressed as    Tk w w kw x x  , where 
1n
w
 is an unknown constant vector 
bounded by ,w w M  and the regression function
1 1: n nw
    is known and bounded 
by   ,w k w Mx   . 
In the presence of bounded attacks, the system states dynamic becomes 
 1k k k s k k kx A x A x Dd Ww     . (52)  
Define the new observer with attack estimation as 
  1 ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆk k k m k k k kx A x A x x Bu Ww      , (53)  
where  ,ˆˆ
T
k w k w kw x  with ˆw  being the estimation of the unknown parameter w  is the 
estimated attack input. Combining (53) with (52) yields the state estimation error dynamics 
with attack estimation 
 1 ˆk s k k k k kx A x A x Dd Ww     , (54)  
where ˆ
k k kw w w is the estimation error of the unknown attack input.   
The next theorem introduces the adaptive update law for the estimation of attack 
input such the parameter estimation error of attack input ,w k , the system state kx , matrix 
A  estimation error 
kA , and state estimation error given by the observer kx  are all UB. 
Theorem 4 (Network Attack Estimation): Consider the network traffic represented 
as a flow at the bottleneck node described by (9) in the presence of bounded attacks. Attacks 
can be detected when the network detection residual exceeds a predefined threshold given 
by (48).   
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Upon detecting the attack, consider the observer (53) with the following adaptive 
update law for the estimation of unknown attack flow input 
      1 4 3 4ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ1
T T T




n nK   are design parameters. Then by selecting the appropriate 
design parameters, the parameter estimation error of attack input ,w k , states estimation 
error kx , and matrix A estimation error kA  are all UB.  
Proof: According to (55) with the fact that 1
TW W  , the estimation error dynamic 
of kw  is given by 
 
    
     





w k w k w k w k
T T T
k k w k w k w k w
x x
x A x x x
     
      
  
  
 (56)  
Now select the Lyapunov function as  
 , ,k o k a kL L L   (57)  
where
,o kV is defined in (16) and , , ,
T
a k w k w kL   .  
Substituting estimation error dynamics of the system parameters and states (15) and 
(54) into
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    
      
      
     
                 
  (58) 
Applying C-S inequality and expanding the last term we have 
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  
       
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 
     
 (59) 
Now substituting the error dynamics of the ˆ kw into ,a kL yields 
 
    
    
, 5 , 4 5





a k w k k k w k w
T T T
w k k k w k w k k
L x A x
x A x w w
     
     
    
    
  (60) 
where    5 3 4 ,ˆ1
T
w k w k w kx x       . 
Apply C-S inequality yields 
 
       
   
2 2 2 2 2 2
, , 5 , 5 , 4
2 22 2 2 2 2 2 2
5 5 , 4 max , 5 ,
2 6 3 3
2 6 3 3 2 .
T
T T T T
a k w k w k w k w k s w k k s w k
w k s w M k w M
L Kx A x Kx A x
A K x
        
       
     
      
  (61) 
Therefore, combining (59) and (60) yields the total first difference of the Lyapunov 
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     
      

    
 
      
 
 
         
  
      
  (62) 
Therefore, by selecting the appropriate parameters such that (14) and 
51 3 3 1 3 3     hold, the estimation error of attack input kw , states estimation 
error kx , and matrix A  estimation error kA  are all UB. 
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5. ATTACK DETECTION FOR THE PHYSICAL SYSTEM 
In this section, we first revisit a stochastic event-triggered optimal control scheme 
[14] for a class of linear systems in the presence network-induced delays and packet losses. 
An event triggered control scheme is proven to reduce network traffic which might help to 
mitigate congestion in the presence of attacks in the event that attacks increase traffic flow. 
Next, since a large delay and packet loss rate could lead to the instability of the system, the 
maximum overall delay and packet loss that the physical system can tolerate is derived. At 
last, we present the proposed a detection scheme for sensor/actuator attacks on the physical 
system. 
5.1. PHYSICAL SYSTEM DYNAMICS 
Consider the stochastic linear continuous-time system with network-induced delays 
and packet losses described by  
       ' '( ) ( ) ( ( ))p p p ca p p ca px t A x t t B u t t t w t t        , (63) 
where ( ) npx t  , ( )
m
pu t  , and  
n
pw t    is the system state, controller input, and 
attack flow input vector, respectively. The system matrices n n
pA
  and n mpB
  are 
considered as unknown. The subscript “ p ” standing for “physical system” is utilized to 
differentiate the variable used to denote the network. In particular, the notation ( )t and 
'( )t stand for the network-induced sensor-to-controller delay which is bounded by
( ) Mt   and  ca t and  
' n n
ca t
 are the packet loss indicators which equal to the 
identity matrix nI when the packet is received and the null matrix when the packet is lost.  
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Remark 3: The term  pw t is used to characterize the change in system states caused 
by attacks on the sensors or actuators [34]. From the diagram of NCS in 0, it can be seen 
that if  pw t is the sensor attack input, then we have
'( ) ( )t t   and    'ca cat t  . On 
the other hand, if  pw t is the actuator attack input, we will have
'( ) 0t  and '
ca nI  since 
the actuator-plant link does not rely on the networks.  
Remark 4: It is important to note that although it appears from (63) that the attack 
affects the system states, this representation is not limited to the case where the attack targets 
at the states [34]. For instance, for any actuator attacks where the controller input is 
manipulated from 
pu  to p pu u  , the attack input term in (63) then becomes p pB u . 
Likewise, for any sensor attack where the state in the feedback loop is manipulated from 
,p kx to , ,p k p kx x  , then the system dynamics becomes  , 1 , , , ,p k p p k p p k p k p kx A x B K x x    
. In this case, the attack input becomes
, , ,p k p p k p kw B K x   . Attacks on the physical systems 
can be detected if  pw t  satisfies certain condition. This will be discussed later in Section 
5.2 after the healthy case, i.e.,   0pw t  . 
Let the augmented state be defined as 
, , , 1 ,[ ]
M
M
n mT T T T





and discretizing system (42) within the sampling period  , 1s skT k T    yields the 
simplified system dynamics 
 , 1 , , ,p k p p k p p k p p kx A x B u W w    , (64) 
where 
,p ku  and ,p kw are the discretized control input and attack input respectively and 
matrices 




Assumption 4: Let assumptions (1-4) presented [14] hold.  
The event-triggered control (ETC) from [14] is adopted in this paper due to benefits 
mentioned before. Furthermore, unlike traditional event-triggered control schemes, the 
proposed approach in [14] utilizes the time-driven Q-learning along with the iterative 
parameter learning updates within the event-sampled instants to both improved efficiency 
of the optimal regulator and obtain a more generalized online Q-learning framework.  
For the system dynamics(64), define the instant cost function as 
  , , , , , , , ,, , ,T Tp p k p k p k p k p k p k p k p kr x u k x P x u R u    (65) 
where
,p kP is a positive semi-definite matrix and ,p kR is a positive define matrix. The 
objective of the controller design is to determine a feedback control policy to minimize the 
following value function  





p k p p i p ii k







   (66) 
Define the action-dependent Q-function as 
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  (67) 
From the Bellman equation, we have 
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. The control input is given by 
   1, , , ,
,
uu ux
p k p k p k p ku E G G x
 

  . (69) 
The Q-function in parametric form is given by 
      , , , , ,
, ,
, T Tp k p k p k p k p k k kQ x u E z G z E
   
   , (70)  




p k k p k p kz x u
 
  
, k  is the Kronecker product quadratic polynomial basis 
vector of 
,p kz , and k is a vector generated by stacking the columns of ,p kG into a one-
column vector with the summed off-diagonal elements. The estimation of the optimal Q-
function is given by 
      , , , , ,
, ,
ˆ ˆ ˆ, T Tp k p k p k p k p k k kQ x u E z G z E
   
   , (71)  
where ˆ
k is the estimation of the unknown expected target parameter k . In event-
triggered control systems, the state vector is sent to the controller only when the trigger 
condition is violated. Let  lk  with l  and 0 0k  denote the sequence of event-trigger 
instants.  




p k p kx x  for 1l lk k k    . The event-sampled error is then given by 
 , , ,
e
ET k p k p ke x x   . (72) 
Accordingly, the estimated Q-function using
,
e
p kx  becomes 
      ,, , , , ,
, ,
ˆ ˆ ˆ,e e T e T ep k p k p k p k p k k kQ x u E z G z E
   
   . (73)  
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k  is the Kronecker product quadratic polynomial 
basis vector of 
,
e
p kz . Then the Bellman error with the event-sampled states is given by 
   , , , ,
,
ˆ, TB k p k p k k k s ke E r x u
 
      , (74)  
where    , , , , , , ˆ, ,
e
T k
s k p k ET k p k p k p k k
k




      
 
.  
It can be seen from (74) that the Bellman error also depends on the event-sampled 
error
,ET ke . Therefore, the estimation of the optimal Q-function depends on the frequency 
of the event-sapling instants. With the event-sampled states, the estimated optimal control 
input is given by 
  
1
, , , ,
ˆ ˆuu ux e
p k p k p k p ku G G x

   . (75) 
At the event-sampled event, the Q-function estimator (QFE) parameter vector ˆ
k
is tuned by using the history data of the Bellman error (74) for a faster convergence. Define 
the auxiliary Bellman error as 
 ,
ˆe e T e
B k k k kZ    , for lk k , (76)   
where 
1 1l l l v
e
k k k kZ          and
     
1 1 1 1, , , , , ,
, , ,
l l l l l v l v
e




 being the 
number of past values.  At the event-sampled instants, The QFE parameter vector ˆ
k is 
tuned with the following update law [V, 29]: 
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, for lk k , (78)  
with 0 0I  , 0 0  , a large positive value.  
Within the time between two event-sampled event, parameters are updated 
iteratively in order to minimize the error calculated after previous event sampling instant. 
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, (80)  
where the superscript “ j ” denotes the iteration index. 
Define the QFE estimation error as    
, ,
ˆ
k k kE E
   
     and then the error 









j j e j e
k k B kj




Z Z   

   
    
   
, 
0








j j e j e
k k B kj j
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, 
0 0
1l lk k k   . (82)   
The event-trigger condition design is critical because on one hand, excessive 
triggering clearly deviates from the original intention of reducing the data transmission. On 
the other hand, insufficient triggering will result in a regulation error, thus degrading the 
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performance and even leading to the instability of the system. Here, the event-trigger 
condition is given by [14]: 
    1lf k f k  ,  11,l lk k k    , (83)   
where   , ,
T
p k p kf k x x  is a quadratic function with 0  and 1  . Now we are ready to 
introduce the QFE performance as well as the closed-loop system stability under healthy 
case where there are no attacks on the physical system. 
Theorem 5 (Parameter Estimation and Stability) [14]: Consider the closed-loop 
system (64) in the absence of attacks on the physical system and the network. Let the control 
input be given by (75) with 0u  being an initial admissible control input. Suppose the QFE 
estimator vector is updated by using (77) at the event-sampled instants and (79) during the 




k  satisfies the persistently exciting (PE) condition. Then there exists a 
constant min 0   such that both the state vector , l
j
p kx and the QFE estimation error converge 
to zero asymptotically in the mean square. Moreover, the estimated Q-function 
    *, , , ,
,
ˆ , ,p k p k p k p kQ x u E Q x u
 
  and the estimated control input  *, ,
,
p k p ku E u
 
 with the 
event-sampled instants lk   .    
In the above analysis, we consider the case where the communication network is in 
healthy condition, i.e., the delays and packet losses are bounded by a small value. However, 
the delays and packet losses increase in the presence of attacks on the network and lead to 
instability of the physical system. Therefore, it is of interest to determine the maximum 




,,l l p kk k     be the interval during which there is no sensor data received at 
the controller. Then the value of 
,p k depends on the following three factors: the event-
trigger error, network-induced delays and packet losses. This can be explained with the 
following simplified example.   
Suppose the event is triggered at 0lk   and the controller received the event with 
no delay. The next event is triggered at 3k   however the packet containing this event is 
lost. Then the event will be triggered again at 4k  since the control input has not been 
changed and the trigger error keeps increasing. Suppose that the network-induced delay is
2 sT  , then the time that the controller receives the event will be 6k  . Therefore, in this 
case we have
, 6p k sT  . The following theorem gives the maximum timespan ,p k  that the 
physical system can tolerate. 
Theorem 6 (Maximum Delay and Packet Loss): Consider the closed-loop system 
(64) without physical attacks and the control input is given by (75). Suppose the QFE 
estimator vector is updated by using (77) at the event-sampled instants and (79) during the 
inter-sampling period.  
Theorem 7: Assume the communication network is under attacks such that the 
timespan
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 . (84)  
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Proof: Let the last event triggered time be lk . Then if the timespan ,p k  is always 
greater than m , there will be no control updates during the interval  ,l l mk k  . Select the 
Lyapunov function as 
    1, p
j













     and    , ,
,p
T
x p k p kL k E x x
 
 . Then by using the error 
dynamics (79), one can get the first difference of 
,kL , which is given by 
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we then have 








    . (88) 
Furthermore, the first difference of  
px
L k is given by 
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  (89) 
Therefore if the event is not triggered for enough long time, the difference of the 
second term in the Lyapunov function,  
px
L k , will keep increasing and become the 
dominant one in (85) and thus
,p kL . To be specific, if (84) is satisfied, by combining (88) 
and (89) we have 
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Hence the stability of the physical system cannot be guaranteed if 
,p k m  always holds.  
Remark 5: Theorem 6 gives the maximum network delay and packet losses that the 
physical system can tolerate. Appropriate network defense must be launched once
,p k
exceeds this threshold, or the physical system needs to be shut down to prevent further 
damages.  
5.2. ATTACK DETECTION FOR THE PHYSICAL SYSTEM 
It is shown in the previous section that in the absence of attacks on the networks 
and the physical system, the system is asymptotically stable. If the network is under attacks 
such that (84) is satisfied, the physical system then becomes unstable. In this section, we 
examine the scenario where the network is in the healthy condition whereas the physical 
system suffers from attacks.  To be specific, the detectability condition is derived under 
which the attacks on the physical system can be detected.  
Consider the system described by (64) in the presence of physical attacks. Suppose 
that the attack input 
,p kw is considered as a disturbance and no defenses will be launched, 
if it is smaller than a given threshold, i.e., 
, ,p k p Mw w . Then the following theorem shows 
the boundedness of the system state vector for the case that 
, ,p k p Mw w . 
Theorem 8 (Physical Attack Detection): Consider the closed-loop system (64) in the 
absence of attacks on the network and let the control input be given by (75) with 0u  being 
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an initial admissible control input. Suppose the QFE estimator vector is updated by using 
(77) at the event-sampled instants and (79) during the inter-sampling period. Select the 
event-trigger condition given by (83). Assume the regression vector 
l
j
k  satisfies the PE 
condition. Let 
,p Mw be the threshold below which the attack input ,p Mw is considered as a 
disturbance. Then the attack can be detected when the system states vector satisfies
 ,
, l
p k pE x
 
   where
,p k is defined in the proof.  
Proof: Consider the following Lyapunov function: 
    2, p
j
p k l x lL L k L k   , (90)  
where  jlL k and  px lL k are defined in (85) and 1 3 0   with 1 1  and 3 defined 
later in the proof. First, we consider case at the aperiodic event-sampled instants. Substitute 
the system dynamics (64) into  
px
L k and one can get the first difference of  
px l
L k , 
which is given by 
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Applying C-S inequality yields 
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where 1 is a positive constant and ,p MB is the bound of pB .  
Since the estimation error of the control input, 
, 1lp k
u   , satisfies [14] 
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where 
,p MG is the bound of ,
ux
p kG  and 2 is a positive constant.  
Substituting (94) into (93) yields 
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Combining (88) and (95), we have the total first difference of the Lyapunov 
function, which is given by 
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  (96) 
Therefore, the first term in (96) is negative by selecting the appropriate  min .  Recalling 
the definition of  in the beginning of the proof, one can conclude that the second term is 
also negative.  
For the interval between two event-sampled instants, we have 
2, 0p kL  because 
the trigger condition (83) guarantees   0
px l
L k  while (88) guarantees   0jlL k  . 
Combining these two cases, we conclude that in the presence of physical attacks bounded 
by 



















. (97)  
That is to say, if the state vector satisfies  ,
, l
p k pE x
 
  , it implies that the attack 
input exceeds the threshold (i.e., 
, ,p k p Mw w ),  thus is considered as an attack. 
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6. SIMULATION AND HARDWARE IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS 
In order to show the effectiveness of the proposed attack detection scheme, several 
scenarios involving both the networks and physical systems are considered in the 
simulation.  
6.1. NETWORK SIMULATION RESULTS  
On the network side, the first scenario is the simulation for the healthy case where 
there is no attack. In the second scenarios, we pick the jamming attack introduced in the 
previous section as an example to show the attack detection and estimation results.  
The simulation is performed in MATLAB with the following parameters for the 
communication networks: sampling period 100msT  , total simulation time 500sT T , 
standard transmission rate 0 300  packets perT ,the desired flow in the bottleneck node 
0 300  packets, 3m  , 1 1/ 8l  , 1 1/ 4l  , 1 1/ 2l  , kP  and kR  are identity matrices with 
appropriate dimensions. 
6.1.1. Scenario A1 (Normal Case). Figure 6.1 shows that in the absence of attacks, 
the QFE error becomes very close to zero, which verifies the result given in Theorem 1. 
Moreover, Figure 6.2 shows the actual and desired number of packets in the bottleneck 
node and the actual number of packets fluctuates around the desired value, which agrees 





Figure 6.1. QFE error converges in the absence of attacks. 
 
Figure 6.2. Actual and desired number of packets in the bottleneck node. 
6.1.2. Scenario A2 (Under Attack). In this scenario, the jamming attack is 
introduced at 250 st T
. As depicted in Figure 6.2, the attacker is assumed to increase the 
number of jammers in the network linearly along with the time until to the maximum value. 
As a result, the packets injected by the attacker will increase to the maximum of 500 
packets per sampling period. The estimation error of the flow, plotted in Figure 6.3, 
exceeds the threshold shortly after the attack is launched and thus it can be detected, which 
confirms Theorem 3. 
 




















































Figure 6.3. Injected flow by the jamming attack with estimation. 
 
Figure 6.4. Estimation error exceeds the threshold in Scenario A2. 
Upon detection, if the observer introduced in Theorem 4 is applied, then the attack 
flow can be estimated. As shown in Figure 6.2, the estimated attack input given by the 
observer is able to track the actual attack input after only a few seconds. With the estimated 
attack flow, one can estimate the delay and packet losses in the link, which can be further 
utilized to tune the controller parameters of the physical systems.   
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6.2. SIMULATION RESULTS FOR THE PHYSICAL SYSTEMS 
On the side of the physical plant, we first evaluate the performance of the hybrid 
event-sampled controller in the absence of physical and network attacks. Then we show 
that the system becomes unstable when the delays and packet losses exceed a certain 
threshold due to attacks on the network. Finally we demonstrate that the proposed detection 
scheme is able to detect the attacks on the physical system.  
The inverted pendulum system is considered in the simulation of the physical 
system. The continuous system dynamics are given by 





x t x t u tg k
l ml ml
   
    
   
   
  (98) 
with 2l  , 10g  , 1m  and 5k  . The system is discretized with the sampling period
, 100p sT ms . The penalty matrices ,p kP  and ,p kR  are identity matrices with appropriate 
dimensions. The system state is initialized with  0 2, 3x    and the total simulation time 
is 500 seconds.  
6.2.1. Scenario B1 (Normal Case). In this scenario, the network in assumed be in 
the healthy condition. To be specific, the maximum delay is 150ms and the packet loss rate 
is 0.1, as shown in Figure 6.5.  
As shown in Figure 6.6, the system states converge to close to zero after about eight 
seconds, although the initial states are fairly far from their target values. Figure 6.7 shows 
the comparison of the evolution of the parameter estimation error between a traditional 




Figure 6.5. Delay and packet loss in Scenario B1.  
 
Figure 6.6. Convergence of system states in Scenario B1. 
 
Figure 6.7. Estimation error comparison between the time-driven Q-learning and the 
hybrid event-trigger learning algorithm. 
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It can be observed that the convergence time for the hybrid learning algorithm is 
much faster than the time-driven approach. Therefore, Figure 6.6 and Figure 6.7 confirm 
Theorem 5. 
6.2.2. Scenario B2 (Network under Attack). In this scenario, we suppose the 
network is under attack such that the maximum delay is 250ms and the packet loss rate is 
0.2, as shown in Figure 6.8. As a result, the overall delay exceeds the maximum value that 
the system can tolerate. Therefore, as depicted in Figure 6.9, the physical system becomes 





Figure 6.8. Delay and packet loss in Scenario B2. 
 
Figure 6.9. System becomes unstable in Scenario B2. 
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6.2.3. Scenario B3 (Physical System under Attack). In this scenario, we first 
introduce an actuator attack on the physical system at 
,250a p st T  where the input is 
manipulated from 





Figure 6.10. Attack on the physical system in Scenario B3. 
As a result, the magnitude of the states increases after the launch of the attack and 





Figure 6.11. Actuator attack detection for the physical system. 



































Next, a sensor attack is introduced where the measured state is manipulated from 
,p kx  to , ,p k p kx x  with  , 20 20
T
p kx  , as shown in Figure 6.10.  Figure 6.12 shows the 
detection results, where it can be seen that right after the attack is launched, the magnitude 
of the states exceeds the threshold. Therefore, the attack can be detected, which verifies the 





Figure 6.12. Actuator attack detection for the physical system. 















7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
Many cyber-attacks on the networked control systems target at the availability 
rather than the secrecy of the data. For such attacks, even the most complicated encryption 
algorithm cannot defend them. To address this issue, in this paper, we proposes a novel 
cyber-attack detection scheme that is capable of capturing the vulnerable communication 
links, which is challenging because the system dynamics are unknown. The detection of 
the attacks is faster than the traditional approach where one has to wait for the physical 
states to be deteriorated. The proposed detection scheme for the physical system is able to 
detect both sensor and actuator attacks. Moreover, the knowledge of the maximum delays 
and packet losses that the system can tolerate helps the operator protect the plant from 
further damages based on the ongoing network condition.  The limitation of proposed 
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V. ATTACK DETECTION AND APPROXIMATION IN NONLINEAR 
NETWORKED CONTROL SYSTEMS USING NEURAL NETWORKS 
Haifeng Niu and S. Jagannathan 
In networked control systems, the communication links, sensors and actuators are 
vulnerable to a variety of potential malicious attacks. Certain class of attacks on the 
communication network is known to raise traffic flows causing delays and packet losses to 
increase. In this paper, we propose a novel attack detection and estimation scheme that is 
capable of capturing the abnormal traffic flow as a result of a class of attacks on the 
communication links within the feedback loop of a control system. The network flow at 
the bottleneck node is modeled as a nonlinear system with unknown dynamics. By using 
an observer, network attack detection residual is generated which in turn is utilized to 
determine the onset of an attack in the communication network when the residual exceeds 
a predefined threshold. For the physical system, we develop an attack detection scheme by 
using an optimal or approximate dynamic programming-based event-triggered controller 
in the presence of network delays and packet losses. Moreover, attacks on the sensor or 
actuators of the physical system can be detected and further estimated with the proposed 





Networked Control Systems (NCS) are feedback systems with control loops closed 
by using a communication network [1]. In NCS, the digital controllers receive measured 
data from sensors and transmit control commands to the actuators through a 
communication network. This communication network is vulnerable to adversaries due to 
two reasons [2]: 1) the components are resource-constrained and low-cost embedded 
devices and it is difficult to deploy advanced security algorithms; and 2) in a few 
applications such as smart grid, the networks are distributed geographically.  
The defense methodology, therefore, for NCS has received significant attention. A 
vast literature focusing on the development of light-weight encryption methods was 
summarized in [3][4]. However, unlike the traditional information technology (IT) 
systems, the protection of data confidentiality and integrity alone is far from enough in 
NCS because the physical system can be affected by the network attacks through the 
feedback actuation. One example is that the network delay induced by jamming attacks 
could lead to control system performance degradation which may potentially lead to 
instability [5].  
Besides encryption methods, there is also significant effort aiming at protecting the 
information security of the networks, but from a different perspective [6-8].  For instance, 
in [1], the denial of service (DoS) flooding attacks by a continuous-time Markov chain to 
compute security measures is introduced using state space approach. The authors in [7] 
study the cyber defense by modeling the actions of the attacker and the defender as a 
stochastic zero-sum game. A similar game-theoretic approach has been adopted in [8] 
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where the authors generate expected probabilities of the attacks and build a transition 
model to access the network security.  
In [3-8], the communication network security is considered whereas others [9-12] 
concentrate on the detection of state abnormality in the physical system due to attacks on 
the network, sensor and actuator devices. For instance, the authors in [9] study attacks on 
control system components compromising of measurement and actuator data integrity and 
availability, and model their effect on the physical system dynamics.  In [10], the state of 
the physical system under false data injection attack is represented with an additive term. 
In [11], the estimation and control of linear systems when sensors or actuators are corrupted 
by an attack is provided, together with a secure local control loop that can improve the 
resilience of the system. The authors in [12] analyze the stealthy attacks and propose 
methods to approximate the reachable set of states for such stealthy adversaries.  
However, these research efforts [9-12] assume the system dynamics to be linear 
and known whereas in real application they may become uncertain under network 
conditions [5]. Although this issue has been addressed in [5][13] with Q-learning and zero-
sum game theoretic formulation, there is another major concern that has not been covered 
yet. To be specific, the communications networks are probably already compromised when 
a significant deviation is observed in the physical system state vector. For this reason, it is 
crucial to monitor not only the state vector of the physical system, but also the condition in 
the communication links. Therefore, in this paper, we propose a detection scheme that is 
capable of capturing the abnormal traffic flow in the communication links for certain class 
of cyber-attacks.  
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Flow control has been studied in the literature [2][20-22]. For example, authors in 
[20] use a Kalman state estimator in discrete-time for reactive flow control in networks that 
do not reserve bandwidth. An optimal rate-based flow controllers is derived in [21] by 
using the decentralized Linear Quadratic Gaussian theory. The authors in [22] proposed a 
distributed algorithm using a feedback-based flow control mechanism which converges to 
the generalized max-min rate allocation.  
However, to the best of our knowledge, minimal effort has been spent on studying 
the flow control from the perspective of network security when the network is attacked by 
injecting traffic flow. In particular, the authors in [2] present a control-theoretic framework 
for modeling and analyzing defense against the jamming attacks on cyber-physical 
systems. However, the assumption that the system representation is linear and known in 
[2][20][21], which may not be realistic since physical systems are invariably nonlinear.  
In this paper, we begin by introducing the nonlinear representation of the traffic 
flow under cyber-attacks for the communication network. Next, we derive the neural 
network (NN)-based controller that stabilizes the flow within a desired level during healthy 
conditions and without attacks. By using an adaptive observer, network attack detection 
residual is generated which in turn is utilized to determine the onset of an attack in the 
communication network when the residual exceeds a predefined threshold. Then we give 
the detectability condition which is a mathematical inequality that determines whether an 
attack is detectable or not.  
Next, the performance of the attack detection scheme is discussed. Upon detecting 
attacks, a novel observer is proposed in order to estimate the flow that has been injected by 
the malicious attacker. For the physical system, we introduce an event-triggered control 
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scheme in the presence of network delays and packet losses resulting of network attacks. 
Moreover, attacks on the sensor or actuator of the physical system can be detected and 
further estimated with the proposed attack detection scheme. 
The contributions of the paper include: 1) the development of novel observer-based 
network attack detection and estimation scheme along with detectability condition for 
nonlinear NCS with unknown system dynamics; 2) demonstration of the proposed scheme 
in the presence of a class of attacks with specific adversary models; 3) development of 
event-triggered controller in the presence of network delays and packet losses and physical 
attacks on the sensor and the actuator; and 4) the development of the attack detection and 
estimation for attacks on the physical system.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the 
nonlinear flow model under cyber-attacks, followed by the observer and controller design. 
The observer-based network attack detection and estimation scheme along with 
detectability condition for the networks is presented in Section 3. The event-trigger control 
scheme, the attack detection and estimation for the physical system are presented in Section 
4. The simulation results and analysis are given in Section 5 and conclusions in Section 6. 
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2. CONTROLLER AND OBSERVER DESIGN FOR THE NONLINEAR FLOW 
MODEL 
2.1. NONLINEAR FLOW MODEL 
In this section, first the communication network in a NCS is modeled and a 
nonlinear flow controller is designed.  Figure 2.1 shows the block diagram of a NCS, where 
both the controller commands and the sensor data are transmitted through a wired or 
wireless communication link. In this section, we propose a nonlinear model in discrete-
time for the traffic flow at the bottleneck link in the presence of attacks. It is verified both 
theoretically and experimentally [23] that the performance measures such as the delay and 
transmission rate are determined by the bottleneck node and therefore a mild assumption 
that is widely reported in the literature [24][25] is asserted.  
The buffer length at the bottleneck node can be described by the following 
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,  (1) 
where kx , ku , kd ,
n
kw   is the buffer length, input rate, disturbances, and attacker input at 
the bottleneck node at instant time k , respectively, T  being the sampling interval, and 
nonlinear function  f   represents the uncertain actual traffic accumulation and is a 
function of buffer length and service capacity. ky is the system output where 1,ky and 2,ky
stands for the delay and packet loss, respectively. The relationship between the delay 










Figure 2.1. Diagram of a typical NCS. 
Let the desired buffer length at instant time k be ,d kx  and define the tracking error 
of the buffer length as 
 ,k k d ke x x  .  (2) 
The objective is to derive the appropriate input flow rate ku  such that the difference 
between the desired and actual buffer length can be minimized. Substituting the system 
dynamics (2) into (1), we have the tracking error dynamics 
  1 , 1k k k k k d ke f x Tu d w x      .  (3) 
Since the nonlinear function  f   is unknown, a one-layer neural network (NN) 
will be utilized to estimate  f  . Let 
    Tk k kf x x    ,  (4) 
where T is a vector of constant weights bounded by M   and    is the activation 
function bounded by   M   . k  is the NN functional construction error vector. Define 
the output of the NN as 
  
208 
    ˆ ˆTk k kf x x  .  (5) 
Now define the input ku as 
   , 1ˆ /k k d k ku f x x Ke T    ,  (6) 
where K  is a diagonal feedback gain matrix. Substituting (6) back into (3) yields the 
closed-loop tracking error dynamics 
  1
T
k k k k k k ke Ke x d w        , (7)  
where ˆT T Tk k     is the parameter error during the estimation. From (7) it can be seen that 
the tracking error in the buffer length is driven by the modeling parameter error as well as 
the disturbances and the attacker input.  
Assumption 1: (1) The desired buffer length  is bounded [26]. (2) The NN 
reconstruction error is bounded by , a known constant. [26]. (3) The disturbance and 
the attack flow are bounded by known constants and  respectively. (4)Next, a 
controller design that stabilizes the buffer length to the desired level is revisited [26]. After 
that, we will present the proposed observer and show that the estimation error of the buffer 
length and the modeling parameter error converge to a small subset. 
It has been reported in the literature [27] that the network state can be easily 
measured when the servers at the output queues are Rate Allocating Servers and the 
transport protocol supports the Packet-Pair probing technique. Therefore, in this paper, the 
network state described by input rate and the current buffer length in the link are considered 
accessible.  Next, a nonlinear NN controller design that stabilizes the buffer length to the 






that the estimation error of the buffer length and the modeling parameter error converge to 
a small subset in the absence of attack input first and with attack input. 
2.2. CONTROLLER DESIGN 
First the following definition and Theorem 1 are needed before presenting the 
observer. 
Definition 1: Consider the following nonlinear system 
  1 ,k k kx f x u    (8) 
where kx  and ku is the state vector and input vector, respectively. The solution is said to be 
uniformly ultimately bounded (UUB) if for all 0 0kx x  , there exist a 
 and an
 0,N x
 such that kx  for all 0k k N  .   
Theorem 1 [26]: Consider the flow model at the bottleneck node described by (1). 
Select the flow input rate (6) with the parameter update law provided by 
      1 1ˆ ˆ ˆ
T T
k k k k k k kx e I x x           , (9)  
where 0   is a design parameter. Then the tracking error of the buffer length ke , and the 
















 , (10) 
where MK  is the maximum singular value of the gain matrix K and  is given by 
 
























Next the observer is introduced to generate the estimated buffer length even though 
it is measured. The purpose of the observer is to generate the attack detection residual. 
2.3. OBSERVER DESIGN 
Let ˆkx be the estimated buffer length and the observer is described as 
    1 ˆˆ ˆ
T
k k k k k kx x Tu L x x      ,  (12) 
where L  is the observer feedback gain matrix. Define the estimation error as ˆ .k k kx x x   
Combing (12) and (1) yields the estimation error dynamics 
  1
T
k k k k k k kx Lx x d w        .  (13) 
Theorem 2: Consider the flow model at the bottleneck node described by (1) and 
the observer described by (12). Select the flow input rate (6) with the parameter update law 
provided by 
      1 1ˆ ˆ ˆ
T T
k k k k k k kx x I x x           . (14)  
Then the estimation error of the buffer length, kx , and the modeling parameter error,
















 , (15) 
where ML  is the maximum singular value of the gain matrix L  and  is given by (11).  
Proof: The proof is similar to that of Theorem 1 and is briefly presented below. 
Select the Lyapunov function as 
 1 2kV V V  , where 1
T




Then substituting the tracking error dynamics (7) into 1V  yields the difference 
      
   
1 1 1
1, 1,
1, 1,2 2 2
T T
k k k k
T T T T T
k k k k k k k k
T T T T T
k k k k k k k k
V x x x x
x L L I x x x
x L x x L x
     
     
   
   
  
, (17)  
where 1,k k k kd w    . Substituting the modeling parameter error update law (9) into 2V  
yields the first difference 
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 
  (18) 
where    2,
T
k k kI x x    .  
Combining (17) and (18) and completing the squares for k , one obtains 
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M k M M k
T
k k k k k k k M
k k M
V L x L x
x Kx
   
      
   


     
     
  
     
  
,  (19) 
where 
    
1
2 2 2
1 1 1 1M M M   

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       
 
       
, 
   3, 1
T
k k kx x    , and M M M Md w    . 
Therefore we have 0V  as long as (10) and  

















 .  Similarly, combining (17) and (18) and 
completing the squares for kx , one obtains 
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
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   
 
    
           
  
. 
Then we have 0V  as long as (10) and the following condition for k hold 
 









          

  
 . (22) 
Therefore, V becomes less than zero once the estimation error exceeds the 
threshold in (20) or the parameter error exceeds the threshold in (22). That means that the 
estimation error of the buffer length and the modeling parameter error converge to a small 
subset with the proposed update law (14).   
2.4. ATTACK DETECTION AND ESTIMATION 
In the previous section, we have shown that the estimation error of the buffer length 
and the modeling parameter error converge to a small compact subset. Based on the results, 
the attack detectability condition is derived. Upon the detection of the attacks, another NN 
is deployed in order to estimate the flow injected by the attacker. It is shown that the 
modeling parameter error of the attack flow also converges to a small compact subset. 
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Theorem 3 (Attack Detectability Condition): Consider the flow model at the 
bottleneck node described by (1) and the observer described by (12). Attacks can be 
detected if the injected (dropped) flow kw  satisfies 
   
1 11 1
10 0
k kk i k i T
k k k k ki i
K w K x d  
    
 
       . (23) 
Proof: The solution of the error dynamics (13) is given by 
   
1 1
0
k k i T
k k k k k ki
x K x d w  
  

    .  (24) 
If (23) is satisfied, by triangle inequality we have 
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 
    
 
   
       
 
 
   . (25) 
Remark 1: The detectability condition proposed in Theorem 3 is a theoretical 
condition under which class of attack flows can be detected. However, this is not the way 
how the attack is detected in practice. Instead, the network detection residual is constantly 
monitored and the attack is detected once the residual exceeds the bound given by (20) due 
to attack input and as shown in the first part of Theorem 4.  
Upon detecting the attack given in terms of bounded traffic flow input, this theorem 
also shows that the buffer flow estimation error and parameter estimation error are 
bounded. 
Theorem 4 (Attack Estimation): Consider the flow model at the bottleneck node 
described by (1) and the observer described by (12). Assume that the attack flow can be 
modeled as  , ,
T
k w k w k w kw x     where ,w k ,  w  and ,w k  is the weight vector, activation 
function and the modeling error of the attack flow respectively.  Then attacks can be 
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detected when the network detection residual exceeds a predefined threshold given by (20). 
Upon detecting the attack, apply the following observer given by  
      1 ,ˆ ˆˆ ˆ
T T
k k k k w k k w k w kx x Tu L x x x         ,  (26) 
where wL is the feedback gain matrix. ˆk  is the estimation of the weights vector for the 
unknown nonlinear function f  which is updated by 
      1 1 1 1 1ˆ ˆ ˆ
T T
k k k k k k kx x I x x              . (27) 
Similarly, ,ˆw k is the estimation of the weights vector for the attack flow and it is 
tuned using 
      , 1 , 2 1 2 2 ,ˆ ˆ ˆ
T T
w k w k w k k w k w k w kx x I x x              (28) 
Then the estimation error of the buffer length kx , the modeling parameter error k , 
and the modeling parameter error of the attack flow ,w k  are UUB, if the following 
conditions are satisfied: 
     2 210 min ,
12
k w kx x     , (29) 
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, (32)  
where  , 1 , 2 , 1 , and 2 are design parameters.   
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Proof: Select the Lyapunov function as 
 1 2 3kV V V V   , (33)  
where  1 Tk kV tr x x ,  2 Tk kV tr   , and  3 , ,Tw k w kV tr   . Substituting (26) into (1) yields 
the state estimation error dynamics 
    1 , 4,
T T
k w k k k w k w k kx L x x x         ,  (34) 
where 4, ,k k k w kd     
Applying the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we have 
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     
   
     
 (35)  
where ,w ML is the maximum eigenvalue of the gain matrix wL .  
Combining the update law (27) and the state estimation error dynamics (26) yields  
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 
  (36) 
Applying the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality yields 
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      
   
,  (37) 
where    1 1 11
T
k kI x x      . 
Similarly, we have 
 
     
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w k w k w M w k k w k k k
T T
w k k w k w k w M
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   
  (38) 
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where    2 2 21
T
w k w kI x x      .Combining (35), (37) and (38), one obtains 
 
   
      
     
1 2 3
22 22 2 2 2 2
, , 1 , 2
22 2 22 2
1 2
2 22 22 2
2 1 ,
4 5 5
1 4 5 5
1 4 5 5
w M w M k w M w k k
k w k k k
w k k w k w k
V V V V
L L x L x x
x x x
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 
, (39)  
where 
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 . 
If inequality (32) is satisfied, then the first term in (39) is negative. If inequalities 
(29) through (31) are satisfied, we have 
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  (40) 
Then the second and the third terms in (39) are also negative. Furthermore, since
 kx ,  w kx , 4,k , 1  and 2 are all bounded, the last term in  (39),  , is also bounded, i.e., 
M   .  Thus, we have 0V   in a compact set as long as inequalities (29) though (32) 
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. (41)  
Therefore, the modeling parameter error k , and the modeling parameter error of 
the attack flow ,w k  are UUB. 
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3. ATTACK DETECTION FOR PHYSICAL SYSTEMS 
In this section, we first revisit a stochastic event-triggered optimal control scheme 
[29] for a class of nonlinear systems in the presence network-induced delays and packet 
losses. An event triggered control scheme is proven to reduce network traffic which might 
help to mitigate congestion in the presence of attacks in the event that attacks increase 
traffic flow. Next, since a large delay could lead to the instability of the system, the 
maximum overall delay that the physical system can tolerate is derived. At last, we present 
the proposed a detection scheme for attacks on the physical system. 
3.1. PHYSICAL SYSTEM DYNAMICS 
Consider the stochastic nonlinear continuous-time system described by  
 ( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ( )) ( ( )) ( ( ))p p p p p p px t f x t t g x t u t t w x t     ,  (42) 
where ( ) npx t  , ( )
m
pu t  , and ( ( ))
n
p pw x t    is the system state, controller input, and 
attack input vector, respectively. The subscript “ p ” standing for “physical system” is 
utilized to differentiate the variable used to denote the network. The nonlinear functions 
( ( )) npf x t   and ( ( ))
n m
pg x t
  are considered as unknown with (0) 0pf   and 0x   being 
the unique equilibrium point.  In particular, the notation ( )t stands for the network-induced 
sensor-to-controller delay and ( ) n nt  is the packet loss indicator which equals to the 
identity matrix when the packet is received and the null matrix when the packet is lost.  
Remark 2: The term ( ( ))p pw x t is used to characterize the change in system states 
caused by attacks on the sensors or actuators. Attacks on the physical systems can be 
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detected if ( ( ))p pw x t  satisfies certain condition. This will be discussed later in Section 3.3 
after the healthy case, i.e., ( ( )) 0p pw x t  . 
Assumption 2: Let assumptions (1-7) presented in [29] hold.  
Let the augmented state be defined as 
, , 1 ,
[ ]T T T T n dmk p k p k p k dz x u u

 
  and 
discretizing system (42) within the sampling period  , 1s skT k T    yields the simplified 
system dynamics 
  1 ,( ) ( )k k k p k p kz F z G z u W z    , (43)  
where ( ) dm nkF z




  are the discretized system dynamics defined in [16] 
and   dm np kW z
 is the discretized attack input function matrix.  
The event-triggered control (ETC) from [29] is adopted in this paper due to benefits 
mentioned before. As illustrated in Figure 3.1, an NN-based adaptive model is utilized to 

















Figure 3.1. Structure of MBETC with attacks on the controller and sensor. 
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The sensor data will be sent to the controller only when the trigger condition is 
violated. Let 
kx be the state vector held at the controller, which is given by 
 , ik p kx x , for 1i ik k k   , (44) 





being the subsequence of sampling instants k . 
Then the augmented event sampled state vector becomes
ik k
z z with , 1 ,[ ]
T T T T
k k p k p k d
z x u u 
and , , 1 ,[ ]i i i i
T T T T
k p k p k p k d
z x u u  . The error between kz  and kz  can be expressed as 
 ,ET k k k
e z z 
,  (45) 
where
,ET ke  is referred to as event sampling error. Let the infinite horizon stochastic value 
function in terms of the augmented state vector be given by 
  , ,
,
T T
k j z j p j z p jj k




  , 0,1,2,...k   , (46) 
where 
zQ  and zR  are positive definite (PD) penalty matrices. However, the optimal control 
input is usually difficult to obtain because: 1) it is very challenging to solve discrete time 
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation; 2) the nonlinear matrix function  kG z  is 
unknown. Therefore, an NN-based solution [29] is adopted. 
3.2. STOCHASTIC ETC DESIGN 
The dynamics of system (43) can be written as 
  1 , ,
,
[ ( ) ( )][1 ] { ( ) ( , )},T T Tk k k k p k I I k k e I k ET kz F z G z u W z E z u z e
 
         (47) 
where ( 1) ( )[ ] Im l dm nT T TI F G  
    is the constant target NN weights vector with F and G
being the targets for the respective functions F  and G . The activation function are selected 
as  ( ) ( ) ( )I k F k G kz diag z z    and ( ) I
l
F kz  , ( )
Iml m
G kz
 with Il  being the number of 
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neurons. The vector ,[1 ]
T T
k p ku u  is the augmented control input and 
, , , ,( , ) [ ( ) ( )] ( )
T
e I k ET k I I k ET k I k k I k ET kz e z e z u z e          p kW z  is the event sampled 
reconstruction error where ,( )I k ET k I kz e u    with [ ( ) ( )]I F k G kz z    being the NN 
reconstruction error. 
Let the event-based identifier dynamics be defined as 
 1 ,
,
ˆ ˆˆˆ ( ) ( ) { ( ) }Tk k k p k I I k kz F z G z u E z u
 
     , (48)  
with ˆI  being the NN weights of the identifier. Let the estimation error of the identifier be 
, ,
ˆ{ } { }k k kE z E z z
   











I k I k k I I k I k k
k
I k p k k
z u z z u
E z E
z W z   
    


   
  
   
  (49) 





1 1 1 1
( )ˆ ˆ{ }
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T
k I I k k I k
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I k k I k k
z u z
E E










, (50)  
with 0I   being the learning rate and k  being the event-trigger indicator which equals to 
one if the event is triggered and zero otherwise.  
Similar to the previous subsection, define the critic NN estimation of the value 
function and the weights update law as 
 ,
,
ˆˆ { ( )}Tk V k V kV E z
 
  , (51)  
 
 






k V V k V k
V kV k T
V k V k
z e
E E







    
, (52)  
where 0V   is the learning rate and      1V k V k V kz z z    . The estimated optimal 





ˆ{ ( )}Tk u k u ku E z
 






( )ˆ ˆ{ }
( ) ( ) 1
T
k u u k u k
u k u k T
u k u k
z e
E E











where 0u   is the learning rate. The event-trigger condition design is critical because on 
one hand, excessive triggering clearly deviates from the original intention of reducing the 
data transmission. On the other hand, insufficient triggering will result in a regulation error, 
thus degrading the performance and even leading to the instability of the system. Here, the 




{ } { }ET k kET k p
E e E zD
   




, ,, , ,
ˆ ˆ{ } { }12
u I
u k I kET k M
E EG C C    
     with, 0 1   , 2 (1 2 )p p    , 0 1/ 2p   and MG  is 
the upper bound of the matrix function ( )kG z . The function  D   is the dead zone operator 
defined as   0D x  when
,
{ }k zE z B
 
  and  D x x  otherwise with zB being the UB of the 
system state. Now the boundedness of the system under healthy case when there are no 
attacks on the network and physical system are shown. 
Theorem 5 [29]: Consider the system (43) with the event-trigger condition (45), 
NN identifier (48) with the weight update law (50), the critic NN (38) with the weights 
update law (52), and the actor NN (53) with the weights update law (54). Assume that there 
is no attack on the network and/or the physical system. Then there exist three constants
1

















 are ultimately bounded in the mean for all 
0ik k N  . Further, the estimated 
optimal value function and control input converge close to their respective optimal values. 
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In the above analysis, we consider the case where the communication network is in 
healthy condition, i.e., the delays and packet losses are bounded by a small value. However, 
the delays and packet losses increase in the presence of attacks on the network and lead to 
instability of the physical system. Therefore, it is of interest to determine the maximum 
delays and packet losses that the physical system can tolerate. 
Let ,, p kk k     be the interval during which there is no sensor data received at the 
controller. Then the value of ,p k depends on the following three factors: the event-trigger 
error, network-induced delays and packet losses. This can be explained with the following 
simplified example.  Suppose the event is triggered at 0k   and the controller received the 
event with no delay. The next event is triggered at 3k   however the packet containing this 
event is lost. Then the event will be triggered again at 4k  since the control input has not 
been changed and the trigger error keeps increasing. Suppose that the network-induced 
delay is 2 sT  , then the time that the controller receives the event will be 6k  . Therefore, 
in this case we have , 6p k sT  . The following theorem gives the maximum timespan ,p k  that 
the physical system can tolerate. 
Theorem 6:  Consider the nonlinear discrete-time system (43) without physical 
attacks i.e.  p kW z  0 . Assume the communication network is under attack such that the 
timespan ,p k  is always greater than m . Then the physical system becomes unstable if m
satisfies 
    2 2,
, m i i
c
k k k k
r E z z E HZ B   






ˆ ˆ{ } { }6 / 2
u I
T
u k I kM
E Er G C C    





, , ,, , , ,, , , ,
{ } { } { }6 (1 2) ( )
I
c
u k I k u kM u M I M I M u Mk
E E EB G C      
         
2
, , , ,(1 2)( ) ,II M I M u M u MC      (1 2 )H I  , and    2 2
T




Proof: Let the last event triggered time be ik . Then if the timespan ,p k  is always 
greater than
m , there will be no NN weights updates nor control updates during the interval 
 ,i i mk k  . Select the Lyapunov function as    ,,
{ }{ }T kk k k
E zV z E z z
  
  . By substituting the 
system dynamics (47) and the estimation error dynamics (49) into the Lyapunov function 






{ } cET kk k k
E eV z r HZ B
 
    , (57) 
Therefore if the event is not triggered for enough long time, the trigger error ,ET ke
will keep increasing and become the dominant one in (57) and thus  kV z . If (56) is 








ET k k k k kk k
E er HZ B r E z z HZ B     
        
Hence the stability of the physical system cannot be guaranteed if ,p k m  always 
holds.  
3.3. PHYSICAL ATTACK DETECTION 
In this section, we introduce the attack detection scheme on the physical system. 
The idea is to monitor the state estimation error of the physical system, which is the 
difference between the measured and the estimated physical system state generated by the 
identifier. Since it is shown in Theorem 5 that the expected estimation error is UB under 
healthy condition, it will exceed the bound in the presence of an attack and thus the attack 
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can be detected. Similar to Theorem 3, the following theorem gives the detectability 
condition for attacks on the physical system.  
Theorem 7: Consider the nonlinear discrete-time system (43). Let the identifier be 
defined as (48) with the NN weights update law shown in (50). Then attacks on the physical 
system can be detected at if ,p kW satisfies 
    2, ,
,
ˆ( ) [ ( ) ( )] ( )T T cI k I k k I I k I k k I k p k z kE z u z z u z W z B
 
          ,  (58) 
Proof: Let the Lyapunov function be defined as 
   ,,
{ }{ }T kk k k
E zV z E z z
  
  . (59) 
Substitute the system dynamics (47) and the estimation error dynamics (49) into (59) and 





{ } { }(1 2 )(1 ) 6 .ck kk I M M u Mk
E z E zV z B G
   
             (60) 




{ } ck z k
E z B
 
 .  (61) 
As a result, the estimation error in the absence of attacks is bounded by 2,
c
z kB . If (58) is 
satisfied, we have 
   2, ,
, ,
ˆ( ) [ ( ) ( )] ( ) { }
a
T T c
I k I k k I I k I k k I k p k k z kE z u z z u z W z E z B
   
           . 
Therefore the expected estimation error exceeds the bound and thus the attack can 
be detected.  
Next, upon detecting the attack on the physical systems, it is of interest to estimate 
the attacker input  p kW z . In order to do this, we rewrite the system dynamics (47) as 
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  1 , , ,
,
( ) ( ) 1 1 { ( ) ( , )},
T
T T
k k p k k k Iw I k w k e Iw k ET kz F z W z G z u E z u z e
 
             (62) 
where TT T T
Iw F W G      
is the constant target NN parameter vector and , 1 1
T
T
w k ku u   
is the augmented control input vector. The event sampled reconstruction error , ,( , )e Iw k ET kz e
is then given by 
  , , , , ,( , ) ( ) ( ) ( ),
T
e Iw k ET k Iw I k ET k I k w k Iw k ET kz e z e z u z e           (63) 
, ,( )Iw k ET k Iw w kz e u    with  ( ) ( ) ( )Iw F k W k G kz z z     being the NN reconstruction error 
vector. 
Accordingly, an NN-based approximator is added to (48) such that the dynamics of 
the identifier becomes 
 1 , ,
,
ˆ ˆˆ ˆˆ ( ) ( ) ( ) { ( ) }Tk k k k p k Iw I k w kz F z W z G z u E z u
 
      ,  (64) 
where ˆIw  being the NN weights of the identifier. Then the error dynamics of the identifier 
can be computed as 
  1 , , ,
, ,
ˆ{ } ( ) [ ( ) ( )] ( ) .T Tk Iw k I k w k Iw I k I k w k Iw kE z E z u z z u z
   
            (65) 
The following theorem shows that the expected value of the estimation error of the 
bounded attacker input  p kW z  is UB. 
Theorem 8: Consider the nonlinear discrete-time system (43) in the presence of the 
attack. Assume the attack is launched after the convergence of identifier (48) and is 
bounded by   ,p k p MW z W . Suppose the vector , ,Iw k w ku satisfies the PE condition [29]. Then 
an attack can be detected when (61) is satisfied. Upon detecting the attack, apply the 
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z u z
E E










, (66)  
where 0 1 2Iw  is the learning rate. Then, for a positive integer wN the identifier NN 




 is UB in the mean for all 
0i wk k N  . 
Proof: Select the Lyapunov function  , ,, , { }
T
Iw k Iw kIw k
EL tr
 
  . For the case of event 
sampled instants, we have 









( ( ) ) ( ( ) ) 1
T
Iw I k w k I k
Iw kIw k T
I k w k I k w k
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.  (67) 
with  
 1 , , ,( )
T
k wI k I k w k wI kz z u     .  (68) 
Substituting (67) into the Lyapunov function and computing the first difference 
yields 
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   
         
   
       
  (69) 
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   
  
is satisfied due to the PE condition [29].  
Therefore, we have 





{ } (1 2 ) (1 2 ) wIwI k wI wI M I m wI ubE B

 







 is bounded at the event sampled instants. Now consider the 
case of the intervals between the event instants. Since the weights are not updated during 
the event instants, we have 
    , 1 , 1 , ,, , ,{ } { } 0
T T
wI k wI k wI k wI kI k
E EL tr tr
   
        . (72)   
Therefore, we have , 1 ,
, ,
{ } { }
i iwI k wI k
E E
   
   held for both cases. As a result, there exists 
a positive integer wN such that for all 0i wk k N  we have ,
,
{ } wIwI k ubE B

 
  . Therefore, the 




 is UB in the mean. 
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4. SIMULATION RESULTS 
In order to show the effectiveness of the proposed attack detection scheme, 
simulations are performed in MATLAB with the following parameters for the 
communication network: sampling period 1msT  , total simulation time 200sT T . Without 
the loss of generosity, let the desired number of packets in the bottleneck node be
 , 200 100sin / 25d kx k  , the unknown nonlinear function be  k kf x x , and the maximum 
modeling error or disturbance be 5Md  .  Past three values are used as the input to the one-
layer NN as a tradeoff between approximation and computation. The logsig activation 
function is selected and all NN weights are initialized to zero.  
In order to make the inequalities in (10) and (15) hold, the feedback gain K is 
selected as 0.05 and the coefficient of the adaptive term   is selected as 0.5. The initial 
adaptation gain  is taken as 0.1 and is updated using the projection algorithm as
    0.5 / 0.1 Tk k kx x    .   
A jamming attack in introduced at 100mst   and it aims at creating traffic congestion 
by placing jammers that consistently inject data into the link. Assuming the attacking 
strength (number of jammers) increases linearly, then the number of packets injected by 
the attacker can be modeled by  0k w k k   where w is the attacking strength and 0k is 
the attack launch time. In the simulation, we choose 20w  and 0 100.k   
4.1. NETWORK SIMULATION 
Figure 4.1 shows the actual and desired number of packets in the bottleneck node. 
Before the attack is launched, the actual number of packets fluctuates around the desired 
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value. Moreover, as shown in Figure 4.2, the modeling parameter error becomes very close 





Figure 4.1. Actual and desired number of packets in the bottleneck node. 
Figure 4.3 shows the estimation error and the attacker injected packets, when the 





Figure 4.2. Parameter error for the number of packets before the attack is launched. 
























































Figure 4.3. The estimation error and the attacker injected packets, when the observer 
given in Theorem 2 is applied. 
Before the attack is launched, the estimation error is very close to zero, concluding 
that the estimated state given by the observer in Theorem 2 is fairly accurate. Once the 
attack is launched, the actual number of packets in the bottleneck node starts increasing 
and deviating from the desired value, as shown in Figure 4.1. As a result, the estimation 
error of the flow, plotted in Figure 4.3, exceeds the threshold shortly after the attack is 
launched and thus it can be detected, which proves the correctness of Theorem 3. 
Next, we apply the new observer proposed in Theorem 4 in order to estimate the 
number of packets injected by the attacker. As plotted in Figure 4.4, the estimated number 
of packets injected by the attacker with the new observer converges to the actual value, 
which agrees with the conclusion of Theorem 4. With the estimated attack flow, one can 
estimate the delay and packet losses in the link, which can be further utilized to tune the 

































Figure 4.4. Estimated and actual number of packets injected by the attacker. 
4.2. PHYSICAL SYSTEM 
























  (73) 
The initial states are selected as  2,2
T
 and the NN weights are initialized with 
random numbers in the interval  0,1 with 15 neurons each in the hidden layer. The learning 
rate are selected as 0.24  and 510  .  Based on the dynamics described in (73), we 
choose min 1g   and 0.99  . The sampling period sT  is 0.01 second and the total simulation 





   . The packet losses follow a Bernoulli distribution with the probability of 
dropping packets being 0.1p   . 
 
 

























Estimated attacker injected packets
Actual attacker injected packets
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First we consider the scenario where there are no attacks on either the physical 
system or the networks. As shown in Figure 4.5, the system states converge to close to zero 
after about seven seconds, although the initial states and the NN weights are fairly far from 





Figure 4.5. The convergence of the states when the network is healthy. 
Figure 4.6 shows the evolution of the trigger condition threshold and the state 
estimation error. The state estimation error oscillates between zero and the trigger threshold 
due to the fact that in the event-trigger control scheme, the estimation error is set to zero 
once it becomes equal or greater than the trigger threshold. It can also be observed that 
state estimation error converges to close to zero after about 10 seconds and eventually stops 
satisfying the trigger condition due to the dead zone function. Therefore, Figure 4.5 and 
Figure 4.6 confirm Theorem 5.  





















Figure 4.6. The evolution of trigger threshold and state estimation error. 
Next, in order to verify that ETC scheme help reduce the network packet losses, 
black hole attack is introduced to the network. To be specific, we assume at each sampling 
instant, the attack drops the sensor-to-controller packet with the probability of 0.3.  Figure 
4.7 shows the comparison of the accumulated number of dropped packets between the 
event-triggered and time-driven control systems in the presence of black hole attack on the 
network. It can be observed that for the ETC, the number of dropped packets by the attack 





Figure 4.7. Number of dropped packets with and without ETC. 
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Especially when the event-trigger error is small enough (after 11s in this example) 
and the event is no longer triggered, there will be no data loss at all. Therefore, it is 
confirmed by Figure 4.7 that the ETC scheme reduces the packet losses in the presence of 
attacks.  
At last, the jamming attack is introduced in the network and as a result, the overall 
delay exceeds the maximum value that the system can tolerate. In the simulation, we select 
6m sT   such the inequality (56) holds. Consequently, as shown in Figure 4.8, the system 
states do not converge to the origin, which is consistent with the analysis of Theorem 6.  
Now, we introduce an attack on the physical system provided the network is in the 
normal condition. Assume the attack is launched at 10attt s after the convergence of the 
system states. The attack targets by the modifying the sensor and the state 2x  such that 
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Figure 4.8. The system states when overall delay exceeds the threshold. 























As shown in Figure 4.9, the estimation error increases after the launch of the attack 
and exceeds the detection threshold shortly. As a result, the attack can be detected, which 
verifies the conclusion of Theorem 7.  
After the detection of the attack, the new observer proposed in Theorem 8 is 
applied. As shown in Figure 4.10, the estimated attack magnitude given by the new 
observer converges to the actual attack magnitude about one second after the attack is 





Figure 4.9. Attack detection results for the physical system. 
 
Figure 4.10. Attack estimation of the physical system. 









































5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
The presence of communication links to transmit sensor data and control commands 
has brought in vulnerabilities into NCS. A corrupted communication link can introduce 
large delays and packet losses, which could lead to the instability of the physical system. 
This paper proposes a novel cyber-attack detection scheme that is capable of capturing the 
abnormality in those communication links. The detection of the attacks is faster than the 
traditional approach where one has to wait for the physical states to be deteriorated. To 
reduce the data transmissions, an optimal event-trigger control scheme with the presence 
of network delays and packet losses are revisited. However, the proposed scheme is 
applicable only to those network attacks causing delays and packets losses while revealing 
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2. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
In this dissertation, several novel defense methodologies for CPS have been 
proposed. First, a special type of cyber-physical system, the RFID system, is considered 
for which a lightweight mutual authentication and ownership management protocol is 
proposed in order to protect the data confidentiality and integrity. Then considering the fact 
that the protection of the data confidentiality and integrity is insufficient to guarantee the 
security in CPS, we then propose a general framework for developing security schemes for 
CPS wherein the cyber system states affect the physical system and vice versa. After that, 
we apply this general framework by selecting the traffic flow as the cyber system state 
vector and a novel attack detection scheme that is capable of capturing the abnormal traffic 
flow in the communication links due to a class of attacks. Further, we develop the attack 
detection and estimation scheme for the traffic flow system when the network parameters 
are unknown. Finally, this attack detection scheme has been further extended to the case 
where the network traffic flow is modeled as a nonlinear system with unknown system 
dynamics. Meanwhile, sensor/actuator attack detection schemes are developed for the 
physical system where the system dynamics are uncertain due to the network-induced 
delays and packet losses.  
2.1. CONCLUSIONS 
In the first paper, a new EPC Gen2v2 compatible protocol by using limited 
cryptographic functionality was presented for mutual authentication and ownership 
management.  This was done by employing the ultra-lightweight permutation operation 
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and the PRNG function. Such use of a simple operation adds a minimal level of 
computation and energy consumption while, at the same time, supports the cryptographic 
goals of the protocol. The protocol was examined both from a security point of view as 
well as with a hardware implementation. The analysis indicated that the transactions in the 
protocol do not expose the secret key information nor does the protocol depend on 
previously used secret keys, thus guaranteeing that replay or disclosure attacks are not 
possible. The comparison with previous work shows that the proposed protocol not only 
conforms to the EPC standards, but also satisfies the security requirements. The hardware 
implementation supports our initial goal of adding security to the existing EPC Gen2v2 
based tags such that the system would be secure both in the case of being used by a single 
owner or in the more practical cases of having multiple owners during the lifetime of a 
tagged item.  
Next, in the second paper, we have proposed a representation that captures the 
interrelationship between the cyber and physical systems such that the states in the physical 
system affect the decision made on the cyber systems and vice versa. Based on this 
representation, the optimal defense and attacks are given to gain the greatest payoff. Since 
the proposed representation is in a general form, it can be used in a variety of applications 
including autonomous systems. In particular, the cyber defender is able to make thorough 
decisions by selecting appropriate cyber state vector and output and customizing the payoff 
function that is of interest.  
After that, in the third paper, a novel cyber-attack detection scheme that is capable 
of capturing the abnormality in the communication links is proposed. The detection of the 
attacks is faster than the traditional approach where one has to wait for the physical states 
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to be deteriorated. With the proposed detection scheme, attacks on both the networks and 
the physical plants can be detected. Upon detection, the physical system can be stabilized 
by re-configuring the controller gain. However, the proposed scheme is applicable only to 
those network attacks causing delays and packets losses while revealing limitation to 
sophisticated attacks.  
In the fourth paper, we propose a novel cyber-attack detection scheme that is 
capable of capturing the vulnerable communication links, which is challenging because the 
system dynamics are considered unknown. The proposed detection scheme for the physical 
system is able to detect both sensor and actuator attacks. Moreover, the knowledge of the 
maximum delays and packet losses that the system can tolerate helps the operator protect 
the plant from further damages based on the ongoing network condition.   
Finally, the fifth paper extends the previous work to the case where the network 
flow dynamics are modeled as a nonlinear system with unknown dynamics. The detection 
of the attacks is faster than the traditional approach where one has to wait for the physical 
states to be deteriorated. To reduce the data transmissions, an optimal event-trigger control 
scheme with the presence of network delays and packet losses are revisited. A 
sensor/actuator attack detection scheme is developed where the physical system dynamics 
are uncertain due to the network-induced delays and packet losses. However, the proposed 
scheme is applicable only to those network attacks causing delays and packets losses while 
revealing limitation to sophisticated attacks. 
2.2. FUTURE WORK 
As part of the future work, the proposed general framework in Paper II for the 
security scheme development can be refined by studying the impact of different attacks on 
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the network performance to generate a more accurate model for the cyber system dynamics. 
Furthermore, the adversary model needs not only to be accurate, but also realistic that can 
reflect the behavior of the attacker in the real world rather than the imagined opponent in 
the simulation.  
Moreover, the proposed attack detection schemes proposed in Papers III through V 
are applicable only to those network attacks causing delays and packets losses while 
revealing limitation to sophisticated attacks.  In many occasions, as a matter of fact, the 
adversaries are more intelligent than the defenders. These attackers could learn from the 
past and know how to maximize the damage while protecting them from being detected. 
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